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ABSTRACT 
The twentieth century will go down in history as a century when Africa fulfilled the 
dismal Hobbesian prediction. Africa has become the one continent in the world where 
human life is hardly worth living because of the man-made problems of inequality and 
impoverishment. 
This thesis examines the effect of land consolidation on gender inequality and 
feminized poverty in a particular community in Kenya. This depends on historical 
documentation, comparative statistical evidence and interviews that the author 
conducted in the Siaya District of Kenya as well as in Nairobi. The thesis argues that 
land consolidation turned out to be a policy of dispossession and impoverishment 
imposed and sustained by a particular colonial authority on the people of Siaya. It 
does not accept suggestions that land consolidation was a positive development 
policy. Initially it started as a punitive measure that was imposed by colonial force in 
a state of emergency. The Luo people were not recognised as having their own 
traditional way of land ownership and use, a right and a heritage that had served them 
for centuries. An honest and ethical approach to life that had been inculcated in the 
culture and widely reflected due to lack of policy informed development. The Luo as 
a society sacrificed and lost all their dignity, and their social, human, physical and 
economic resources to colonial and post colonial Kenya. Siaya eventually became the 
most socially underdeveloped and therefore the poorest district in Kenya. 
This thesis is presented at a time when, paradoxically, the international community 
has resolved to eradicate poverty from the face of the earth. Different international 
agencies accept that this is possible. Certainly it will depend on a strong will. There 
are many people in the world who are ready to help others empower themselves, but 
not discriminate against them or dominate them. These are the people who Will 
confront the problem discussed in this thesis. Overall, this thesis contributes to an 
understanding of the reasons why poverty has not been eradicated in Siaya and may 
even have increased. Having witnessed the failure of development policy, humanity 
will be defeated and international citizenship will remain a dream in the next century 
unless strategies to eradicate poverty and gender inequality become more successful. 
ii 
DEDICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
As this century comes to a close, everybody agrees that few have had it worse than the 
poor indigenous rural women of Africa. It is hard to imagine what they have gone 
through in the last century. I can do no more than to dedicate this thesis to all women 
of Africa, and through them to my mother. Nyar Ohola gave all she had for my 
education. Thank you Mama. 
Most special thanks go to Professor Peter Townsend. It took me a decade of working 
with women in Africa and the diaspora and continuously wondering where I could do 
a PhD. I kept wondering and thinking about feminized poverty in Africa and the lack 
of policy action to address it. This was until I knew about the (former) Department of 
Social Policy in the University of Bristol. I have no words, in English, to express my 
heart-felt thanks to Professor Townsend for supervising this thesis. His support and 
encouragement made me feel included and at home in place and through the time. 
I went through this with my wife, Aoko, who was a constant source of encouragement 
and support. To her, and the entire family, some of which had to endure our long 
absence from home; Thank you all. 
The staff of the School for Policy Studies were most supportive. Ben Oakley first met 
me and Aoko in Nairobi, before we came to Bristol. Ben remained a constant source 
of support and encouragement to both of us. Helen, Zaheda and Jaqui were 
particularly helpful all through. I am grateful to them all. 
During our stay in Bristol, we were lucky to meet wonderful people who became real 
family friends and kept us happy. For lack of space, I cannot mention them all, except 
Barbara and Bill Charnock; Kathrin and James. Thank you all. You did everything to 
keep us happy in Bristol. Erokamano maduon'9 ahinya. 
iii 
DECLARATION 
I declare that the work in this thesis is original except where indicated by special reference in the 
text and no part of the thesis has been submitted for any other degree. Any views expressed in 
the thesis are those of the author and in no way represent those of the University of Bristol. The 
thesis has not been presented to any other University in the United Kingdom or overseas. 
9 
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Title page i 
Abstract H 
Dedication and Acknowledgement W 
Declaration iv 
0. Introduction I 
0.1 The Background, Historical and Theoretical Contexts 
of Land Consolidation in Kenya I 
0.2 The Main Disciplinary Aspects of the Debate 9 
0.3 Participants in Managing the Effects of Land Consolidation 
and Gender Differentials in Kenya 19 
0.4 Overview 25 
Land Distribution and the Status of Women 
and Men in Kenya: An Historical Background 27 
1.0 Introduction 27 
1.1 Land and Gender: An Historical and Theoretical Outline 28 
1.2 Origin of Kenya: A Nation or a Colony? 37 
1.3 Settler and Native or Landlord and Tenant? 45 
1.4 The Young Lion becomes Independent or becomes a Market? 51 
1.5 The Nature of British Colonialism in Kenya 66 
1.6 Conclusion 69 
V 
2. Land and Gender in Sub-Saharan Africa: A 
Theoretical and Comparative Analysis 72 
2.0 Introduction 72 
2.1 Understanding Landlessness and Gender Inequality 
in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of Theory 73 
2.2 Gender, Feminism and Theory: Any Relevance 
to Africa? 79 
2.3 Colonialism and Human Equality in Africa 85 
2.4 Development of Underdevelopment: Gender and 
Class Consciousness in Africa 96 
2.5 Which way Africa, Still Dependent? 109 
2.6 Conclusion 115 
3. Land as a Determinant of Differential Status 
of Women and Men in Kenya 119 
3.0 Introduction 119 
3.1 The question of Land and Gender in East Africa 123 
3.2 Problem with Kenya: Dependency or Exclusion 
from Land 143 
3.3 Conclusion 159 
4. Land Consolidation and the Differential Status of Women 
and Men in Siaya District 160 
4.0 Introduction 160 
4.1 A Mission to Develop Siaya District? 161 
4.2 The Role of Siaya District in the Service of 
vi 
Colonialism in Kenya 168 
4.3 Land Reform and Landlessness in Siaya District 174 
4.4 Conflicts over Landlessness in Siaya District 182 
4.5 Education and Women's Empowen-nent in Siaya 189 
4.6 Can the Situation in Siaya be Explained by Theory? 195 
4.7 Conclusion 200 
5. Poverty in the Periphery: Land Consolidation, Gender 
and Landlessness in Siaya District 202 
5.0 Introduction 202 
5.1 Social capital and Landlessness in Siaya 203 
5.2 Understanding Landlessness in Siaya: The Question 
of Land Ownership in Kenya 212 
5.3 The Agrarian Question in Kenya and the Agrarian 
Crisis in Siaya 225 
5.4 The Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Kenya: 
Focus on Siaya 233 
5.5 Conclusion 246 
6. Landlessness and Poverty in Siaya: Time for Action is Now 248 
6.0 Introduction 248 
6.1 Land Policy as Underdevelopment in Kenya 249 
6.2 Landlessness, Gender and Social Policy in Kenya 259 
vii 
6.3 Poverty in Siaya District: Who will do Good? 275 
6.4 Landless-as-Poverty in Siaya: The Time for Action 
is Now 282 
6.5 Conclusion 289 
7. Land Consolidation and the Status of Women and Men in 
Siaya: Summary and Conclusions 292 
7.1 Summary of Main Arguments 292 
7.2 Findings, Conclusions and Contribution to Knowledge 298 
7.3 Recommendations for Action and for Policy 308 
8. Bibliography 311 
9. Appendix 1 333 
10. Appendix 2 339 
11. Appendix 3 343 
12. Appendix 4 348 
viii 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines the effect of land consolidation on the differential status of 
women and men in the Siaya District of Kenya. It has three main objectives. First, to 
show that land consolidation, as a policy action programme, was not intended to 
benefit indigenous people of Kenya. Second, to prove that the prevailing differentials 
in the social status of indigenous women and men in Kenya, with evidence from 
Siaya, resulted from the same policy action programme. Third, to propose a new 
policy programme to deal with the effect of land consolidation for the benefit of 
women and men in Siaya. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section discusses the 
background, historical and theoretical contexts within which land consolidation took 
place in Kenya. The second section puts the thesis in a more disciplined context with 
focus on policy. The third section examines the main participants in this scenario of 
underdevelopment and their role in managing the effects of land consolidation as well 
as prospects for an alternative policy action. 
0.1 THE BACKGROUND, HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL 
CONTEXTS OF LAND CONSOLIDATION IN KENYA 
The main background ideas behind this thesis are presented from an historical 
perspective because social ideas should be placed in their historical context (Seidman 
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1977). It is actually not possible to understand the effect without a clear background 
context on which the policy was decided and acted upon. 
0.1.1 The Background of Land Consolidation in Kenya 
Three main facts about land consolidation in Kenya must be initially clarified. Firstly, 
it was a decision that was unilaterally taken by an authority that had earlier imposed 
its rule on Kenyans without their consent. Secondly, it was initially started at the time 
and place (Kiambu District) for a particular reason which had nothing to do with 
African development. Thirdly, it was later adopted and formalised by way of a plan 
(Swynnerton Plan) to develop African agriculture despite the hidden fact that it was a 
punitive and underdevelopment plan. Land consolidation was therefore a policy that 
was simultaneously destructive to the African in political, strategic and socio- 
economic ways. 
The problem is that these three features are still valid in Kenya. Politically, it was land 
consolidation that put emphasis on a district as a unit of underdevelopment in Kenya. 
That emphasis still persists in Kenya. Strategically, the landlessness in which the 
freedom fighters found themselves also applied to other parts of Kenya. Some Kenyan 
freedom fighters and their families are landless. Further, this strategic element was 
also gendered. While the women of the freedom fighters became directly landless 
because their land was grabbed by the settlers, the women of other rural parts of 
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Kenya became landless because they were disinherited during consolidation. Where 
was the intention to develop African agriculture? 
0.1.2 Historical and Theoretical Aspects of Land Consolidation in Kenya 
The issue of land in Africa can become clearer if explained in the context of 
motherland. We all know that one person can only claim one belonging or one 
motherland. Double motherland is naturally not possible. A place called 'motherland' 
is where one has a stake and where one naturally belongs. It is the root of a person's 
existence. A place where one has the right to defend his/her freedom and way of life 
and die for the sake of defending her/his own existence. The concept of motherland 
therefore starts from the individual's station in life, in the family, locality, society, up 
to the country and not beyond. The Kikuyu of Kenya, for example, consider the earth 
as the 'mother' of the tribe; for the reason that she bears her burden for about eight to 
nine moons while the child is in her womb, and then for a short period of suckling. It 
is the soil that feeds the child through life time; and again after death it is the soil that 
nurses the spirits of the dead for eternity (Kenyatta, 1961) 
The struggle by Africans against European interference in their motherland has 
continued since the Europeans first stepped on African soil. Africans are still 
struggling with two questions: Why did European settlement in Africa become a 
problem for Africans? What did Europeans want in Africa? It could be obvious but 
worth reiterating that the most difficult person to live with is a settler. A settler, in 
this case, is a person who leaves his/her motherland and moves or migrates to another 
place with the intention of staying there for ever. The intention of the settler may or 
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may not be known to the native or host. Furthermore, a settler may be an invited 
immigrant or may just turn up. 
The problem with all settlers is that whenever they come into other people's home, a 
kind of struggle starts immediately, depending on the reason for the immigrant 
coming into the community. A settler could come a slave, prisoner of war, refugee or 
just turn up. This person is always considered an outsider, or exogenous variable in 
the community into which s/he has migrated. 
Since Europeans were settlers in Africa, what did they want? Furthermore, the 
European settler was more equipped for any eventuality. S/he also came with two 
weapons of colonialism hitherto unknown to Africans, Christianity and the gun. The 
first weapon was secret, and the second one was physical. Africans did not know that 
he had come to stay. 
In 1652 the Dutch gained a foothold in an almost empty land. In it they found only wandering 
bands of Bushmen and Hottentots who had no permanent dwelling place in the area in which 
the Europeans began to cultivate the soil. 
The white man's Africa came into being, not by conquest, but by colonization (Neame 
1953 p12). 
To what extent could this be a justification for the white man taking Africans' land? 
Colonialism is 'the policy and practice of a power in extending control over weaker 
peoples or areas' (Collins Concise English Dictionary, 1992). In my view, this 
definition exposes some conceptual difficulties on the reasons for European 
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colonization of Africa. Who gave the 'power' a right to extend control over other 
peoples? How were the weaker people defined? Can colonialism be defined as the 
policy and practice of a human power in extending control over weaker human 
powers? 
What is the theoretical justification of European colonization and dispossession of 
Africans' lands? Changes in man-land relations will always occur in response to 
natural factors like population growth, climatic and environmental changes. The 
changes can be planned reforms, but they can be spontaneous or just indigenously, 
socially or enviromnentally evolve. But land tenure reforms are usually part of a 
broader economic and political reform process and can stem from diverse conditions 
(de Anda 1996). They can emerge as a consequence of a revolution, as was the case in 
China, Mexico and several European countries during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries (ibid. ). They can also occur as a result of specific conjectural conditions or 
unique local events, such as the position of a country in the international community 
or a local calamity or major disruption (ibid. ). Examples are Taiwan, Republic of 
Korea, and Japan (ibid. ). 
Many different illustrations can therefore be given of land policy formation. 
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All land tenure reforms are top-down; an enlightened elite with a sense of statehood 
conceives of reform as a mechanism for the consolidation of its power in relation to 
other elites.... Land tenure reform is crucial in this context because the recognition of 
property rights infers a corresponding recognition of the right to participate in the 
political community, and citizenship does not refer merely to the provision of social, 
civil and political rights ... but 
is grounded on a recognition that the effective use of 
these rights might, and indeed should, lead to the enhanced welfare of citizens and 
future generations (de Anda (ibid. p6). 
Land consolidation was a change injected from outside, by an external power that has 
subordinated the stakeholders and denied them the rights relating to the ownership of 
their land. Some of the rights to land are: 
a) surface right which permits a landowner to enjoy the current use of his land, 
b) productive right, which allows an owner to make profit from the current use of his 
land, 
c) development right, which allows the owner to improve his property, within the 
prevailing context of planning legislation, 
d) pecuniary right, which allows a landowner to benefit financially from development 
value both actual and anticipated, 
e) restrictive right, which grants the landowner a right not to develop his land, and 
f) disposal right, which allows the land owner to sell or will his land (Ratcliffe 1976 
op. cit. p22). 
The processes of subordination, dispossession and consolidation of land and power 
take place over a long time until the dispossessed natives or stakeholders and their 
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descendants no longer know that they have the natural right to their motherland. This 
denial of rights can become a culture of poverty for the dispossessed natives. 
An equally damaging view of poverty is the recent much publicized notion of the 
culture of poverty. According to the main exponent of the culture of poverty thesis, 
Oscar Lewis, the poor have a way of life, remarkably stable and persistent, passed 
down from generation to generation along family lines. The culture of poverty has its 
own modalities and distinctive social and psychological consequences for its 
members. It is a dynamic factor which affects participation in the larger national 
culture and which becomes a subculture of its own'.... This view of poverty confuses 
norms with aspirations (George 1973 p39). 
This problem does not go away because as time passes, it becomes internalised. and 
status differentials among the victims also start to widen along the axis of sex as the 
poor realistically respond to the situation they find themselves in. Often it is promoted 
by stereotyped patriarchal attitudes, racial discrimination and religious teachings of 
the possessors until the dispossessed lose their aspirations and become unconscious of 
the gender inequalities within themselves and between themselves and the possessors. 
Colonisation was therefore very conducive to land consolidation: they are both top- 
down, they both political and authoritarian, they both breed inequality, deprivation 
and poverty among the colonials. 
Furthermore, the powerful always take advantage and control over the powerless. 
Unfortunately, this is often done by use of violence. Colonisation was a process of 
Europeans taking control over other people and their land by force. The colonialists 
wrongly believed '[t]hat the natives were to be civilised while the raw materials and 
other resources of the colonies would benefit the economy of the metropolitan 
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country' (Louis 1998 p9l). Native colonials who went through European colonisation 
in Africa, Asia, America, and Australia know what it means in reality. 
[C]onsultation [with the leaders of the natives] will be fruitless as long as the non whites will 
agree to nothing save the extension of Gold Coastism from Lagos to the Lion's Head. Upon 
that demand the Whites will make no compromise and discuss no terms. They will fight to the 
bitter end for mastery of their own house (Neame 1953 op cit. p 104). 
Another dimension of colonial underdeelopment was masculine violence. Apart from 
violence as a normal human instinct, colonial violence, especially settler colonialist 
violence, that Kenyans, South Africans and Zimbabweans went through, was a policy 
that was used to deprive the natives of their land. This is the relationship between 
masculinity, colonialism and violence. 'One argument is that "masculinism" - "an 
ideology that justifies and naturalises male domination", ... shapes aggressive, 
controlling, competitive, power oriented, rationalistic, instrumental behaviours in 
men' (Huggins and Haritos-Fatouros 1998 p30). Acts of violence by Europeans for 
example, slave trade and colonisation can be attributed to masculinism. Specifically, 
English "state building" involved "not just a deepening sexual division of labour [between 
men and women] ..., but also 'differentiations of masculinities'- most notably 
between 
aristocratic and bourgeois masculinities .... between the 'warrior masculinities' and more 
rational/calculative [ones].... [A]ristocratic masculinities focused on a man's relationship to 
family and blood line and on his duty to honour others through 'praiseworthy' acts. With the 
rise of the capitalist state, bourgeois masculinitics emphasised individualism, scientific 
nationality, control and a subdivision of psyche into public and private spheres. (ibid. p3l) 
Masculinised violence can also be bureaucratised and become very dangerous to the 
very existence of the deprived, the colonised or the 'othered' lesser souls. Colonial 
and postcolonial administration in Kenya, for example, were and still are carried out 
by institutionalised functionaries and agents of development administration such as 
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the Police, and the Judiciary who still have a colonial mentality about the ordinary 
native Kenyan. Institutionalised violence can therefore be exhibited at all levels; 
individual, family and societal or national. At individual level, the conditions show in 
the trends and causes of individual births and deaths. The individual conditions are 
also doubly gendered. Any society in which land has been privatised becomes an 
antagonised society of the 'possessed' and the 'dispossessed' that are ruled by 
institutionalised violence. In all cases, the dispossessed have lost their self defence 
and the defence of their motherland, which then becomes the colony of the 'managers' 
of metropolitan land. In this case, 'the principle of giving a people the right to 
determine their future within or outside this framework of the existing state is 
becoming increasingly recognized' (Deng 1996 p224). 
0.2 THE MAIN DISCIPLINARY ASPECTS OF THE DEBATE 
'The main reason the rich world is rich ... is not because it has physical and human 
capital in abundance (though that helps) but because it is rich in ideas and knows how 
to apply [them]' (Rohwer 1998 pl3l). This is why it is necessary to empower the 
(colonised) local people so that they can generate their own ideas on how to deal with 
their day-to-day lives. In this case, realistic social science should aim at long term 
empowerment of the people and not just social engineering. It is important to keep in 
mind that any society like any individual is single and unique. That is why researching 
on the social aspects of life in a place like Siaya will only benefit other people if it is 
comprehensive, multidisciplinary and action oriented. 
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Social sciences share something in common. They do not come in separate boxes of 
economics, politics, history and sociology, for example. Furthermore, science is 
inherently biased. 'Science is, after all, practiced by a community of scholars who are 
given financial support in order to discover the truth' (Pelrich 1989 pI 13). For 
example, population science has been described as bogus in nature, and that 'in the 
absence of a precise relationship between population growth and any particular set of 
economic, social or cultural outcomes providing scientific support for particular 
policy agendas is only a form of 'witchcraft" (Grimes 1998 p377). Grimes has 
rightly pointed out that 'the World Bank has cleverly redefined the "population and 
development" sector as "population and women" thus making invisible the 
destructive impact of its policies on the lives of Third World women and ironically 
appearing as a champion of women's rights' (p349). 
In this thesis, women and men are assumed to be equal human beings. Why then 
should human beings be born to differences in entitlement to motherland, just because 
of their sex? The reason can only emerge from the hidden agenda of development 
economics in relation to the Third World. This agenda, just like the land question in 
Kenya, is also historical. That is why I have used the historical plain method basing 
my arguments on historical facts. I have not used the normative hypothetical method 
because, as Locke wamed us: 
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"we should not take up any one [hypothesis] too hastily" until we have examined the 
particulars, made experiments, and found substantiation for the hypothesis. A hypothesis must 
never be confused with a principle, an "unquestionable truth" for a hypothesis "is really at 
best but a doubtful conjecture" (Redmann 1997 p66). 
I have tried not to base my argument on hypotheses which are very unclear. My 
approach is historical in that it examines events through the twentieth century. It is 
also economic because it examines the effect of a specific action (land consolidation) 
that was taken for the sole purpose of colonial economic development. In this sense, it 
is economic as well as historical. Commenting on the relationship between history and 
economics, Setterfield (1998 p525) argued that 
[t1he indigenous nature of change associated with increasing returns brings to the fore the 
importance of time in economics, whereby the present and future cannot be understood 
without reference to the past. How variables behave depends on what has gone before. History 
matters, in contrast to "equilibrium theory" where the exogenous variables are given and 
assumed unchanging through time and where everything can therefore be predicted with 
certainty in advance. 
First, we have already seen that change in the relationship between human beings and 
land was continuing in Africa before the coming of the Europeans. In other words, in 
addition to the fact that land consolidation was imposed on Africans by Europeans 
we have to remember that natural change in man/land relationships was also going on 
in Africa. I am aware that poverty and social inequalities also existed among African 
societies before Europeans came. But we must be clear of the differences. For 
example, some diseases like leprosy and ulcers existed in Africa before the Europeans 
came, but the real killers like small pox do not have their origin in Africa. 
it 
Second, the argument that Europeans helped to arrest poverty in Africa must also be 
challenged. The cost that Europeans had to incur for arresting poverty in Africa 
cannot be compared to the price that Africans had to pay for being enslaved, 
colonised, impoverished, loss of their land and being put on harm's way in European 
First and Second World Wars. Furthermore, Africans lived in their motherland with 
their poverty, and even their landlessness, until structural poverty was imposed on 
them. 
Certain new categories of the poor were created by colonial rule and economic change. They 
were groups impoverished by land alienation.... All these developments ... did not outweigh 
the underlying continuity of structural poverty in colonial countryside (Ififfe 1992 p143). 
This argument is about Europeans imposing structural poverty on Africans and trying 
to justify it as development. Here is where sociology can help us in understanding the 
hidden agenda behind development economics. Why was land consolidation imposed 
on the native people as if land can also trickle down from the possessed (settler) to the 
dispossessed natives? Didn't the natives of Africa and India have to fight colonialists 
because of their right to their motherland? 
The colonial government imposed land consolidation on the native communities in 
Kenya because it was interested in economic gain of the Europeans rather than of the 
natives. It was that same Europeans' economic benefit that was turned inside-out and 
became known as development economics in the Third World. Development 
economics can be interpreted as a tool used for imposing market fundamentalism in 
the Third World despite the fact that '[t]here are really no such things as "pure" 
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markets - markets that can be understood solely in economic terms' (Prusak 1998 
p138). Whatever economic models try to make people believe, the old saying that 
eyou can fool some people sometimes but you can't fool all people all the time' 
(Molho 1997 plO) still applies. According to him, colonialism is just another 
economic idea, like free-riding, which is built on lying and cheating. 
Have women of Kenya received any specific economic benefits from the West since 
colonialism? 'Economics and ideology undoubtedly provide the backdrop to any 
explanation of gender oppression but ... these structures are continually recreated by 
actors, both male and female, who assume the inevitability of bureaucratic solution' 
(Wragg 1989 p261). According to Koczberski (1998 p597) 
[a]ssociated with colonialism were fundamental long-term changes to indigenous 
social and political structures, land tenure, land use and labour patterns, resulting in 
profound disruption of whole societies. Although young men were the main target of 
colonial governments' interventions (as a cheap labour force), the impacts were often 
more widespread, with men and women affected in different ways. Women, as the 
main food producers and nurturers, and in some areas, the main generation of wealth, 
felt much of the brunt of colonialism. Land degradation, enforced relocation, 
commercialization of agriculture, labour migration and weakened precolonial trading 
links all put tremendous pressure on women's ability to meet their expected 
responsibilities 
Structural poverty in Kenya is currently very scaring. A recent report by the British 
aid agency, Department for International Development (DfID) found that 42% of 
Kenyans live below the national poverty line and 50.2% live on less than I dollar a 
day. Surprisingly, Kenyans do not have any policy action programme to deal with 
poverty, apart from those imposed on them such as 'population policy [which] is 
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based on ideological rather than technical considerations' (Grimes 1998 op cit. p346). 
Kenyans have ever been cheated by the colonialist version of history into forgetting 
the root cause of their poverty. Their search for the causes of underdevelopment has 
been directed to other marginal issues as 'over-population' and 'environmental 
degradation'. This argument is developed further in the thesis. 
The long term impact of Western underdevelopment was always felt in the Third 
World. First, Christianity did everything to change customs and traditions of Kenyans 
and failed. Second, another indicator of poverty in rural Kenya is the frequency of 
AIDS deaths. What worries me is whether other races living in Kenya, like Asians and 
Europeans, also die from AIDS at the same rate with the Africans. Where are the 
statistics? Third is the Asian question. Since Asians were brought to Kenya around the 
beginning of this century, they have had a lot of influence among the rural 
communities in Kenya. But since Asians were not allowed by Europeans to own land 
in Kenya, their small scale agribusiness's could not last. After independence, they 
started migrating to bigger urban centers like Kisumu, Nakuru, Mombasa and 
Nairobi. 
The total effect of these imposed factors is more poverty for native Kenyans. That is 
where development theory has failed Kenyans, especially the rural people of Siaya. 
Africa will never gain from the intrusive Western cultural imperialism because the 
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fiwestern. culture has developed a high degree of immunity and imperviousness against 
influences from other cultures except in areas where these are inevitable corollaries of 
its exploitative activities' (Tangwa 1996 p 18 5). 
[T]he belief that 'might is right' [and] 'knowledge is power' leads to a pervasive desire to 
know everything, to co-ordinate everything, unify, harmonise, control, commercialise and 
monopolise everything. Western culture has a big mouth and very small ears. Even when it 
condescends to listen to other cultures, it does so within the framework of 'searching for 
spices' and specifies both what it wants to hear and how it should be said. ... Since Industrial Revolution, western culture has laboured under what ... has [been] called a 'transcendental 
pretence' ... that is, a strong impulse to present western ideas, whether optimistic or 
pessimistic, sub specie universali, if not sub specie aelernitatis, and as the only rational and 
universally valid ones (ibid. p 185). 
The biggest challenge to the future of Africa is the extent to which Africa will have to 
continue bowing down to transcendental pretence. What humanity wants is equality, 
development and peace. 
I have suggested that land consolidation was a deliberate colonial instrument used for 
underdeveloping the indigenous people of Kenya. How did that instrument of policy 
come into being? 
0.1.1 Land Consolidation as Policy Action? 
Land consolidation was an instrument of underdevelopment policy in Kenya. I will 
adopt Dillon's (1988 plO) definition of policy as a 
series of ongoing understandings built up by political administrators over time, 
understandings left to run where practicable, repaired where necessary, and 
overturned where they are desperate. 
This definition of policy will enable us to understand why Kenya has no land policy 
and politics in Kenya is based on land. Land consolidation was an understanding built 
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up by colonial political administrators over time, repaired (where necessary) by the 
Land Adjudication Act of 1968, and left to run wherever applicable until it was 
'desperate' and had to be overturned by economic exigencies in 1995. Kenyans just 
did what they were told after consensual decolonisation. What they did not know was 
that consensual decolonisation was 'essentially Janus like: simultaneously looking at 
both international and domestic contexts, and continuously mediating between the 
two' (ibid. pI 1). This means that the land issue in Kenya had to accommodate both 
foreign and local interests. The problem with this policy is that foreign interests were 
purely economic while local interests were not only economic, but also social, 
historical, cultural, and geographical. As Kenya continued to become an agricultural 
country of few land grabbers, her natives became poor landless squatters. 
Kenyans have now got to live painfully with their government which inherited and 
adopted a very bad policy whose source they both (Kenyans and their government) 
did not know. Shleifer (1998) gives three sources of bad policies which I find useful 
here. The first is 'politicians' desire to control property so as to use it to gain political 
support' (p240). That is, in my view, why Kenya retained the colonial institutions 
such as Commissioner for Lands and District Land Adjudication Officer. 'The second 
source of bad policies is politicians' interest in personal income, namely bribes' (ibid. 
p240). That is why Kenyan policy makers currently do not know where they stand and 
where they sit with regard to the issue of land. The 'third reason for bad policies is the 
confusion of politicians - their using wrong models in the economy, and even more 
important of the government, in making policy proposals' (p240). Although I agree 
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with Shleifer that '[c]onfusion of policy makers is universal' (p240), I believe that this 
argument presupposes an elected government as the source of bad policy. In the 
Kenyan case, the source of this bad policy (land consolidation) was not the same 
Kenya goverment as development economists may want us to believe. A question 
yet to be answered: How long will Kenyan policy makers remain confused about this 
policy in their country? 
Land is the bottomline of poverty and policy in former British settler colonies like 
Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa. The need for land redistribution in Kenya has 
been tried many times, without success. First, it was a recurrent theme in much liberal 
and left-wing political and economic analysis on Kenya. Second, it was also revisited 
by the 1972 ILO report Employment, Incomes and Inequality in Kenya Third, the 
World Bank has tried to emphasise the need for redistributive land reform to Kenyan 
policy makers and failed (Gibbon 1993). 
Why can't Kenya take policy action on her own land issue? Because supporters of 
economic inequality still continue to confuse the Kenyan policy makers with the 
outdated and irrelevant economics that 'individual property rights spur growth 
through increased credit resources, higher security of investment, and the increase in 
land area controlled by the most efficient farmers' (Pinckney and Kimuyu 1994 p2). 
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These advisers know very well that every native ethnic group in Kenya has its own 
traditional tenure systems, but they still tell Kenyan policy makers to do nothing about 
inequality before land in Kenya. As de Anda (op cit. p8) pointed out, 'there are 
different types of private property: individual, co-operative, corporate and 
condominium (the latter being the approximate modem equivalent of many 
indigenous communal land arrangements)'. Kenya policy makers should tell these 
economists that Kenyans have the right to own their land under any of these 
altematives. 
In brief, Kenyan policy makers are still confused, selling Kenya internationally as a 
free market while the rural subsistence farmers are getting poorer. They will have to 
take action because, they are the ones who have the duty to weigh the cost of action 
now against the price Kenyans will have to pay for inaction. There are three issues 
which they will have to deal with. First, they will have to lead Kenyan men and 
women in the struggle for their land as Kenyans, not as separate ethnic groups that 
were already divided and ruled for generations. Nairobi will have to look London in 
the eye, even if it means another Lancaster Conference in London or in New York. 
After finishing with the first battle, the second battle will begin. Kenyans will then 
have to fight for gender equality before the land and remove different local traditions 
like male inheritance, and cultures like circumcision that victimise women or men on 
the ground of sex. Third, they will again fight against the hidden agenda behind 
Western NGOs that have been let loose to discreetly get involved in their strategic 
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matters. They will also clarify the role of the local (Local Authorities) and 
international community (foreign Governments and intergovernmental organisations) 
that participate in shaping their lives and their future. The fact that these participants 
in Kenya's local and foreign affairs, i. e., NGOs, Local Authorities and the 
international community, are so central to poverty, land and gender issues in Kenya 
needs some explanation too. 
0.3 PARTICIPANTS IN MANAGING THE EFFECT OF LAND 
CONSOLIDATION AND GENDER DIFFERENTIALS IN KENYA 
The three battles above are being fought concurrently at the continental level. Harare 
is now fighting the first one to balance local and tribal rights to substantial areas of 
land against market competition for land, while Nairobi is still confused. However, 
there has to be a balanced or partnership solution. The second one starts at the local 
level, and is the one of most interest to this thesis. The third one has been fought for a 
long time, in fact since the white settler came to Africa. A clear line needs to be 
drawn between the fight for equality about land and other movements of social 
contestation that express a revolt against the forms of living imposed by capital in 
full-blown expansion: alienating work, the patriarchal family and militarisation (Amin 
1990). 
In fact the church, at the start, was emphatically a 'non-governmental' and even 
&anti-govemmental') civil organization, whose members thereby expressed their 
determination to regulate social issues in accordance with their religious faith (ibid. 
p186) 
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This thesis is not in support of any of these ideological camps: Greens, Reds or Blues, 
or any denomination as such. Most northern NGOs come to the Third World as 
charities. We know that charity begins at home. The important question is: How do 
the Third World governments know the hidden agenda of those NGOs whose 
motherland is elsewhere? 
One headache for Third World govermnents is foreign NGOs involved in policy in 
Africa. In almost all cases, what these NGOs tell African governments is: This is what 
you ought do in service ofyour people, but since you have failed to do it, we are doing 
it here and now. But what they should tell govemments is: This is what you ought to 
do in service ofyour people, we are ready to assist you with the necessary resources 
to do it. Can we start now? The govermnents should still be able to say Yes or No. 
These NGOs should only confine themselves to emergency assistance and projects 
which locally meet the practical needs of 'people' such as water and infrastructure. 
They should not involve themselves in strategic issues and government 
responsibilities such as policies to provide services in education, health and defence. 
With respect to Central Governments, pre-colonial African governments must beware 
of the role that their former European colonial powers are now playing in the 
international scene. Firstly, Britain and France are permanent members of the UN 
Security Council. They are also major donors to African development. Secondly, j 
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Europe is becoming one, socially, politically, economically and even militarily. If 
quick action is not taken, time may run out for Kenyans. Kenyans must be very clear 
of the prevailing prospects for alternative policy action to deal with the land issue and 
poverty in their country. 
0.1.3.1 Prospects for Alternative Policy Action to Eradicate Poverty in Kenya 
Kenyans must thank the British people for the general elections of May 1997.1 am yet 
to learn of any British government or any other government of a developed or donor 
country that had declared a commitment to ethical foreign policy. My (wrong) 
understanding of ethical foreign policy is also golden: Do unto your neighbour what 
you would rather be done to you. In this case, the neighbour is a foreign or another 
goverrunent. 
There is another reason why the people of Kenya need to be thank the British people 
for the election. Never before had a British Minister told the Government of Kenya 
that Britain's main interest is the welfare of the ordinary Kenyans. Never before had a 
British High Commissioner to Kenya spoken out clearly that Britain's donor support 
to Kenya will only go to community development. The ball is now in the Kenyans' 
court. It is up to them to get complete ownership of their land and end the first battle 
as stated above. The sooner this is sorted, the better for both Kenya and Britain's 
commitment to eradication of international poverty. 
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Second, Kenyans and all Africans must be awake to the fact that they are now living 
through the First United Nations Decade for the Eradication of Poverty, 1996-2006. 
UN General Assembly Resolution No. 52/193 reaffirms further that all Governments 
and United Nations System, in particular, the relevant funds, programmes and 
agencies, should promote an active and visible policy of mainstrearning a gender 
perspective and use gender analysis as a tool for the integration of a gender dimension 
into the planning and implementation of policies, strategies and programmes on 
poverty eradication. The same Resolution also emphasizes that, in developing 
countries, rural development remains central to poverty eradication efforts, and this 
often includes agrarian reform, investment in infrastructure, extension of rural 
financial intermediation ensuring food security, better education and greater 
utilization of appropriate technology, ensuring fair prices to provide incentives for 
agricultural investment, and increasing productivity, including productivity in the 
informal sector. Furthermore, Kenyans must be aware that the quiet revolution is on ' 
now (Annan 1998). As will be shown later on, these efforts of the United Nations and 
the British DfID are central to this thesis. 
The gender struggle for equality before land must therefore be sorted out. This is 
where ethical foreign policy will be needed. The most appropriate policy option for 
the current British government is to help Kenyans deal with the social question by 
empowering the local societies in Kenya to become active societies. The only 
acceptable route for reaching local and rural poor communities as far as land issue is 
concerned, is through local authorities in the lead and others, such as NGOs behind. I 
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believe that only elected governmental structures like Parliaments and County 
Councils have the moral right to impose policy decisions, like land consolidation or 
diffusion on people. 
That is the main reason why research for this thesis was confined to Siaya District. 
Local government is also a way of benefiting from both traditional (tribal) and 
modem (national) ways of governance. For example, why did the British colonial 
government decide to reserve some land, called native reserves, for the Kenyans to 
live? The main reason that emerged was to establish a reservoir of cheap labour for 
use in European settler farms and in the urban sector. It also served the colonial 
interests well to keep the tribal identity of the native Kenyans for the sake of divide 
and rule within the framework of a command economy. That is the social connection 
between the national struggle and the gendered struggle for land that Kenyans now 
face. The colonial government knew very well that the national struggle for land 
would trigger migration of the landless men into urban areas and enclaves as cheap 
labour, while women would remain behind still rooted in tradition and backwardness. 
It is now up to the Kenya government to manage the boundary between native 
Kenyans and their tribal identities for the sake of equality, development and peace. 
Africans will not eradicate poverty before first ensuring peace. 
Africans should also know that there can't be economic development without social 
development. That is why colonialists deliberately disrupted pre-colonial social 
relations in order to ensure social dependency on them. Social relations at local level 
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are natural and depend on the good use of social capital which naturally exists in the 
community. They are natural because the main element of social development is 
language, which is the main vehicle of negotiation, infon-nation, communication and 
education in the community. Consequently, there can be no development in a 
community that is not dependent on the mother tongue. It is through the mother 
tongue that people and societies express their hopes, fears, sage philosophies, and 
their policies. Otherwise, Kenya will remain a social dependency until Kenyans 
realise that social development starts at the local or district level. 
Siaya District is a case in point. Firstly, Siaya town now stands at the point where 
young men from Alego Location used to be assembled by Chiefs and then collected 
to go to Wars or to work for Europeans. Different clans of Alego like Karuoth, Kakan, 
Kogelo, Kadenge, Boro, Kamlag, Kalkada and many others, were affected. This is the 
way the British imposed both land and gender battles on Siaya people. Secondly, 
Siaya town now stands at the centre of Alego Location which is the original home of 
the Luo ethnic group. The original version of the Luo language, customs, traditions, 
and ways of life are still found within Siaya district. That is why Siaya is a classic 
example of a local goverm-nent as well as a community that is crying out for ethical 




What approach have I adopted? This thesis represents a combination of many social 
science disciplines, especially sociology, social policy, anthropology, politics and 
economics. The fact that the thesis is a factual and realistic construction of a historical 
case makes history a central discipline in constructing the main argument. 
Furthermore, the thesis is intended to show the need for action, realism and an ethical 
approach to research. It is opposed to unethical rationalism, blind hypothetical 
approach, and economic and statistical quantitativesness for the sake of it. It is not a 
study in feminism, women-in-development or gender issues. If anything, I am a 
sceptical feminist. I agree with Richards (1980) argument that some feminists tend to 
shoot themselves in the foot. I am also on the. side of Plato's argument for equal 
treatment and consideration for women and men, as human beings, all the way. I am 
distinctly in support of African philosophy and personality as a rich source of 
relevant knowledge for the future development of the whole world. 
Chapter I is a historical analysis of land distribution and the status of women and men in 
Kenya. Chapter 2 is a theoretical and comparative analysis of land consolidation and gender 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter 3 examines the extent to which land is a determinant of 
differentials in the status of women and men in Kenya. Chapter 4 is a report of the field 
work. Chapter 5 is mainly a discussion of findings from the field including some further 
reporting on findings from the field. Chapter 6 is a proposal on what should be done about 
the effect of land consolidation on the differential status of women and men in Siaya, in 
Kenya and in Africa. 
25 
This thesis draws from both primary and secondary data. Primary data came from four 
sources. First were the intensive interviews I carried out in Siaya, Nairobi and Bristol 
with those women and men who were knowledgeable in the issues under field 
research. The second was the questionnaire I administered to a small sample or cross- 
section of women and men in Siaya. The third were the focus group interviews I held 
with different groups of people in Siaya. The fourth was my own participant 
observation of administrative land court in Siaya, as well as the life of women and 
men in and outside Kenya. Secondary data were necessary for synthesis with the 
primary data into a coherent whole. Sources of my secondary data were carefully 
selected with advice from specialists of different persuasions and also represent the 
width and breadth of the case under discussion. Finally, the general argument in the 
whole thesis is that land is a public property and should not be put under private 
control. In other words, land is not a private property. 
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Chapter One 
LAND DISTRIBUTION AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN 
IN KENYA: AN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Any European who has happened to be in Nairobi city center on a working day, 
especially in the last two decades, may experience what s/he will never forget. Noise! 
Everybody is looking up to the sky and shouting at the top of his/her voice: God! 
Jesus! Savior! Come, Come, Come! It is a very big noise which goes on every 
working day. One may think that people are going crazy in Kenya. Even worse, the 
tourist who happens to be around the Norfolk Hotel, near the fonner Royal Technical 
College and the Central Police Station is advised to be careful of tear gas! The 
University of Nairobi students may be reacting again while Kenya Police are always 
in pursuit of their zero tolerance policy! 
Does history repeat itself? Isn't the Norfolk Hotel exactly at the point where the first 
native public meeting in Kenya was trampled upon by the colonial police in 1922? 
The tourist would be right to be scared. What is happening in this city? What is the 
future of this country? But if these questions were addressed to a native Kenyan I 
would imagine answers like: Ybis is the fruit of the seed you planted here at the 
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beginning of this century. It is our history and our heritage. Perhaps, it is at least a 
chapter in your history too. Arnold-Baker's 'The Companion of British Flistory' 
(1996 p758) defines KENYA as follows: 
(1) highlands were inhabited partly by agricultural tribes of which the Kikuyu (much 
the biggest), the Luhya and the Kamba were Bantu speaking, and the Luwo Nilotic. 
The Rift Valley was occupied mainly by Nilo-Harnitic pastoral tribes of which the 
most'prominent were the Masai, Kipsigi and Turkana. The coastal tribes were 
agricultural and much affected by Islam through contact with the Sultanate of 
Zanzibar, where European traders and squadrons touched for water on their way from 
and to India, or for cloves and slaves sold there in abundance 
This chapter is about the legacy of colonialism and the future of Kenya. In section 
one, I will examine the importance of history as well as some theoretical connections 
between land and gender. In section two, I will emphasize the importance of history 
in understanding levels and differentials of human inequality in Kenya. In section 
three I will present a brief history of settler colonialism in relation to indigenous land 
rights in Kenya. In section four, I will examine the socio-economic development of 
Kenya in relation to gender, landlessness, and settler colonialism. In section five, I 
will discuss the nature of British colonialism in Kenya. Throughout the chapter and 
beyond, I will examine other conceptual issues as and when necessary. 
1.1 LAND AND GENDER: AN HISTORICAL AND 
THEORETICAL OUTLINE 
1.1.1 The Importance of History 
There are three reasons why it is difficult to write about land consolidation and gender 
in Kenya without an initial focus on history. First, 'the exact time and way in which an 
event occurs is crucial to that event having the identity it does' (Humphreys 1997 p4). 
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Second, '[h]istory... is ... the result of causal patterns of processes which combine to 
produce particular trends and developmental trajectories' (Hall and Gieben 1992, 
p104). 
History so infuses the present and sets parameters for the emergence of the future that 
any social science that does not place it at the heart of its explanatory system is 
doomed to deliver woefully inadequate accounts of whatever phenomenon happens to 
be under scrutiny (Henderson et. al. 1992 p5). 
Third, in understanding Third World politics, Leys (1996) agrees with Bayart (1993) 
that the concept of 'historicity' is important. This is 
the idea that politics must always be understood as a moment in a complex and very 
long term story. This story can be understood ... in three possible ways: as the story of 
a 'civilization'..., as a story of a system of inequalities (caste, class, age, etc. ) or as a 
story of a culture - or as a combination of all these.... The analysis of politics must 
therefore ... try to link 'the collective work of the production of the state to the 
subjective interiority of its actors' (Leys 1996 p4O4 I). 
I want to argue that the current differential status of women and men in Kenya is a 
result of Kenya's colonial history. 'Kenya was one of the African 'colonies of 
European settlement', in which Europeans became involved in land ownership and 
agricultural production as well as adn-ftistration' (Mosley 1991 p270). Note that 
Nairobi was founded in the central highlands of east Africa, where 'the indigenous 
communities [Kamba, Kikuyu and Maasai] were (hitherto) largely untouched by 
Europeanising influences' (Tignor 1976 pl). 
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Three factors that were used by British colonialists to determine the current social 
inequality in Kenya were missionaries, administration and land (ibid. ). The 
missionaries came with Europeanization, i. e., the determination to force Africans to 
abandon their own way of life and adopt the British way of life. The colonialists also 
brought administration as a conscious determination to manage the contradictions 
caused by the 'white presence' and make it appear developmental and good for 
Africans. Then the settlers started coming and taking away as much land as they 
needed. These are the main historical factors that determined the current gender 
differentials in Kenya. I will discuss them in more detail later in this chapter. First, I 
want to briefly discuss the theoretical determinants of the 'status of women'. 
1.1.2 Status of Women: A Theoretical Outline. 
This chapter is based on the assumption that Third World development has to be 
gender sensitive in order to have long term positive effects on all. Many authors have 
attempted to define gender in different ways. The definitions can be grouped into 
seven conceptual areas: Women's Autonomy, Patriarchal Structures, Position of 
Women, Women's Productive Value, Gender Inequality, Women's Roles and Female 
Economic Dependency. According to the United Nations, the 'status of women' 
indicates the position of women in society including the amount of control they 
exercise over economic, social, domestic and political spheres - and the esteem 
accorded to them and the amount of autonomy they enjoy. 
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These attempts at defining gender have one thing in common, i. e., to make women's 
participation in economic, political, social and domestic spheres explicitly visible. If 
we take Assogba's (1986 p3) definition of status into consideration, we find that the 
concept of status is also multidimensional, hierarchic and dynamic. Assogba defines 
status as Tensemble des relations egalitaires et hierarchiques quun individu 
enterient avec les autres membres de son groupe'. Since equality implies 
egalitarianism, we need to go further in our search for the best way to conceive gender 
inequality. Satz (1995), gave two important dimensions of gender inequality as first, 
inequalities in the distribution of income, wealth, and opportunity and second, the 
mechanisms through which women are treated as unequal with men. The first one 
concerns income inequality between women and men, job segregation, poverty, 
especially among female headed households, and unequal division of labour in the 
family. The second one concerns negative stereotyping (women are thought to be less 
intelligent than their male equals), unequal power (violence against women), 
marginalisation (from roles which convey self-respect and meaningful contribution to 
society) and stigma (attached to women when they become victims of rape, for 
example). 
All these aspects of gender and status need to be considered. Only then can gender 
become a concrete element of policy making. However, some demographers in sub- 
Saharan Africa have concentrated primarily on the relationship between the status of 
women and fertility (Mhloyi 1988). This essentialist approach, e. g., higher fertility 
means lower status, may also be a way of understanding the status of women in 
particular contexts such as urban areas. But there is need for a balance between rural 
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and urban based studies in any particular country in Africa. Even the Cairo 
Conference on Population and Development agreed that raising the status of women is 
the 'major strand for any effective prescription population control in the 'developing 
world". (Mackinon 1995 p222). Studying the factors underlying the status of women 
in countries like Kenya, with over 75% of population in rural areas should therefore 
be in accord with the history behind the current population dynamics. A major 
problem with African population studies is that it has been obsessed with economic 
and political policy agenda, e. g., to reduce fertility, with no local historical evidence to 
support the need for the 'policy action'. 
This thesis contends that land consolidation is the most historically important policy 
action responsible for the current differential status of women and men in Kenya. I 
argue, in this chapter, that land consolidation defied the historical attachment of 
people to their land and deliberately created a lower status feminised landless class in 
rural Kenya. 
1.1.2.1 Gender and the Status of Women In Kenya 
Settler colonialism also had an historical connection with women's status in Kenya. 
European involvement in determining the status of women in Kenya started with the 
colonial disapproval of female circumcision as was practiced by the Kamba, Kikuyu 
and Maasai (Tignor op cit. ). This was because settler colonialists needed a reason to 
impose their values on Africans and destabilise their cultural systems. Theoretically, 
however, 'gender, ethnic and racial divisions predate capitalism although it is true 
that capitalism incorporated them into its economic structure. -' But inequalities of 
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gender and race are generated culturally as well as economically' (Bocock 1992 p55). 
Gender was just a tool for the formation of state and class in Kenya under settler 
capitalism while 'the imposition of colonial rule disrupted crucial precolonial 
mechanisms of control over persons in Kenya and inaugurated a period of flux that 
lasted until the Great Depression' (Lovett 1989 p24). Settler colonialism was 
therefore a system which generated and institutionalised its own structure of gender 
inequality based on land, labour and a continuously dependent economy. Clearly, 
Kenyan dependency on Britain was specifically caused by colonial land policy. 
What is land policy and how did it create this dependency? To answer the first 
question, I agree with Needham (1988 p448) that 
by definition, there is no land policy. Similarly, there is no land policy if the public 
authorities do not use their land instruments, [for example, the means to achieve the 
goals of development policy] or if they have not found it necessary to give themselves 
such instruments, leaving "common law, inheritance, and the market to secure an 
adequate system for ownership, allocation, use and development of land". 
In rural agrarian societies, public authority simply means clans or communities that 
are also traditional holders of land, in common trust for the individual stakeholders. 
This understanding of public authority can be agreed upon to include local authorities, 
such as county councils and municipalities. It should be agreed upon in order to warn 
us of the problem of individual land ownership because 
Rousseau advanced the argument that original sin arose with the first man who saw fit 
to appropriate land from the rest of the community by delineating his own boundaries 
with stakes effectively pronouncing 'This is mine! ' (Ratcliffe 1976 p9) 
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Any kind of individual land ownership must be checked against the possibility of 
committing the original sin, which means going against the systems of land tenure that 
exist in that particular community. 
Systems of land tenure embody those legal, contractual or customary arrangements 
whereby individuals or organizations gain access to economic or social opportunities 
through land. The precise form of tenure is constituted by the rules and procedures 
which govern the rights and responsibilities of both individuals and groups in the use 
and control over the basic resources of land (ibid. p20). 
1.1.3 The Cause of Landlessness in Kenya 
By definition, landlessness is also the same as relative deprivation (Townsend 1993). 
As land reform was going on in Kenya, the poor were deprived land by the rich and 
the poor took a lower status in terms of landlessness. On the other hand, women were 
also deprived of land by men and took a lower status than men. Women were 
therefore more deprived in relation to men. Understanding the political (colonial and 
administrative), economic (market and developmentalist), the cultural (traditional and 
African) and the social (policy and democracy) dimensions of relative deprivation is 
also vital here. 
Landlessness was caused by land consolidation, but women's landlessness was 
exacerbated by the traditions and customs of different ethnic groups in Kenya. We 
must remember that even 
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[c]olonial administrators were divided about the desirability of granting individual 
titles to African farmers, and concentrated their efforts on persuading them to plant 
cash-crops, to fight soil erosion and, where necessary, to consolidate their holdings. It 
was only in the mid-1950s, when large scale compulsory land consolidation schemes 
were initiated in the Kikuyu Land Unit, that serious thought was given to the nature of 
the title which the owner of a consolidated holding would acquire (Coldham 1979 
p615). 
But according to the Kikuyu tradition, female children do not take part in the 
ownership of land. Since the Kikuyu have no system of spinsterhood in their society, 
women do not inherit land in their father's side, but play their part in the family or 
clan where they marry (Kenyatta 1961 op cit. ). Figure 1-1 below shows the effect of 
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It is clear from Figure 1-1 that the main effect of land consolidation is that it caused 
the economic value of women to fall. First, this increased poverty among the people 
since bride price decreased with landlessness among men. Second, it increased the 
need for male children thus increased fertility in general. Third, and worst of all, the 
higher the fertility and the more male children, the more landlessness in the 
community and the more valueless women become. In Siaya district, the effect was 
that women became valueless because primitive customs and traditions did not allow 
them to inherit land equally with boys. I will examine the question of customs and 
traditions later, but for now I want to discuss the historical cause of land 
consolidation. This was based on the origin of Kenya as a colony of Britain. 
1.2 ORIGIN OF KENYA: A NATION OR A COLONY? 
As a colony, Kenya was a 'property' of Britain, first owned by the Imperial British 
East African Company, then later by a kind of parallel arrangement between the White 
settler community and the British government. Three different kinds of Kenya have 
existed that are of relevance to this thesis. These were Kenya before colonisation, 
during colonialism and after colonialism. From now on, Kenya before colonialism 
will be refereed to as Kenya,, during colonialism as Kenya, and after colonialism as 
Kenya. In some cases Kenya will be used to refer to any of the three versions. 
The reason for referring to the same Kenya in three different ways is to make clear the 
genesis of inequality and injustice during colonialism. Had Kenya changed its name 
when it became independent, for example, Southern Rhodesia became Zimbabwe, or 
Gold Coast became Ghana, the task would have been different. From independence to 
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date (1998), the political party in power in Kenya is the Kenya African National 
Union (KANU). Since 'the political power in [Kenya] was in the hands of settler 
farmers' (Mosley 1991 op cit. p271), it is important to find out what Kenya has done 
about native landlessness since uhuru (independence). In this section, I will examine 
some ways in which landlessness and poverty were imposed on Kenyans by colonial 
law. 
1.2.1 Law and Land Ownership in Kenya 
Julius Nyerere addressed the University of Edinburgh in 1997 and said: 'One thing is 
sure. The past of peoples and nations is always a part of their present, and the present 
a part of their future'. Kenyans must therefore understand that British colonialism, 
which is part of their past, is still part of their present and will remain part of their 
future. It was during the period when Charles Eliot was Commissioner that the first 
official encouragement was given to white settlement. From about 1904, settlers 
began to arrive from South Africa. This was the first of several government sponsored 
Europeans settlement schemes that were to be a marked feature of Kenya's history. 
They were soon followed by other immigrants from Britain, Australia, New Zealand, 
and Canada who, on the whole, brought more capital than their predecessors (Ogot 
1974 p253). 
The policy of colonising Kenya was only a question of owning land and residential 
property in Kenya, not of becoming Kenya citizens at the same level with native 
Kenyans. But who were the real owners of the land in the 'young lion'? This question 
has to be answered. 
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1.2.1.2 European Land ownership in Colonial Kenya. 
In relation to control over land, the British Government had been advised by the law 
officers, as far back as 1833, that the exercise over the protection of a state did not 
carry with it power to alienate land contained therein (Ghai and McAuslan 1970). The 
same Government was advised that unless a right to deal with waste and unoccupied 
land was specifically reserved in an agreement or treaty of protection, no such right 
would be allowed in a protectorate. Even in respect of waste and unoccupied land, it 
was not clear whether it would be alienated. This position represented a major 
obstacle to colonial authorities because in Africa, no less than in England, he who 
controls the land is in good position to influence Government. Secondly, because if 
the colonial Government could not grant parcels of land, they would not be able to 
attract settlers. To resolve this issue, the East Africa Lands Order in Council (1901) 
vested crown lands in the whole of the protectorate to the Commissioner. In 1902, the 
Commissioner promulgated the Crown Lands' Ordnance which provided for outright 
sales and leases of 99 years duration, and European settlement in Kenya started in 
earnest the following year (ibid. ). 
The significance of this process can be understood in terms of a clear concept of 
tenure. 
i- 
'Crown Lands wcre defined as all public lands within the East African Protectorate which for the time being are 
subject to the control of Her Majesty's Protectorate, and all lands which have been or may hereafter be acquired by Her Majesty under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or otherwise. 
39 
Crudely simplified, the feudal theory supposed the king by conquest to have acquired 
an ultimate or radical title to all land within his kingdom. All land was therefore held 
either mediately or immediately of the King as paramount lord. Each tenant held his 
land in return for services to be rendered either for the king himself or to some 
intermediate lord who comprised part of the feudal pyramid of lordship at whose 
apex, of course, sat the king. A complex medieval tariff of services (and of the 
valuable "incidences" or privileges of tenure) denoted more precisely the nature of 
the relationship between the occupier of land and his baron or lord. The tenurial 
relationship was one of reciprocal obligation (Gray 1996 p236). 
Gray (ibid. p237) adds that the doctrine of tenures was later to lose most of its 
practical importance after the eventual dismantling of the feudal system. In England, 
the beginning of the end came with the Tenures Abolition Act of 1660, although the 
process was completed - amazingly - only by the Law of Property Act 1922. The 
concept of tenure as still exists is a uniform tenure or landholding directly from the 
state (or crown). In all common law jurisdictions, it is pertinent to note that the 
tenurial concept still persists in the modem leasehold relationship of landlord and 
tenant in England. Tenure expressed the balance between private claims to land and 
the elementary emanations of brutish governmental power, the balance between the 
citizen and the emergent nation state. 
Underdevelopment in Kenya started earlier than the time when Kenya formally 
became a colony. The slave trade was but one aspect of a much more pervasive 
system of international trade which was ever drawing East Africa into the world 
market in a distinctly subordinate role (Alpers 1974). Then came the Uganda railway, 
completed in 1902, and with it the settlers [especially after the First World War] (Cox 
1965). It was to maintain a religious influence in Uganda that the railway from the 
coast was begun and the territory of Kenya came into existence (Wood 1960). But as 
early as 1897, individual tenure was introduced by the Imperial British East African 
Company (IBEACO), a company initially charged with the administration of the East 
African Protectorate on behalf of Britain. From then onwards, Kenya had two distinct 
and separate judicial systems: one to administer the general law established by the 
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colonial administration, the other to settle disputes arising between members of the 
indigenous African population (Pfeiffer 1978). Further, in Kenya 'the general law was 
certain Codes and Acts of India, locally enacted statutes, and - so far as these did not 
apply - the common law, doctrines of equity, and statutes of general application in 
force in England on 12 August 1897' (ibid. p40). Henceforth, the development of 
communal land tenure was halted and the individual tenure, modelled on the English 
way of holding land was official policy. This, in practice introduced a dual policy 
scenario in which traditional land use systems, based on family ownership, existed in 
the native reserves while the settler land tenure was individual, and based on 
agriculture oriented to cash crops (Wood 1960 op cit. ). 
The basis of colonial land policy in Kenya was, therefore, the acquisition of all fertile 
land by the colonial government. All the land was, in law, the absolute property of the 
Crown. No native tribe, chief or individual had any right in land, whether of 
ownership or of tenure, as against the Crown (Leys N 1922). The British government 
officials saw East Africa as a country to be occupied, pacified and then administered- 
that is, order enforced, taxes collected, and justice dispensed, although it is difficult to 
say who asked them to do so. But the settlers who alienated land from the Africans 
had neither the knowledge nor the capital to farm it very differently from the Africans 
on their land. Africans had then to be compelled to work, partly by force, partly by 
taxation, and partly by preventing them from having access to enough land or 
profitable crops to enable them to pay taxes without working for wages (Leys C 
1975). No wonder that the basic relations of production, land-ownership and the 
division of labour, were left largely untransformed. Outside a few areas of white 
settlement, African households were induced, through a mixture of coercion and 
inducement to shift their labour (above all, women's labour) into the production of 
export commodities, without other fundamental change (ibid. ). The motive of 
development was primarily to export produce to Britain. At least, a reason for this 
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colonial policy of ruthless exploitation is important to understand. 'The salient fact 
about Britain is that, more than any other nation, ... she depends on the world market' 
(Waters, undated). What is the experience of the native Kenyans since 1914? 
1.2.1.3 The First World War 
When the First World War came, Africans were asked not only to fight a foreign war, 
but also to make heavy sacrifices for it (Ogot 1968 p258). The 1914-18 War, (in 
which Britain, France, Belgium and South Africa conquered German colonies in 
Africa) was the first direct occasion for a gendered differentiation of the African 
community under the old imperialism. In East Africa, the conquest of Tanganyika was 
a protracted and bloody business in which both the casualties on the victor's side 
alone included deaths of some 4,000 African soldiers and about 30,000 carriers' (Fage 
1995 p417). The natives of Central Nyanza District of (Kenya), [part of which became 
Siaya District in 1967] suffered remarkably as carriers. There was continual demand 
for men of the carrier corps form Central Nyanza. In one year alone, 1917-1918, about 
9,000 men were recruited from the district. In the same year, 2,000 heads of cattle 
were provided for slaughter (Ogot 1968 op. cit. ). 
Official neglect of African agriculture lasted until the Second World War after which 
the British Government required the colonies (settler governments) to be self 
sufficient in agricultural production (Kibwana 1990 p235). Land reform in Kenya 
started by the colonial administration's pretence to correct problems plaguing African 
agriculture in Kenya by the creation of settlement schemes, such as those at Taveta, 
Makueni, Gedi, Majimboni and betterment schemes which aimed at reconditioning 
and preservation of land. These schemes were intended to convince the natives that 
the colonial government was interested in their welfare. 
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When these schemes failed, the colonial agronomic experts advanced the argument 
that the best way to correct the problem of land use among Africans was to reform the 
tenure system (Kibwana op cit. ). In the process of reform of the tenure system, the 
combined effect of geography and politics changed the perception of different ethnic 
groups as far as land use and ownership were concerned. Differential and favourable 
circumstances prevailed and were most eagerly grasped by the beneficiaries. For 
example, Nyanza and Central Province had roughly the same value of marketed 
output until 1957, after which Central Province drew rapidly ahead, so that at the time 
of independence, its marketed output from small farms was roughly twice that of 
Nyanza Province (Hazlewood 1979). It is very important to understand that Central 
Province, compared to other provinces, started receiving official favourable treatment 
even during colonial times. 
1.2.1.4 The Carter Land Commission 
In April 1932, the Secretary of State for Colonies appointed a commission under the 
chairmanship of Sir Maurice Carter to consider and report on certain land problems in 
Kenya. The report of the Kenya Land Commission was submitted in July 1933. It 
was not until this report that the policy of the exclusion of African rights-holders in 
the Highlands was authoritatively stated. The Kenya Land Commission recognised 
that a tribal approach to the allocation of land, as embodied in the Native Lands 
Ordnance, was the only one practicable at the time, although it was anticipated that 
this condition would change. The reservation of the Highlands for Europeans by 
administrative practice was ended by the Land Control Regulations made in 1961 
under the authority of the Kenya (Land) Order in Council, 1960 (Morgan 1972). 
Much of this is history of rapid change in Kenya as the wind of change was blowing 
towards independence, and as political'influence shifted from the Europeans to the 
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Africans. The formal opening of the White Highlands to Africans took place in 1960. 
Under the Swynnerton plan, the colonial government took a major initiative in the two 
issues of land ownership and land use among the Africans. First, Swynnerton 
proposed a change of land ownership from customary tenure to individual tenure. This 
involved the enclosure and registration of existing rights and, where there was 
fragmentation, the sorting of scattered fragments and their re-assembly in areas around 
the homestead in roughly the same proportions of kind of land as was held before. The 
purpose of this was allegedly to give, through individual ownership, the greatest 
incentive to farmers to change from subsistence agriculture to modem planned 
fanning for money. The second purpose was the provision on these consolidated 
farms of farm plans and layouts, crop rotation, introduction of exotic livestock on the 
resulting African small fanning systems in order to consolidate the transition from the 
traditional to cash fam-dng (Carey-Jones 1972). 
Swynnerton's plan was designed to be implemented over a period of fifty years, which 
means that it is still valid in the present Kenya. Initially it received a lukewarm 
reception by the Africans who simply did not trust the Europeans during the period of 
the independence struggle. The settlers also did not like it since it they thought it was 
intended to consolidate the transition of Africans from traditional to cash farming. 
The Mau Mau uprising and the resulting emergency provided an opportunity to 
proceed with land consolidation and registration in Kikuyu areas, with the 'co- 
operation of the people' - since most of the Kikuyu politicians were detained and the 
opposition to the Government removed. By 1958, for example, consolidation was 
complete in Kiambu District and by 1959 in Nyeri District (King 1977). 
This historical account of the European influence in Kenya is important for 
understanding of the factors behind the current impoverishment of the indigenous 
Kenyan African population. Three important factors are worth repeating: flrst, the 
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acquisition of all land by the British colonial authorities, second, the recent 
emergence of Central Province ahead of Nyanza and other provinces in agricultural 
production, and third, the event of Mau Mau as a 'reason' for land consolidation 
policy in Kenya. The resulting situation permanently put the settler and the native in a 
landlord tenant relationship. This is another effect of land consolidation on the current 
status of women and men in Kenya. 
1.3 SETTLER AND NATIVE OR LANDLORD AND TENANT? 
The general spatial structure was eventually fixed. The fertile highlands in the centre 
of the colony were firmly in the hands of the settlers. Nyanza Province had fallen 
behind Central in food crop production. The main challenge now was to manage the 
structure. How was it done? 
1.3.1 The White Settler 
It is important to initially examine the way white settlers managed spatial inequalities 
in Kenya for their own benefit. This is important because the above structure was 
designed to last for 999 years. It is also important because '[t1he colonial goal in 
Kjenya was not to create an African state, but rather a "western" state under multi- 
racial leadership' (Rosberg and Nottingham, 1970 p189). Charles Eliot was very clear 
about it; 'Kenya was to be the last of the typically British settlements established 
overseas, after the USA, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa' (Ogot 
1974 op. cit. p253). Furthermore, 'the goal of [that] generation [was] the 
establishment in East Africa of a new, loyal, white dominion, securely founded on the 
principles of British tradition and western civilisation (ibid. p253) 
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The agenda of the white settler was to ensure that Kenya was to remain for ever a 
dependency. It is highly doubted that this deliberate and conscious effort was made 
with the genuine hope of enabling all Kenyans to build up some capability for 
capitalist development in the future. Godfrey (1982) also examined this issue as far as 
post- independence Kenya is concerned. He found no reason for any hope at all. In any 
case, the grass had too many roots and the trickle down was bound to dry up before it 
got to the deepest root. 
Kenya is probably the ex-colony in Africa that got the worst of a colonial heritage. 
Issues in the Kenya Debate have very practical current political implications and the 
obligation to try to draw up the account of the debate is surely real (Leys 1996 op. cit. 
p46). The likely alternative to this scenario is a strategy labelled socialist, put forward , rT 
by the petty bourgeoisie, involving state socialism in industry and trade along lines 
already broadly charted in Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania (Leys 1980). 
1.3.1.1 Colonialism in Kenya: Where was Development? 
The role of Britain in the future of Kenya can never be overemphasised, especially in 
the context of human equality. I want to use only three examples to illustrate this 
point. First, consider the way Kenya's national statistical accounting was moulded to 
ensure that agriculture was securely fixed at the centre of it. This colonial policy 
resulted in Kenya regarding other sectors such as health, and education as mere social 
services without social policy to take care of them. A major employer of agricultural 
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and female labour force, viz.: subsistence agriculture, was conveniently omitted in the 
Kenyan colonial statistics. However, Kenya still talks of itself as an agricultural 
country, despite the fact that the ordinary family in Kenya can not even feed itself 
from the land. Even worse, some observers still deny the fact that the parallel 
arrangement (dualism) in the agricultural sector, i. e., 'large scale commercial oriented 
white settler farms and the subsistence oriented peasant sector' (Oruko and Apton 
1998) was deliberately designed to underdevelop African agriculture. 
Second, Kenya's agricultural policy was deliberately mixed up with politics (Lofchie 
1994). While Tanzanian leaders declared a national goal of self-reliance, and the 
agricultural component of this objective was the principle of food self-sufficiency, 
Kenya's strategy, on the other hand, was based on the principle of comparative 
advantage. 'Throughout the Presidency of Jorno Kenyatta (1963-1978), Kenya's 
agricultural policy makers were strongly influenced by classical economic ideas, 
holding that a country can best improve it's economic well-being by producing the 
highest possible value of agricultural (and other) commodities for export' (pl. 32). 
Kenya still has a political architecture without a sense of responsibility and a 
capability for independent policy making on: land and agrarian issues. The social 
problems Kenya are currently facing stem from elite ownership of land, i. e., black 




Elite land acquisition has been one of the highest priorities of Kenyan public policy 
since the late colonial period, when the British Government first sought to enable 
large number of Africans to acquire land on a freehold basis under a program called 
Land Consolidation and Adjudication. The idea was a simple one: convert the legal 
basis of landholding for African farmers from traditional tenure to freehold ownership 
and aggregate scattered communal plots into viable single farms. The stated purpose 
of this program was thus economic: Individuals who held fee simple title deeds would 
qualify more easily for development loans because they could offer their land as 
collateral. The intent of the program was also deeply political- to create a politically 
moderate class of landowning Africans. 
Another problem that stems from this statement is that land policy in Kenya did not 
change after 1963, and has not changed to date. The central question is: Why did the 
British Government encourage Europeans to 'own' land in Kenya? Perhaps if we dig 
deeper in history, we may find an answer. 
1.3.3 Land Distribution in Precolonial Kenya. 
Misconceptions about indigenous land tenure in Africa that involve the terms 
customary, communal, traditional, etc., have been used to describe the social 
arrangements governing allocation and use of land in a way that conjure up images of 
an unchanging, normative system (Jacoby 1970). A common feature of these 
misconceptions is, however, that they are usually never related to any time reference. 
There is no evidence that the ethnic groups were historically static in time and place. 
The present Luo people, for example, have been referred to as a hybrid population 
because during their long march, which lasted for over 400 years, (1500 to 1900), the 
population of the Luo societies increased not simply through natural reproduction but, 
significantly through a quiet and effective process of cultural assimilation (Ogot 
1967). 
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Slave trade deserves one mention here because it was a European policy action with a 
potentiality of eventual extinction of the black race. It is difficult to resist thinking that 
this potentiality was intended. 
Ships sailed from Liverpool, Bristol and London carrying textiles, guns, cuttlery, 
glass, beads, beer and other British manufactures. These were battered for slaves on 
the African coast. Anything between twenty million and sixty million able bodied 
Africans were crammed into these ships during the whole period of slavery, under the 
most oppressive and inhuman conditions, and transported across the Atlantic to 
Jamaica, Barbados and elsewhere (Wetherell 1996 p 182). 
That was chattel slavery. 'A slave in the West Indies could never establish a secure 
household of his own (Persky 1998 p63 1). By the operation of chattel slavery, 
the most meritorious slave who may have accumulated a little peculum, and may be 
living with his family in some tolerable comfort ... is liable at once to be torn for ever from his home, his family and his friends, and to be sent to serve a new master, perhas 
in another island , for the rest of his life. 
In these ways, the slave owners had prevented the the natural development of families 
and left their slaves unconnected and adrift. Slave owners had attached the natural 
institution of marriage. Here was the deepest cost of chattel slavery (ibid p63 1). 
Current dernography of Africa should not forget that the slave trade was a particular 
way in which Europeans deten-nined its historical reality. 
Beginning with the Mercantile period, right through the colonial period, and down the 
post independence years, Third World countries have been oppressed and exploited 
by their colonial powers... This exploitation has taken several forms and has assumed 
varying degrees of intensity ranging from the plain plunder and looting to destruction 
of native industries, and to unfavorable trade terms (George 1988 p19). 
Further, another period of turbulence occurred between the end of slave trade and the 
fon-nal colonisation of Africa. In many parts of Africa, this was the era of tribal wars 
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as the various groups struggled to make the best of the new opportunities offered by 
the trade with the Europeans (Osaghae 1994). The social and economic future of 
Africans was not spared either. When colonialism came in it simply and 'deliberately 
exploited ethnic differences and failed to negotiate an accommodation between 
traditional political cultures, while the constitutional orders constructed at 
independence contributed to the pervasive lack of popular identification with Africa's 
post colonial states' (Leys 1996 op cit. p90-91). 
Kenya, like many parts of Africa, consisted of ethnic groups living their lives in their 
own ways and guided by their customs and traditions. But the way Kenya was 
colonised by the British was also stratified and therefore important to understand. It 
was stratified with respect to its impact on the people and the administrative regions 
of Kenya. The effect of settler colonialism on the differential development of Nairobi 
area and the central Highlands compared to Kisumu and Western Kenya is very 
obvious. Even within the central highlands region, the Europeans had more impact 
(both positive and negative) among the Kikuyu than among the Kamba and, lastly, the 
Maasai (Tignor 1976 op cit. ). The Europeans brought change among the Kikuyu 
through Missionaries (changing the African way of life), money (forcing, and later, 
inducing landless Africans to work), and administration (pacifying quarrelsome 
Africans) (ibid. ). 
On the other hand, the Luo and the Luhya of Western Kenya were indirectly 
colonised. Among the Luo for example money was introduced by the Asian traders 
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(Hobley 1929). Administration in Siaya District for example came through the use of 
the Luhya chieftancy to pacify the troublesome Luos (Ogot 1967 op. cit. ). There were 
also more types of missionaries working in the Central I-Eghlands compared to 
Western Kenya. Understanding contemporary gender inequality in Kenya has to take 
into account all these pre-colonial circumstances. Further examination of the 
relationship between colonialism, land ownership and use in post-colonial Kenya is 
justifiable. 
1.4 THE YOUNG LION BECOMES INDEPENDENT OR 
BECOMES A MARKET? 
1.4.1 The Lion and his 'Independence' 
This history of land in Kenya has three lessons for theory. First, Africans were 
deliberately forced into a settler colonial class system. Class antagonisms between the 
Africans and the settlers could have been avoided through interpenetration policy as 
was aptly suggested (Leys N 1922 op. cit. ). Notably, this suggestion was rejected both 
by the British Government and the British people. Second, British colonialism forced 
Kenyans into a kind of wage slavery. Ordinary Kenyans were nailed into a subsistence 
standard of living, expropriated of any property or surplus accruing to their labour, 
coerced by force or violence into labour and eventually, and robed of their partriarchal. 
authority and kinship networks (Persky 1998 op. cit. ). Third, the colonial state 
therefore played a key role in consolidationg the new social structure in the rural 
economy of Kenya. The institutional apparatus of the state had a significant impact on 
class relations between the native and the white settlers (Leys C 1996 op cit. ). It was 
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also the beginning of rural underdevelopment which eventually ensured that women, 
who form the greater part of the rural population, were confined to the status of the 
'oppressed of the oppressed, ' 
This history has implications for Kenya's future development. The most profound 
implication is that new, more pervasive dependency has been established in Kenya. 
This means that class conflict will continue to shape ongoing change in the country. 
Furthermore, this does suggest that such a conflict will be more likely to be rooted in 
the rural areas and in the reactions of the power-excluded regions. This underlies the 
theory of 'impending crisis' in Kenya (Hunt 1984), which is continually fuelled by 
structural poverty due to land alienation (Iliffe 1992). Further, remember that settler 
withdrawal from Kenya was one of the most gradual in the post colonial world. 
Resolving the land question would not only guarantee the continuity of the colonial 
capitalist economy, but would also stand as a mark of the socialisation (maturity) of 
Kenya's new leaders in managing the inherited colonial system (Wasserman 1976). 
Was post-colonial Kenya really supposed to be independent or just a manager of the 
inhcritcd colonial systcm? 
1.4.2 Independent Country or Just A Dependency? 
The fact that Kenya achieved her independence with a 'Made in Britain' constitution 
is not important since all former British colonies started their independence status 
with such constitutions (Mohiddin 1981). What was important was that the Kenyan 
nationalists, agreed to manage, a colonial system as a condition to getting 
independence. This was, a classic marriage of convenience between KADU and 
settlers on the question of land. Even in 1963, the political party that assumed power, 
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KANU, was not necessarily united. It was only a winning coalition of nationalist 
organisations that formed a government (Anyan'g-Nyon'go 1989). How did the new 
KANU Government start off with the question of land? 
In September 1964, President Kenyatta made his famous Back to Land speech, during 
which he said: 
I Our greatest asset in Kenya is our land. This is the heritage we received from our 
forefathers. In land lies our salvation and survival. It is in this knowledge that we 
fought for the freedom of our country. Whatever our plans for the future, they must 
spring from a resolve to put to maximum production our land, however small the 
acreage we may possess (Republic of Kenya 1966 p 10). 
In the absence of a clear policy on land, it was difficult to understand the message of 
this speech. What was not clear was 'who was being asked to go back to the land, and 
why'. Since women were the ones who did most of the farming in rural areas, was this 
speech meant to ask women to go back to the small farms? Was it meant to 
encourage the j ob-seekers to 'go home'? 
On the other hand, the Kenya People's Union (KPU) Manifesto which appeared later 
on was more like a policy statement: 
This [land] has always been and remains one of the most crucial issues in the minds 
of the wananchi [ordinary Kenyans]. Our people struggled bitterly against 
colonialism, not merely because it was foreign rule, but also because it went beyond 
that to seize wananchi's very source of livelihood. Land has always been at the heart 
of our struggle. Until the land problem is solved, Uhuru [independence] has no 
meaning. To millions of people, the end of colonialism meant the return of stolen 
lands. They have so far waited without satisfaction (Gertzel 1970 p 146). 
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Coming so early after Kenya's independence, Kenyatta's return to land call was also 
an indicator of how serious the Government was on the issue of land. The speech 
heralded the new priorities which the Government of Kenya was then formulating in 
its program of agricultural development. This program was clearly spelt out in the 
Government's Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, African Socialism and its application 
to Planning in Kenya. Before the document was even published, the Government had 
in March 1965, already requested assistance from the British Government for a broad 
program of agricultural development. The objectives and priorities of this program 
were to: 
1. Establish the pre-conditions for a rapid rise in productivity in Kenya's peasant 
fanning areas, which constitute well over 80% of land now devoted to some form of 
agriculture. The most important of the preconditions was a basic reform in the tribal 
system of land tenure, to be accomplished through an acceleration of the process of 
land consolidation and registration. 
2. Provide the resources for a direct stimulus to increased productivity once the 
preconditions have been met. Such resources were: agricultural credit and educational 
and supervisory services to farmers. 
3. Stabilise and expand the economy of the former scheduled areas, where over a 
million acres of land which settled roughly 35,000 families, (the Million Acre 
Scheme) had been transferred from European to African ownership in the previous 
three years. 
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The British Government had offered the KANU Government financial aid, additional 
to existing commitments for land purchase and development amounting to E18 
Million during the years 1966 to 1970. Approximately one third of this sum was to be 
allocated to land purchase and the balance to development projects to be agreed 
between the two Governments. However, the British Government specifically 
indicated its willingness to consider financing from within this sum, a further 
programme for the consolidation and registration of holdings of land, the extent of 
which would be examined after the recommendations of a joint British-Kenya team of 
specialists on land survey and registration had been examined. This offer was 
conditional on the Kenya Government's ability to obtain funds for agricultural credit 
and to make available the necessary advisory services (Republic of Kenya 1966 op 
cit. ). 
Clearly, the British Government took this opportunity to: (a) restrict the sale of land to 
independent African farmers, and (b) to consolidate remaining settler interests and 
hence dominate the country's export of cash crops. Consolidation of settler interests 
was done through the way in which agricultural workers were employed. This 
reflected three objectives of capitalist development. The first was that the employer 
was interested in keeping labour costs down as much as possible, regardless of means. 
The second was because agriculture lagged behind other economic sectors, and 
therefore the employer wanted to have as few employees as possible in order to hold 
constant labour costs down. Third, in those agricultural areas where capital 
accumulation was slow, pre-capitalist, famfly based production, mixed with wage 
employment and the proletariat did not emerge. This was the foundation for capitalist 
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mode of production in Kenya's agriculture which in turn served the metropolitan 
interests. Colonial capitalism was introduced through cash crops (like coffee, tea, 
sisal), land alienation and the changing of traditional land tenure patterns (Leitner 
1976). 
Remember that the main architect of development planning in Kenya, Tom Mboya, 
had a very clear idea about land tenure reform: 
The question becomes more complicated ... when we interpret African socialism in 
terms of ownership of land. I have already said that the possession of individual land 
title is an idea foreign to Africa, which has only been introduced north of the 
Limpopo River during the last century. In the old African concept, land was the 
property of the tribe or clan, and could never be sold. This concept has been disrupted 
since the introduction of the money economy... so land titles are bound to come.... 
But it would be a mistake to adopt this as the standard system for all parts of Kenya. 
Among other agricultural tribes, like the Meru or Abaluhya or Luo, it would be 
difficult to introduce land tides universally without destroying the sense of values 
which the communal system provides (Mboya 1963 p 170). 
This background information is also essential to a full understanding of how the needs 
of the majority of native Kenyans were handled during the transition from colonial to 
independent Kenya. The action of the British government resulted in an accelerated 
process of destruction of the traditional land use systems in the tribal areas and the 
creation of a cheap agricultural labour force in rural areas. First, the emerging 
differentials in the status of women and men, and hence underdevelopment of the 
mass of Kenyans became clearer. Second, the argument Kenya was the first Black 
African country to opt decisively for individualised land tenure (King 1977 op. cit) 
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cannot stand. It is contrary to Mboya's argument above, which was almost the same as 
Gluckman's (1969 p252) argument that 
when we say that a particular group of kinsmen owns land, we are also saying that all 
the members of that group have claims to exercise certain rights over that land, may 
be equally with one another, may be varying with their status. 
Kenya's native fanners, being Africans still hold their land under indigenous, 
customary tenure systems, whatever the formal legal system might be under national 
law (Bruce 1994). The aim of the KANU government was progressively to acquire the 
surplus lands of the settlers for redistribution to African families to cultivate as 
medium sized family farms (Sobhan 1993). 
A few policy issues come out clearly in the foregoing analysis. First, the KANU 
Government started off by merely talking about the importance of land to the people, 
but eventually continued with land consolidation in the spirit of the Swynnerton plan. 
Second, discrimination continued with respect to land consolidation when women 
were excluded from inheriting land, and with respect to agricultural labour force in 
plantations when they were paid less than men. Third, by suppressing alternative, 
policies, 'KANU put an end to attempts to change the Government's agricultural 
policies by organising a political movement capable of removing incumbent elites 
from office' (Bates 1981 pl. 07). Fourth, the KANU government was then hooked (by 
the West) into a dependency on development planning. Development planning 
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is defined as "the conscious effort of a central organisation to influence, direct, and, 
in some cases, even control changes" in the principal social variables "... of a certain 
country or region over a course of time in accordance with a predetermined set of 
objectives" (Dubnick 1980 pl. 97). 
The West knows very well that they are the beneficiaries (not ordinary Kenyans) of 
the Nairobi centred development planning. That is why planning is based on general 
themes (see Table 1-1 below) with no significance to Kenyans. Is it surprising that the 
themes have yet to be specific about land and women? 
TABLE 1-1. - THEMES OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS IN KENYA 
PLAN PERIOD THEME 
Ist 1964166-1970 Redistribution with Growth 
2nd 1970-1974 Rural Development 
3rd 1974-1978 Employment and Income Distribution 
4th 1979-1983 Alleviation of Poverty 
5th 1984-1988 Mobilisation of Domestic Resources for 
Equitable Distribution 
6th 1989-1993 Participation for Progress 
7th 1993-1996 Resource Mobilisation for Sustainable 
Development 
8th 1997-2001 Rapid Industrialisation for Sustained 
Development 
Source: Various national Development Plans of the Republic of Kenya 
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1.4.3 Colonial Land Policy and Women in Kenya: An overview 
One aspect of this history of land use has been neglected. To what extent were women 
recognised during the colonial period? In order to answer this question, it is best to 
examine the British settler and colonial history with regard to women in general and 
the Kenyan women in particular. First of all, colonialism has often been seen as a 
primarily masculine project, consisting of white men subjugating and civilising 
Gnatives', also male. European women were the 'inferior sex' within the 'superior 
race' and had an entirely different experience of colonialism compared to African 
women (Waylen 1996). 
The majority of European women who went to the colonies did so in their capacity as 
wives, either of colonial officials or of settlers, such as farmers in Kenya. The 
presence and protection of European women was often used as a justification for the 
clarification of racial lines and the strict control of the colonised, particularly 
colonised men. For example, while the sexual abuse of black women by white men 
was not classified as rape, the fear of the 'black peril' swept through Papua New 
Guinea, Rhodesia and Kenya in the 1920s and 1930s, resulting in 1926 in the 
imposition of the death penalty for black men who 'raped' white women (ibid. ). 
Hobley (op cit. p20) also stated that 'the success of the colonialists depended on the 
adaptability of their wives more than may be believed. ... The women can, therefore, 
play no mean part in the building up of the colony, and they will prize their success 
no less than the men'. But African women can also equally prize themselves. They 
were the ones affected by the colonial policies designed to encourage their men to 
migrate to European farms and leave them alone. Reluctant men were forced out of 
the reserves both through taxation and by fining or even dismissing the chiefs who did 
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not supply them with sufficient young men. The long term absence of many husbands 
meant that many women in Kenya played important roles as de facto farm managers. 
The Luo women, for example, responded to the withdrawal of male labour' and the 
need to maintain a certain level of food production and other family problems, 
through economic innovation, particularly in terms of agricultural crops and 
techniques allowing them to spend more time trading (Waylen 1996 op cit. ). 
Since there were still fewer employment opportunities in the formal sector, were 
women not the ones restricted to rural areas since it was assumed that men were only 
in urban areas temporarily as wage labourers? When women defied colonial 
restrictions and moved to urban areas, didn't they have to support themselves through 
informal small scale businesses which were often illegal? (ibid. ). Finally, a typical 
English colonialist's opinion about the African woman is noteworthy. 'The position 
accorded to its womenfolk is a fair index to the worth of any society' (Wilson 1952 
p77). This is correct, and I agree. But Wilson continues: 'By this criterion primitive 
African society stands utterly condemned: the state of the women was dreadful. 
Evidence of the miserable position of women in past times in Kenya is to be found in 
all the records of the early pioneers'. It is difficult to place this statement in a time 
frame. It is not clear 'which pioneer' Wilson was referring to. Could it be the slave 
trader, the merchant adventurist, the missionary, the colonialist or the settler? Was 
every white person a pioneer? Could an African person also be a pioneer? 
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1.4.4 African Socialism and the Land Question in Kenya. 
One of the pioneers of African Socialism, George Padmore, considered it as a general 
philosophy that meant total elimination of the economic and social heritage of 
colonialism. Also considered as such were bribery and corruption, and the colonial 
impact in relation to ignorance, poverty and disease which were not able to promote 
the aspirations of the people for a welfare state with their well-being at heart. This was 
the frue meaning of nationalism in the context of African Socialism which ensured 
equality between women and men in the African context (Friedland and Rosberg 
1967). The starting point in economic reconstruction of a newly independent state had 
to be land with its communal ownership and production and its element of 
cooperative self help founded upon the African social base. This is not the same as 
the colonial small farm system that was designed for the Kenyan reserves by land 
consolidation. This distinction is important. The Kenyan pattern of development 
could and was actually compared to apartheid South Africa, when the two states were 
considered to qualify as sub-imperial states- meaning that the development of 
capitalism in those two countries had reached a stage where the countries may be, or 
were being, used as facilitators in the capitalist conquest or capitalist incorporation of 
the contiguous states (Khapoya 1984). 
Socialism was therefore a non-starter in Kenya. It lacked both official support from 
the bureaucracy and political support from KANILL It was only used by KANU to 
head off the radicals' image within the party (Anyan'g-Nyon'go 1989 op cit. ). A 
major problem was that KANU was unable to come out clearly was land. In that 
case, could it be possible for the KANU government, since there was no difference 
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between KANU and the government of Kenya, to chart out a clear future where 
everybody is equal before the law? Which law was this? Could Africans be 
historically equal before a European colonial (land) law? This begs the question of 
the law and the history of land in Kenya. 
1.4.5 Law of the Land in Kenya 
One of the cornerstones of modem society is the legal apparatus that sits as an 
appendage to the state. It is, among other things, through the state law that the state 
legitimises its control and its use of physical coercion. An understanding of the 
modem world thus necessitates an understanding of law as a living institution 
(Chambliss 1973). This is true, especially in relation to colonial agrarian law and land 
structure in Kenya. The assertion that colonial agrarian law was sectional and 
fragmentary in scope does more than to simply state the dual character of the 
economy. It suggests that there were two levels to the question of structural 
underdevelopment. At the territorial level, colonial decision makers made no attempt 
to devise a regime of land holding and land use that would relate the reserves to the 
colonial economy as a whole. This sectionalism was not just an organisational error; it 
was a political blunder for which the settler economy had to pay heavily in the 1950s 
(Okoth-Ogendo 1991). 
Since colonial times, land distribution in Kenya has strongly been related to law and 
how the customary and statutory laws relating to land have evolved. Within the 
62 
context of the legal sources of the exercise of power by the British government in 
Kenya, two issues are most relevant The first is the jurisdiction over the indigenous 
population, and the second is the control of land. The general rule, (until 1880s), in 
countries in which the British Crown exercised foreign jurisdiction over its own 
subjects was that, unless a treaty provided otherwise, subjects of the local ruler 
remained under his [the ruler's] exclusive jurisdiction (Ghai and McAuslan 1970 op 
cit. ). 
I have shown how the colonial authorities used the law to obtain full control over land 
in Kenya. Necessarily, provision had to be made as to where the Africans could be 
allowed to live, cultivate the land and look after their animals, and also be 
encouraged or, if necessary, required to work for the settlers. This was the foundation 
of the current agrarian law and public administration in Kenya. It was characterised 
with four clear phases. First was the inauguration of the dual mandate (1902-1921) 
which was characterised by the law of European settlement after the First World War, 
the law of African Reserves (comparable to Bantustanisation in apartheid South 
Africa), and the law of agricultural labour which gave rise to the squatter problem 
(comparable to male labour migration from the surrounding states into South Africa) 
(ibid. ). 
Second was the consolidation of the dual policy (1922-1939) which ensured the 
security of the European settlement (by among others, the Crown Lands (Amendment) 
Ordinance, 1938 and the Kenya (I-Eghlands) Order in Council, 1939); and the 
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creation of the African Reserves divided into Native Lands and Native Reserves. The 
third phase came in after the secondVorld War and lasted till independence. This 
phase was characterised with a 'changed' emphasis on the nature of the land question 
in Kenya. This was also the phase of consensual decolonisation within which the 
settler interests in land had to be accommodated in Kenya. The fourth phase (which 
explains why KANU continued with the colonial land policy) was the consolidation 
and continuation of The Plan. The inherited duality was then renamed modem 
agriculture, i. e., large farms and traditional agriculture, which was confused with 
small farms designed by The Plan. In order to modernise traditional agriculture, the 
KANU Government continued with land consolidation. For the masses, the land 
question in Kenya was perceived as land consolidation. But for the elite, it meant land 
ownership. The dissatisfaction and reaction of the masses led to an open conflict: Mau 
Mau. 
1.4.5.1 Mau Mau and the Land Question in Kenya. 
It is important to see the difference between the concept of land in terms of Mau Mau 
and in terms of Kenya as a whole. For example, Rosberg and Nottingham (op cit. 
p352) argue that the quantity of Kikuyu land alienated for white settlement, as 
contrasted to the Masai was relatively small, although in ecological and social terms, 
the Kikuyus could least afford to lose land. The myth of stolen land that emerged as 
the rallying cry for the Kikuyu masses was of slight appeal to such groups as the Luo 
and the Luhya (ibid. ). 
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The fact is that a state of emergency was declared officially in Kenya on 20th. 
October, 1952, and lasted until 1959. By the end of it, the official casualty figures 
were as follows: 1153 'terrorists' killed, 2585 captured and 2714 surrendered; 95 
Europeans killed (35 civilians) and 127 wounded; 29 Asians killed (26 civilians) 
and 48 wounded; 1929 'loyal' Africans killed (1819 civilians) and 2395 wounded. 
With the capture of Dedan Kimathi, the Mau Mau war was virtually over, although 
the emergency was not officially ended until January 1960. Mau Mau had cost the 
colonial Government some E55,585,424 and the lives of 13,547 people, less than 100 
of them white. The war was over and the settlers had won it (Best 1979). 
The settlers won the war but Kenya still attained independence because the Africans 
won the argument. The nationalist political struggle was started primarily for 
I 
independence while Mau Mau was an uprising in demand of stolen land. At some 
stage, however, these two issues were merged in the high politics of Kenya. Mau Mau 
then became an independence struggle. Mau Mau was also another victory for the 
colonialists, since they managed to divide the African nationalists on the issue of land, 
although the Africans barely managed to speak with one voice at the first Lancaster 
Conference in January 1960 (ibid. p204). 
The division on tribal lines pitted the Kikuyu-Luo ethnic groups on one side, and the 
other ethnic groups on the other side. This division served the colonial interests well 
because the KADU side were made to believe in the possibility of the 'dominant' 
tribes expropriating the land of the subordinate tribes. The genesis of political 
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division among Kenyan Africans as well as the origin of multiparty politics in Kenya 
was land. On the - other hand, 'land consolidation, as a political policy tied, to the 
maintenance of the colony's rigid agrarian colour bar, was doomed to fail' (Rosberg 
and Nottinghharn op cit. p307-308). When independence came, land consolidation 
ceased to be a political issue to Africans. What came to the fore was the economic 
merits of land consolidation as a far-reaching measure of agrarian reform. 
The gender dimension of armed resistance in Africa cannot be ignored. There has 
been no armed war in history which excluded women, in one way or the other. Mau 
Mau was no exception (Kanogo 1990). According to Kanogo, women often used the 
opportunity of gathering firewood to pass information and food supplies to freedom 
fighters, especially in the areas bordering the forests. Kanogo also maintains that there 
was no gender discrimination among the fighters because merit was the most 
important factor for leadership. All the factors discussed in this section; dependency, 
marginalisation, subordination, armed resistance were all about land. This was the 
lesson Kenyans learnt from British settler colonialism. Was there something special 
about British colonialism in Kenya? This issue needs further examination. 
1.5 THE NATURE OF BRITISH COLONIALISM IN KENYA 
There were two parallel forces at work. First was the imperial force that was legally 
in charge of the colony. This was the force that came to impose itself on the African 
customary and traditional systems. Second, there was the settler force that came in 
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when IBEACO gave up responsibility for Kenya. These two forces operated in 
parallel and in some cases in confrontation until independence in 1963. It is important 
to understand their roles in the underdevelopment of Kenya. 
1.5.1 Kenya: A Multi-racial or Multi-ethnic Society? 
It is also important to understand why colonialism intended to make Kenya a 
multiracial society. Assuming that Kenya was a multiracial society, then the spatial 
distribution of Kenya would look like schema IA. In the case that Kenya was a 
multiethnic African society, then the spatial distribution of what now constitutes 
Kenya would look like schema 1B. The crucial question is: 'Which schema is giving 






The composition of African ethnic groups in Schema IB is not necessarily in any 
order. It is known that before colonisation, the major ethnic groups that were living in 
Kenya, Luo and Kikuyu or Karnba and Luhya, for example, did not care about one 
another. Even when they were taken to go and fight the World Wars, they just went as 
Kenyan soldiers, not as tribes from Kenya. Clearly, the British could not and did not 
want to drive the natives away from the colony. They needed them, especially their 
labour. But the people they happened to find in the 'young lion' were the ones in 
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schema 1B. Then there was the question of the British deciding to colonise and to 
settle in Kenya. This had a lot to do with European settlers in Kenya. 
SCHEMAlB 
All 40+ African ethnic 
groups that live in Kenya 
such as Kisii, Pokot, 
Luo, Kamba, Kikuyu, 
Luhya, Dorobo, Masai, 
Mijikenda, Kipsigis, etc. 
1.5.2 Was Colonial Kenya an African Motherland or a European 
Settler Society? 
British colonialism in Kenya had three major characteristics: labour, settlerdom and 
land. Again, each of these characteristics had a gender dimension. It is important to 
understand that settler colonialism could not succeed without forcing Africans to 
I 
become cheap labour. It is also important to note that labour is labour, whether it is 
provided by women or men. The need for labour force also involved some kind of 
labour migration. This is where women lost their status as men were encouraged, or 
forced by the local chiefs to work in the European plantations while women were left 
behind. 
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In those agricultural areas where capital accumulation was slow, pre-capitalist, family 
based production,, mixed with wage employment and the proletariat did not emerge. 
This was the fate of most of Kenya that was outside Nairobi area, Central Province 
and the White 11ighlands. This was the foundation for capitalist mode of production in 
Kenya's agriculture which in turn served the metropolitan interests. Colonial 
capitalism was introduced through cash crops, land alienation and the changing of 
traditional land tenure patterns (Leitner 1976 op. cit). 
Even after Kenya's independence, differentials remained in the wage rates of African 
female and male agricultural labourers. The wage rates paid in the four branches of 
agriculture (sisal, tea, coffee and mixed farming) differed remarkably, up to 100% for 
the same type of work. The task allocation and the combination of various wage rates 
were left to the discretion of supervisors and managers (ibid. ). In Tanganyika, just 
before the Maji Maji war broke out in 1905, 
the loss of men's labour especially as protectors of fields, threatened food production 
at a time of drought, and left fields vulnerable to invasions of wild pigs and other 
predators. Women responded, to the threat of famine ... by increasing their labour 
output, by reshaping cropping patterns and by obtaining medicines to protect their 
fields and to bring rain (Sunseri 1997 p238). 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has presented the various ways in which history can help us to 
understand the cause and effect of land consolidation on the differential status of 
women and men in Kenya. It has also highlighted three areas of serious concern for 
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the future of Kenya: settlerdom, administration or bureaucracy and the missionary or 
the Church. The way in which land, underdevelopment and religion currently occupy 
the centre stage of Kenyans' lives is important for understanding the future survival 
of Kenya as a nation. As Amin (1990 p187) said, 
[t]he African and the Asian are denied their history, their culture, their language and 
also - often - their religion, by three centuries of Western-centrism and a century of 
imperialist colonization. Does the Western left, which boasts the principle of 
4proletarian internationalism' for the most part not in fact prefer 'solidarity of the 
European nations'? 
I have dealt with the legacy of settler colonialism in some detail because a proper 
understanding of the settler colonial history is unique and therefore important. It is the 
comer-stone of the current socio-econornic and political architecture on which the 
future of Kenya rests. When Kenyans properly understand this history, they will be 
able to deal with their exclusion from their common property, they will also realise 
that their tribalism and the Asian question are creations of Britain - in order to keep 
them under perpetual economic dependency. 
I have also stated that there are two dimensions to the land question in Kenya: 
ownership and reform. This is a question of exclusion of the landless labourers, the 
vulnerable and the poor majority from the benefits of development and the fruits of 
independence. It is a real concern for the colonised native, the rural poor and the 
socially excluded who now live at the fringes of Kenyan society. They are the victims 
of multifaceted determinisms and fundamentalisms that are simultaneously religious, 
racial and feminist. They are found within themselves in terms of their differences in 
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sex, in literacy levels and age. The only thing they have in common with those in 
schema 1B is that they are also human. 
This chapter has been a call for a recognition of the real problem that a greater 
majority of Kenyans face: sex inequality before land. It is a question of being 
excluded from the only individual and family lifeline because of one's sex. It is now 




LAND AND GENDER IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A 
THEORETICAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
History and class consciousness are never a finished business. In Chapter One, I spelt 
out a concern with the historical aspect of land distribution in Kenya. Now I want to 
examine both issues, land reform and differential status in a broader and comparative 
perspective. To start with, I will make comparisons between and within different 
regions of sub-Saharan Africa plus a good content of history and class theory. 
Secondly, I will broaden the spatial base of my argument in order to assist 
understanding of what lies behind the current differential status of women and men in 
Africa. Implicitly, this is the best way of representing the situation in Kenya from a 
different perspective and to show concern for the future of Africa. 
This chapter will be divided into five main sections. Section one examines those 
conceptual and theoretical questions that need to be answered in order to shed some 
light on the relationship between land and gender in sub-Saharan Africa. I will start 
with the theory of equality and then discuss the politics of inequality and its relevance 
to Africa. Section two discusses theory of gender and feminism and its relevance to 
Africa. This will be an attempt to shed some light on the differential status of African 
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women and men in Africa. This will be necessary background information when I 
examine the logic behind class consciousness in Africa and the question of European 
African gender relations in contemporary and historical terms. Section three will 
discuss the European settler colonialisms, in sub-Saharan Africa. It will discuss the 
Portuguese and the French colonialisms and then the British. Section four will discuss 
the effect of European culture on gender and class consciousness in Africa. It will 
examine the politics of underdevelopment and alienation in Africa through the 
medium of European languages. Having discussed the theoretical and comparative 
issues, I will need a fifth section to examine any hopes left for African women and 
,k equality before IWd men with regard to 1hp -r national heritage, i. e., land and land 
rights. 
2.1 UNDERSTANDING LANDLESSNESS AND GENDER 
INEQUALITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF 
THEORY 
2.1.1 Theory and Equality 
Current inequality in Africa can be explained by use of theory. '[T]heory is always for 
some one and for something. Theory always serves some purpose and never exists in a 
vacuum. It is inevitably the product of a certain historical period and circumstances, a 
reflection of a certain point in time, of a particular social and political order (Hoffman 
1987 p237) '[T]heorizing is [also] the surest and most expeditious route to 
understanding' (Rosenau and Durfee 1995 p4). In order to understand the basis of 
human inequality, one has to start by theorising because 'theorising is founded on 
73 
rules ... 
for transforming raw observations into refined hypotheses and meaningful 
understandings' (ibid. p5). 
The fact that human beings are either female or male does not theoretically have any 
relation to their differential status because all women and men share a common 
humanity. We must therefore look elsewhere for any differential in the status between 
women and men. One 'place' to look for the differentials between women and men is 
gender and feminism. I agree with Carver (1996 p 117)1 that 'gender is not a synonym 
for women [but] ways that sex and sexuality become power relations in society' which 
means that gender inequality is basically a matter of differentials in power. Gender as 
power relations is the way to understanding 'the extent to which women occupy 
disadvantaged positions in traditional economic and social arrangements' (Sen 1995 
p259). My argument is that nations such as Kenya and societies such as Siaya are also 
economic and social arrangements in which gender as power relations operate. Power 
relations in Kenya and in Siaya are also gendered. 
On the other hand, feminism must emerge from the silent majority. These are 
the women who are most victimised by the sexist oppression; women who are daily 
beaten down , mentally, physically and spiritually- women who are powerless to 
change their condition in life. They are the silent majority (Hooks 1984 p I). 
According to Hooks, 
'Note that in the absence of a thoroughgoing approach, what underlies both equality and gender is the same, i. e., 
is power relations. 
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[w]bite women who dominate feminist discourse today rarely question whether or 
not their perspective on women's reality is true to the lived experiences of women as 
a group. ... Racism abounds in the writings of white feminists, reinforcing white 
supremacy and negating the possibility that women will bond politically across 
ethnic and racial boundaries (p3) (my emphasis). 
At the heart of gender and feminism is one issue, social exclusion. But since the 
changes that are required to move towards a situation of equal opportunity are deeply 
rooted in the economic and political environment, 'it has become increasingly difficult 
to write about women as a group' (Pascall 1998 p192). For example, if land 
consolidation is effected in a given society, justice will not have been done if some 
people eventually become landless, now and in the future and for whatever reason. 
There will therefore be an increasing need to address both economic and political 
questions. Some questions will continue to demand answers. For example, who, in 
Siaya at present, is responsible for past injustices caused by land consolidation, the 
victims or the perpetrators? Where do the descendants of those whose situation was 
made worse by land consolidation go for justice? How far back do we go in history in 
our attempt to trace the root cause of this problem? 
Some of these questions can not be ignored. If we ignore them, our children will have 
to answer them. If current injustices are real, then past injustices are also real. They 
are as real as wounds that were inflicted in the past and are not yet healed. Waltz 
(1997 p913) says that '[fleality is whatever we directly observe'. If justice is to be 
seen and reality is to be observed, then justice is reality. If land consolidation was a 
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(legal) reality, was it socially justified? It was not because it did not portray the 
values of social justice. Quoting Beveridge, Flew (1997 p 116) argues that 
[t]he values of social justice are ... the equal worth of all citizens, their equal right to 
be able to meet their basic needs, the need to spread opportunities and life chances as 
widely as possible, and finally, the requirement that we reduce and where possible 
eliminate unjustified inequalities 
Let me use two examples to illustrate the argument. 
2.1.1.2 The Agrarian Creed 
The concept of Agrarian Creed, as the driving force that, irrespective of time, place, 
and civilisation, has guided and still guides, directly or indirectly, the peasants way of 
thought. Though often obscured by local myths and legends, the Agrarian Creed is 
universal. It is so strongly entrenched in the hearts of tillers that it has become the 
recognised expression for the diverse ideal solutions to rural situations and has 
encouraged the weak to fight their oppressors. Being universal, the concept of 
Agrarian Creed applies everywhere in the world, including Africa, Latin America and 
Asia, irrespective of any form of oppression and exploitation mankind has had to 
undergo in time and place. Of particular interest here is the formulation of the Creed 
by an old Nigerian Chief. I conceive that land belongs to a vastfamily of which many 
are dead, few are living, and countless numbers are still unborn (ibid. p89). How 
does this African perception of land compare to that of the European? 
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2.1.1.3 African Land and British Nationalism: Reality of Life or Just a Matter of 
Definition? 
This definition of land also compares, almost word for word, with a 'British' 
definition of nationalism. Edmund Burke (1729-97) a famous British political 
philosopher, 
talks about society as a pact between those living, those dead and those yet to be 
bom. It is, for Burke, a union among all generations that can not be lightly changed 
or broken. The nation is something, for Burke, that is for all eternity (Sergeant 
1978 p19). 
Note that '[a] conceptual framework standing alone cannot provide explanation, but, 
in the absence of a deductive theory, such a framework is extremely important for 
interrelating explanatory propositions when a broad and complex macro-level topic 
such as political change is to be explained' (Scarritt 1980 p2). The best way out of 
this is to adopt one of Rawlsian principles of justice that 'each person is to have an 
equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for 
others' (Mueller 1989 p4l 1). This is a definition that I agree with since it is realistic. 
2.1.2 Realism and Equality 
it is also possible to dismiss the argument above as mere rationalism. Frohock (1997 
p833) says that 'one can be rational and wrong', but Dow (1997 p80) quotes 
Redman's definition of critical rationalism as 'espousing "tolerance, honesty, 
commitment to the advance of science above personal advance and to the freedom to 
exercise criticism, a willingness to listen and learn from others, and so on"'. 
Rationalists still believe in the omnipotence of science as the ultimate source of all 
the answers to life. 
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Realism, on the other hand is a broad research program that contains a host of 
competing theories (Walt 1997). Realists begin with some general assumptions such 
as: states are the key actors, the international system is anarchic, power is central to 
political life, etc. It is therefore more useful in understanding international relations 
(ibid. ). But George (1995) says that. realist scholarship has only considered the 
egoistic liberal thing-in-itself, and the anarchical warring god in itself. This is a one 
sided problematic from which realist scholarship constructed the egoism-anarchy 
thematic. It is therefore necessary to counter this one-sidedness by a kind of politico- 
ethical attitude evident in Foucault's injunction against the universal intellectualism 
of those traditionally engaged with theory and practice (ibid. ). If rationalism is more 
useful in understanding international relations, then why hasn't it helped us to 
understand African relations with the West? Furthermore, isn't universal 
intellectualism being one sided by not talking for the oppressed, the poor women and 
men in Africa, dying everyday from famine and poverty? 
How is the modernist God-like status compatible with the current Western driven 
globalisation that is deliberately snatching the Third World the right to self 
determination? 'A central tenet of 'globalisation' is that multinationals can move 
their capital whenever they want, so thwarting attempts by governments to control 
them or of workers to improve wages and conditions' (Harman 1996 p2). How can 
governments in a globalized Third World be responsible for the poor, the women, and 
the landless? I agree with (Varshney 1997 pl) that '[Plostmodem views have serious 
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implications for research on postcolonial societies and 'subaltern' groups such as 
women, tribals, peasants, and minorities'. Will they ever be able to speak for 
themselves if they do not have the right to self determination? 
This argument was necessitated by three reasons. First, it brought out the two sides of 
theoretical divide in social science: the realist and the rationalist divides. Second, it 
demonstrated the problem with imPosing irrelevant Western concepts such as 
postmodernism and globalisation to the Third World. Third, it gave me a context for 
theoretically situating the balance of my argument. I must repeat that it is not possible 
to get away with injustice, past, present and in the future. In this regard, it is important 
to note what Bauman (1976 p16) calls 'Tocqueville's summation of American 
democracy: what the few have today, the many will demand tomorrow'. I now turn to 
examine the theoretical relevance of gender and feminism to Africa. 
2.2 GENDER, FEMINISM AND THEORY: ANY RELEVANCE TO 
AFRICA? 
A major problem with rationalism is that it is not verifiably possible to use one's 
particular capacities to help qIhm speak for themselves. This particularly depends on 
what is meant by capacities. Capacity as 'a specified position or function' 2 has a 
connection with gender as power relations discussed above and also as individual 
power irrespective of sex. I am here referring to power in a relative sense and also in 
2This is the sixth of ten definitions of capacity in the Collins Concise English Dictionary, 1992 page 195 
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absolute sense. Before I examine the implications behind this definition, it is 
necessary to throw some light on the theory behind gender and feminism. 
2.2.1 Feminism in Theoretical Perspective 
Feminist theorists, particularly those that are class conscious have also been critical 
of rationalist approach to feminism and empowerment. 'Instead, African-American 
women [particularly] have overtly rejected theories of power based on domination in 
order to embrace an alternative vision of power based on a humanist vision of self- 
actualisation, self-definition, and self-determination' (Deveneaux, 1996 p233). 
Lovibond (1994) also argued that women should refuse to take on trust the account 
that science and philosophy have given of themselves in the past. Women should 
beware of 'the crisis of rationality' which 'consists in a confrontation between the 
thinking subject and the fact of his own materially conditioned status -a fact for 
which there is no obvious means of assimilation into a cognitive enterprise that aims 
to transcend historicity and local perspective' (p75). 
The main argument here is that women should not simply be like 'bourgeois 
feminists' - or better still, - 'women's-rightsers', within the existing social order 
because 'such feminists make women's juridical rights ... the be-all and end-all of 
their movement and program, by detaching the question of women's rights from the 
basic social issues, by making it a separate question' (Draper and Lipow 1976 p 180) 
(emphasis in original). 'Women's activity must link up with all the questions that are 
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of pressing importance for the general movement of the proletariat. The main task 
surely is to arouse class consciousness among women and involve them in the class 
struggle' (ibid. p199). 
This debate has relevance to Africa and to the develoPing World in general. I find this 
relevance in two examples from history. Firstly, '[hlistorical studies indicate that the 
most ancient of all gods (in Pharaonic Egypt, for example) were female. [But this] 
was a reflection of their status within society before the systems characterised by the 
patriarchal family, land ownership and division into social classes came into 
being'(Saadawi 1980 p92). The rise of these systems saw the gradual fall of the status 
of women over a period of time although vestiges of the matriarchal system continued 
to survive in the feudal or slave societies such as that of the Pharaohs (ibid. ). 
Secondly, 'legal systems related to family structures, inheritance and the naming of 
children are also a reflection of the socio-econornic relationships in society' (ibid. 
p92). Economic life in the early stages of human history was dependent on very 
simple and restricted activities, such as picking fruits and nuts, fishing, hunting, etc. 
These simple activities required humans to lead a continuously nomadic life in search 
of food. This form of life left no room for a surplus and private property was out of 
question. In the absence of private property, people were not divided into classes, into 
rulers and ruled. They were all equal members of the community (ibid. ). 
In comparison to Africa, we can draw two parallels from this example. First, there are 
currently many ethnic communities in Africa that still live with simple 'Communal 
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economics' of hunting, fishing and gathering fuel wood, picking fruits and vegetables, 
etc. Secondly, the system of inheritance, as shown in Figure 1-1 is very typical of 
many ethnic communities in Africa. In both cases, privatisation of common property 
leads to disinheritance of women and inheritance by men and subsequently, a 
patriarchal class based society. 
In sum, two generalisations arise from this discussion on theory and feminism. The 
first one is that there is very little difference between Foucaultian feminism and 
bourgeois feminism. Both are rejected by feminism based on realism. The second one 
is that the need for integrating individual women's capacities, irrespective of race and 
class in the process of social awakening is the only option that is realistic and can 
stand the test of time. I now want to discuss the theory behind gender. 
2.2.2 Gender in Theoretical Perspective 
The debate on theory and gender is also a debate of sexual power relations. Fraser 
(1996) strongly argues that theory itself should be debunked. 
The whole theoretical enterprise is problematic in a deeper sense. In its objectivism, 
(which is only men's subjectivism) in its abstraction, in its partiality disguised as 
universality, in its failure to be sensitive to concrete practicalities, in its construction 
of facts which are false to realities, in its oppressive nature, theory is male or 
masculine, and 'theorising' is a male activity (pl7l) (emphasis in original). 
Within particular contexts of feminist discourse, feminist movement in the UK, for 
example, has been caught up in a dispute about the dominance of middle class values 
(ibid. p 174), a case against bourgeois feminism. However, 'theory can not be gender 
82 
neutral. An acceptable theory must not be masculine in the same way theories in the 
western tradition too often have been; but theory must be gender sensitive' (p 18 0). 
The question of gender equality per se can be complicated. Gender equality in real 
life comes down to the question of 'female human nature' - an issue originally 
discussed by Plato and Socrates. 'Plato has been portrayed as a bold precursor of 
modem feminism, a ruthless oppressor of women and the "female voice" and a 
complete ironist' (Forde 1997 p657). Socrates, on the other hand launches on the 
difficult subject of gender equality arguing that there is a single, genderless human 
virtue, and justice requires that it be developed and made use of wherever it is found 
(ibid. ). In brief, modem feminism has been very interested in the ideas of Plato and 
Socrates on gender. However, my centre of interest in theory here is related to three 
strands of feminist philosophy mentioned by Lennon (1995). First are those Marxists 
and critical theorists who have argued for decades that much of contemporary culture 
reflects bourgeois interests. Second are those theorists that Lennon calls 'Southern 
scholars', who have pointed to the Eurocentricism of contemporary knowledge 
production. Third are the theorists of postmodernism, who point to the contingency 
and locatedness of all our knowledge claims. The locus of human inequality in Africa 
is therefore currently dangling inside ideological triangle bounded by three variables: 
Capitalism, Eurocentricm and Postmodemism. 
I have hardly come across literature by African or Third World women scholars on the 
theory of gender and feminism. By 'Southern scholars', Lennon must have referred to 
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people from the South blaming Europe or the North for their bourgeois feminist 
interests. Perhaps she meant American women 'of colour'. I agree that postmodernism, 
ceteris paribus 3 must be attractive to North American or European women 'of colour' 
because postmodernist writers like Foucault, Derida, Lyotard, etc., 'argued against the 
faith in universal reason that [was] inherited from European enlightenment 
philosophy. They rejected stories that claimed to encompass all of human history 
and proposed a social criticism that was ad hoc, contextual, plural and limited' 
(Hartsock 1996 p40). These, in my view, are the attributes that European and 
American writers of colour, including Africans, complain about. 
At this point, gender and feminism meet with theory and relevance as they work to 
determine the differential status of women and men in Africa. When these values and 
theories are exported to the Third World, they do not go to operate in a tabula rasa. 
They find the indigenous and existing values and theories, called customs and 
traditions that already operate and keep those 'primitive' societies going. The 'clash' 
between the two types of values and theories is phenomenal. Understanding this clash 
is important for understanding the significance of Europe, and especially, Anglo- 
saxon determination of human inequality and class consciousness in Africa. Relying 
on the lessons I have learned from this history, I now want to examine some specific 
cases of European relationships with Africa. 
3 with other things being equal 
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2.3 COLONIALISM AND HUMAN EQUALITY IN AFRICA 
There is no way in which the history of human life in Sub-Saharan Africa can be 
delinked from European colonialism. According to Williams (1993 p 103), 
History permits us to interpret colonialism as a fascinating example of nineteenth 
century liberal notions superimposed on the anciens regimes of Africa, Asia and 
Latin America. High ideals and even higher profit levels, determined the extension 
of European influence over newly conquered territories of the far flung empire, 
regulating the interaction of a world system of core, semi periphery and peripheries. 
The 'accidents' of European Balkani§ation produced a diverse pattern of multi-ethnic 
colonies whose transition to independence is one of the most squalid and tragic 
episodes in world history. 
'For African countries, it is unfortunate that a national tradition can not be 
manufactured overnight. There is at least one factor that can be used to help 
manufacture a national identity - the colonial experience' (Sergeant 1978 op cit. p26) 
(my emphasis). A point to start from is land because European colonisation in 
tropical Africa disturbed the equilibrium. between Africans and the land (King 1977 
op. cit. ). The colonial experience is critical to modem Africa because of its strong 
impact on the present socio-economic situation in Africa. The incorporation of 
tropical Africa into European Empires is generally held to have been not only the 
most significant process of recent decades in a relative sense but also in an absolute 
sense with its radical, indeed revolutionary impact on society, economics and politics 
(Hodder-Williams 1984). But '[t]he colonial bureaucracy was a "political 
organization" without a legitimate constituency. It was both unrepresentative and 
unresponsive - the two hallmarks of undemocratic social systems' (Oyugi 1988 p102). 
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Colonial inheritance contained two basic concepts alien to Africa, nation'states and 
boundary lines (Griffiths 1995). These factors emerged as the major determinants of 
human status and land reform in post-colonial Africa. I will examine three specific 
examples: the Portuguese, the French and the British. 
I must clarify that my understanding of Africa in this context is synonymous to pan- 
Africanism. defined as 
Africa as the homeland of Africans and persons of African origin, solidarity among 
men of African descent, belief in distinct African personality, rehabilitation Of 
Africa's past, pride in African culture, Africa for Africans in Church, and state and 
the hope for a united and glorious Africa (Bhola 1990 p 16). 
We are aware that European colonialism effectively disrupted African's understanding 
pan-Africanism and African socialism for their own benefit. In fact, 
[d]ualistic modes of analysis have possessed a kind of intuitive truth in Southern 
Africa because at a political level, colonial regimes were brutally dualistic and 
authoritarian. The historical owners of the land were transformed into the 
'indigenous', the 'natives' or the 'traditional', their institutions partially maintained 
yet subordinated to European law, settler culture, and capitalist class relations. Many 
African cultivators became migrant workers, strangers in one part of their own land, 
with households divided between reserves, locations and compounds (O'Laughlin 
1996 p4). 
This was a real nightmare scenario whose aim was to wipe out the African traditional 
relationships with land. Unprecedented waves of dualistic migration started with men 
moving to work in settler plantations while women reproduced labour power in native 
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reserves (ibid. ). In terms of age and sex, migration policies were also dualistic. Men 
were recruited for manual work in their youth and then exiled to reserves with women 
and children in illness and old age (ibid. ). The policy was to separate the husbandman 
from his land and tho make him the labourer in his own land. Despite all these 
colonial efforts, ethnographic studies in at least nine cases of land holding in various 
regions of Africa have shown that individuals had the rights to use and take the fruits 
of land they are working (Vanderlinden 1967). 
They could also dispose of it freely except that: 
i) the rights could not be transferred to a stranger (settler), unless that stranger joins 
the political community which has superior rights over the land, be it tribe, kinship 
group, village, or family, and 
ii) land could not be sold traditionally (ibid. ). 
Does this help us to understand the agenda behind the current Anglo-American 
interest in family planning and population studies in Africa? An examination of other 
'models' would greatly help understanding the reality behind the colonial land and 
population policy in Africa. 
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2.3.1 The Portuguese Colonialism 
The Portuguese were the first to launch a series of European footholds on the African 
coasts. The first visit by Portuguese ships at Malindi, Kenya was on 15. April 1498. 
This was able to bring sub-Saharan Africa into closer relations with the rest of the 
world than ever before (Fage 1995 op cit. ). Strangely enough, the Portuguese claimed 
that they had certain historical experiences and social practices that gave them a 
unique ability to co-exist with peoples of colour. Racial tolerance, hard work, 
religious faith, devotion to home and family, assimilation of indigenous cultures, and 
respect for the authority of the Church and the state were the behavioural norms 
which the Portuguese claimed were widespread throughout their African colonies and 
were creating multi-racial societies in the image of Brazil (Opello 1980). 
The Portuguese are known to have created lasting inequality between the indigenous 
people in Mozambique. On a spatial or horizontal scale, the lasting differentials 
emerged between the ethnic groups from the North/Central and the South regions 
inhabited by the Makonde, the Yao, and the Tonga, respectively. The northerners 
considered the southemers as primitive and traditional, while the southemers 
considered the northerners as aggressive, domineering and corrupt. Superimposed on 
these ethnic cleavages was a vertical system of stratification based upon socio- 
economic, educational, cultural, and racial factors. At the top were the Portuguese 
owners of large plantations, large scale business enterprises, top level civil servants, 
military officers and successful businessmen. Below them were middle level civil 
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servants, salaried white collar employees, and small farmers who could be thought of 
a 'middle class'. Although they were largely white, many middle class members were 
mulattos and a few were assimilated Africans4. Finally, the lowest level of this 
minority consisted almost entirely of African assimilants who worked as skilled and 
semi-skilled wage earners (Opello op cit. ). In sum, effects of Portuguese colonialism 
in Africa are lasting inequalities based on religious, tribal, geographical, racial 
boundaries and landlessness. 
2.3.2 The French Colonialism 
The French imperialist expansion and rule in Africa was stimulated by the 
universalist ideals of the Revolution of 1789-notably, LibertiEgaIU4 Fraterniti This 
vocation in the 19th. century became the mission civilisatrice, ultimately linked with 
French imperialist rule and expansion in Africa. After the 2nd. World War, French 
policy makers initiated a process of decolonisation from above as they came to realise 
that the ending of formal control need not necessarily be accompanied by a loss of real 
power and influence on the continent (Martin 1995). Shortly after assuming power in 
June 1958, General Charles de Gaulle, who was trying to revive French grandeur, 
nurtured a special relationship with those fracophone African leaders who thought 
that if they could share in the creation of a new France they would also have a part in 
her success. De Gaulle's personal conception of France-Afrique was translated into 
4 Walter Opello argues that for Africans granted assimilated status, there was theoretically freedom to advance in 
any endeavor, but due to Portuguese racism, the assimilados still had comparatively low levels of education, 
and the relative paucity of economic and political opportunities militated against widespread social and 
economic mobility. Mullatos, by contrast, were automatically considered to be assimilated because of their 
mixed parentage, and their color gave them ascriptive advantage in the competition for the relatively scarce 
educational and socio-econornic opportunities available. 
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his project of a communautefiranco-qfricane (CFA) granting autonomy and internal 
self governrnent to the African colonies, while France would retain control over such 
essential matters as defence, foreign affairs, as well as economic, monetary, and 
strategic minerals policy (ibid. ). Only Sekou Toure of Guinea was able to tell de 
Gaulle that the inhabitants preferred 'poverty in liberty than wealth in slavery' (ibid. 
p4) 
The relationshiP between France and her former colonies in Africa were founded on 
some kind of 'elitist egalitarianism', while Britain insisted on unequal relationship 
with her fonner colonies (Apter et. al. 1994 op cit. ). France's continued policy of 
exclusivity, stability and continuity also showed that her African policy was primarily 
motivated by a conception of 'own national interests', disregarding African concerns 
and interests. For France, 'Africa is seen as simply a place of nature for which there is 
no need to waste much intellectual thought' (Bourmaud 1995 p6l). Having taken 
Africa for granted, 'French policy in Africa is [currently] at crossroads' (ibid. p58). 
First, the initial shock waves were felt when the CFA franc was devaluated by 50% in 
January 1994, thereby signalling the demise of the franco-African preferential 
monetary and trading area known as la zonefranc (Martin 1995 op. cit. ). Second, 
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[t]he 1994-97 developments in Rwanda and Zaire were considered by many French 
government officials as evidence of an "anglosaxon conspiracy". The events in 
Central Africa were seen by French politicians, diplomats and journalists as part of a 
plot, as evidence of an "anglosaxon" scheme to develop an arch of influence from 
Ethiopia to Eritrea via Uganda, Rwanda and Zaire to Congo and Cameroon. For 
them, the 'Anglosaxons have a hidden agenda "to oust France from Africa" 
(Huliaras 1997 pl). 
When will Africans be left alone to start rebuilding their continent again? Africans 
had to go through (Anglo-Saxon) slave trade, European colonialism, soviet/Anglo- 
Saxon rivalry (the cold war) and now the francophone/Anglo-Saxon rivalry? Is there 
something particularly Anglo-Saxon in Africa? 
2.3.3 The British Colonialism 
Under Roman Britain, the structure of rural society had its base on the coloni, or 
dependent cultivators of the soil, and below them the slaves. Both classes will be 
found reappearing under Anglo-Saxon rule (Finberg 1972 p400). 
In fact, they reappeared in Africa; first, slave trade, and second, rural dependent 
cultivators that now abound in Africa. This is, in my view, the historical explanation 
of the relation between Britain and Africa. To crown it all, on 5th. December 1857, 
Livingstone addressed Cambridge University. He said: 
I beg to direct your attention to Africa; I know that in a few years I shall be cut off in 
that country, which is now open: Do not let it be shut again! I go back to Africa to 
try to make an open path for commerce and Christianity; do you carry out the work 
which I have begun. I leave it wilh you (Pakenham. 1991 p 1). 
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Pankenham (p xxiv) added that 
Livingstone sounded a call for a world-wide crusade to open up Africa. A new slave 
trade, organised by Swahili and Arabs in East Africa, was eating out the heart of the 
continent. Livingstone's answer was the '3Cs': Commerce, Christianity and 
Civilisation, a triple alliance of Mamon, God and social progress. Trade, not the gun, 
would liberate Africa. 
David Livingstone is an appropriate starting point for both theoretical and 
comparative discussion of British colonialism in Africa. Just as the Portuguese 
believed in their Catholic culture, the British believed in their Christianity. Just as the 
French believed in their mission civilisatrice the British believed in the triple alliance. 
But an extra point to the British compared to other continental colonialisms in Africa 
is that the British system had more dimensions to it. The one that is relevant here was 
the Anglo-Americanism, herein called super-power colonialism. I will discuss other 
dimensions of British colonialism in the next chapter. Better still, we are now aware 
of the strong Anglo-American content in the debate on the theory of gender and 
feminism as well as their relation to human inequality in Africa. A brief discussion of 
the super-power colonialism and the creation and sustenance of the current differential 
status of women and men in Africa will also be appropriate. 
2.3.3.1 British Imperialism in Africa 
The relationship between British imperialism and land question was deeply rooted in 
the geography and history of Africa. British settlerdorn was greatly influenced by the 
land and climate which were suitable in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Kenya. 
Settlerdom was therefore the main factor underlying slow progress to majority rule in 
Southem Africa: Zimbabwe (1980), Namibia (1990) and South Africa (1994). 
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Kenya's earlier independence (1963) was influenced by the independence of Uganda 
and Tanzania, although the settlers, some of whom came from South Africa, almost 
took arms to resist Kenya's independence (Tignor 1976 op, cit. ). 
The relationship between colonial underdevelopment in Kenya and South Africa is 
very special. According to Padmore (1972 p 18 9) quoting Dr. [Norman] Leys, 
When the [scholar] of the future looks for examples of the worst result of the 
capitalist system in society, where avarice allied with racial pride and domination 
showed least signs of shame, where the common people were most despised and 
poorest, where the law was least regarded and loyalty least possible, he will point to 
South Africa and Kenya. 
There was also the cold war, which had greatest impact in those countries that were 
relatively abandoned by their colonial masters such as the Portuguese, the Belgians 
and Italians with respect to Angola/Mozambique, Rwanda/Zaire and Somalia, 
respectively (Gross 1996). As an accomplice to British settlerdorn in Africa, the US, 
for example, kept a safe distance from African struggle for independence. When 
Nigeria had its civil war in the 60s, the US embargoed the sale of arms to both sides 
and maintained a low profile, while France supported Biafra. In South Africa, the US 
continually played a mediating role, all the way to majority rule in 1994. In Kenya, 
the US was content with the system until it became clear that only multi-party system 
could save Kenya from a possible break-up (ibid. ). 
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Since attaining majority rule in 1994, the Republic of South Africa has quickly 
occupied the centre, stage of a middle power in the continent. Remember that 
[m]iddle powers are not simply middle powers because of their participation in the 
mediation, bridge-building activity or co-operation in certain technical areas, but 
because 'it suits their long term interest vis-a-vis world order, the world economy, 
and the pursuit ofdominant societal values and interests, all supported by significant 
material/ technicallbureaucratic capabilities to do so' (Westhuizen 1998 p439) 
(emphasis in original). 
It is now possible to see the spread of Anglo-Saxon triumphalism across much of 
sub-Saharan Africa more clearly. Mozambique has become a member of the 
Commonwealth. Colonialism has now become globalisation and privatisation while 
Africa is now forced to negotiate her future and the new Millennium in Anglo- 
American terms (Woodhouse 1996). Is the settler re-emerging from south of the 
Limpopo to privatise land in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa? 
Building theory about the development of sub-Saharan Africa must therefore be 
founded on the legacies of colonialism and imperialism, let alone slavery. Such 
arguments as 'the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the 
misery of not being exploited at all' (Robinson 1964 p45) are deep-rooted behind the 
economic rationalisation of imperialism. They are deeply entrenched in the liberal 
school, 'that free trade and only free trade appears justified from the purely economic 
point of view, that only it guarantees the best provisioning of all persons, the greatest 
yield of labour with the smallest expenditure of costs' (von Mises 1983 p76). The 
philosophy behind exploitation was that colonialism and imperialism provided free 
trade and not exploitation. 
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The settler is not re-emerging from the south. Only the goal posts are moving for the 
African, as has ever happened before. The game is still rooted on impoverishing the 
Africans in their motherland. Robinson's interpretation presents imperialism as an 
economic necessity. Just as colonialism, it regards the natives only as a means, not as 
an end in themselves. 
In summary, the gender landscape in sub-Saharan Africa is at the cross-roads because, 
as Klan (1997) says, cultures take time to mature. Three main factors account for this. 
First, quoting Hollister, Klan (p2) says that the Germans used to inherit the wives of 
their kins in A. D. 98. "Germanic sexual equality is contradicted by evidence from 
early Germanic law codes which regard women as life long minors under- the legal 
guardianship of their fathers, their husbands, or, if the husband died, his nearest 
kinsman". Second, the parallel after-war colonialism in which the British, French and 
Portuguese were involved in decades of social engineering produced everlasting 
vertical and horizontal gender inequalities. Horizontally, these inequalities affected 
the African traditional land use systems by forcefully imposing alien commercial 
agribusiness on African land. Culturally the changing African land owners into 
tenants of the crown, using their male labour force in the export oriented and 
European owned commercial farms and then abandoning the aged men in the 
'overpopulated' rural reserves of women and children was no better than slavery in 
reverse. Third, the political project of Anglo-American globalisation. Gray (The 
Guardian May 27th. 1998) has pointed out; 
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When it is used by political and business leaders, however, globalisation usually 
refers to something else - world-wide economic deregulation and the universal reach 
of the Anglo-American free market. In this later sense, globalisation is not an 
inexorable historical trend. It is a neoliberal political project. 
All these are the determinants of the differential status of blacks and whites in Africa. 
At all times and in all places alien forces ensured that African women were at the very 
bottom of the pyramid. This is also how African women's perception of themselves, 
and African men's perception of African women was determined. This is how women 
in Africa understand their social station in life: that they have to be religious, that they 
are 'inferior' to men, and that they are not achievers, etc. This perception of life is 
passed on from older women to the younger women through generations. To what 
extent do Africans see their poverty and gender inequality in tenns of European 
imposed poverty and landlessness? This question can only be answered by a 
theoretical examination of land and class in Africa. 
2.4. DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT: GENDER 
AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS IN AFRICA 
We have seen that Social Science literature from the West often neglects to clarify 
how Africa currently fits in the rest of the Third World. For instance, sometimes one 
may find South Africa classified in the group of developed countries, as in Worsley 
(1989 p517). Other times, sub-Saharan Africa and continental Africa are mixed up. 
This confusion stems from the difficulty of white settlers to identify themselves with 
the dark continent. But South Africa, as the centre of British settlerdom in Africa, is 
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y= important in understanding what lies behind current policies on land and gender 
in these countries. It is clear that land consolidation, which started in Kenya in 1956 
was similar to apartheid, which started in South Africa in 1959. Kauppi (1989 p480) 
said that 
[i]n 1959, at a time when much of Africa stood on the threshold of independence 
from its colonial masters, Prime Minister H. F. Verwoerd unveiled a sweeping 
partition plan that was euphemistically termed "separate development. " It was 
hoped that this policy would not only reinforce white political control, but actually 
increase south Africa's legitimacy in the eyes of the world. 
There is no difference between the separate development plan and land consolidation 
since they are just aspects of social engineering aimed at depriving the natives of their 
land ownership and then tenanting them. Both of them create physical and social 
boundaries aimed at excluding others from the land and power, irrespective of sex. 
In this argument, Sub-Saharan Africa excludes North Africa, i. e., the so-called 
patriarchal belt, 'running eastwards from Morocco through Asia to Southern China, 
where the sharing of resources between men and women is at it most unequal' 
(Griffiths 1996 p66). However, it is also important to note that 'we live in a world 
system, which is limited only marginally by national sovereignties. This world system 
is not only of capitalism, but also racism and patriarchy' (Barrett 1992 p33). 
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One of the ways in which Africa5 negotiates the Millenium is to change the 
contemporary European perception and attitude about Africa In other words, if 
humankind is to expect a future of human equality, happiness and dignity for 
Africans, they will have to start from the theory behind European perception of 
Africa. One major instrument in moulding that perception is language particularly 
English language. It was the medium of communication during conquest and 
colonisation of Africa. It is also the medium of current Anglo-American globalisation 
and privatisation of land, especially in Africa. How is Africa negotiating the 
Millennium in English language and in Anglo-American terms? 
2.4.1 English Language and Class in Africa 
Ali Mazrui already pointed out the parallels between class consciousness among the 
African 'scholars' and 'intellectuals' and the African masses. He examined how 
English language originally created African leaders and politicians and then created 
their followers among the masses and the nations. In a reciprocal way, 'English helped 
to make [African] intellectuals nationalistic and intellectuals in turn helped to lead the 
thinking of the masses in the same direction' (Mazrui 1966 p303). 
A decade later, Mazrui pointed out 'the emergence of a modem intelligentsia, the 
expansion of their role in society, the internationalisation of their horizons, and their 
significance for modem Africa and its new educational and political systems' (Mazrui 
1978 p368). He then defined an intellectual as 'a person who has the capacity to be 
fascinated by ideas and has acquired the skill to handle some of those ideas 
sBy Africa here, I mean sub-Saharan Africa 
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effectively' (p368). Another question followed: 'Must an [African] intellectual be 
socially committed' (p368)? He argued that it is desirable for African intellectuals to 
be socially engaged although not all educated Africans are intellectuals. Educated 
Africans who become very prosperous prematurely are particularly prone to 
intellectual decay. Eventually, they become ex-intellectuals, either having lost interest 
in abstract ideas, or permitted their intellectual skills to fall into disrepair (ibid. ). 
This is one example of how class consciousness was determined by European 
language colonialism in Africa. Particularly in the Anglo-American Africa, which 
Mazrui was concerned with. This trend had devastating consequences for, gender. 
First, class consciousness was synonymous with political consciousness, which was a 
matter for a carefully chosen few. Most of these were 'made in England' mentalities 
like Kamuzu Banda, Kwame Nkrumah and Jorno Kenyatta. An important difference 
was Julius Nyerere, who was 'made in Scotland'. With specific reference to Kenya, 
Curtis (1995 p72) says that 
[t]he cultivation of African elite whose task would be to preside over Kenyan 
independence and who would preserve the British economic and political interests in 
the country was not an easy one, given that many of the most popular nationalist 
leaders had been imprisoned in 1952 with the declaration of the state of emergency. 
Second, class consciousness in colonial Africa was deliberately made a preserve of 
6male intellectuals', some of whom, like Leopold Sedar Sengor, an apogee of the 
assimilationist influence of the French culture, and who was just sent from Europe to 
go and lead their countries to 'independence' (Mazrui and Tidy 1984). Paradoxically, 
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in southern Africa, particularly where Europeans were involved in land ownership and 
land rights, e. g., Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. African male 
intellectual development was suppressed by Apartheid and Luso-tropicalism. Luso- 
tropicalism was the doctrine that the Portuguese, whether in Portugal or Africa or 
Brazil were in partnership with non whites and did not share the colour prejudice so 
prevalent among the other European peoples (Mazrui and Tidy 1984 ibid. ) . In this 
scenario, there was completely no chance for an African woman to be conscious about 
her status. 
Another example was how the development of class consciousness in post- 
independence Africa was gendered. For example, before Jorno Kenyatta was released 
from prison, the rallying cry in Kenya was a two-finger salute signifying Uhuru na 
Kenyatta, i. e., Independence and Kenyatta- When Kenyatta was released in 1961, it 
was changed to Uhuru na Kazi, i. e., Independence and Work. Kazi is a Swahili word 
meaning 'work' or 'employment'. But did Kenyans know that they were already 
doing work in their indigenous social systems such as subsistence agriculture? When 
commercial agriculture became a matter of economics, i. e., agricultural economics, 
subsistence agriculture ceased to be counted as part of the wealth of the nation. The 
human labour that was mainly responsible for subsistence agriculture also ceased to 
count. Gender inequality became evident when subsistence agriculture was classified 
as 'informal sector' and therefore not counted as kazi in Kenya. 
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When subsistence agriculture was no longer counted as productive work in Kenya, it 
became like other activities, such as routine household work and other activities which 
are called reproductive. But the rationale behind separating productive and 
reproductive work is difficult to understand. Allen (1972 p 177) pointed out that 
[t]he most pervasive economic factor in any society is the means whereby labour 
power is acquired and utilised. It is this factor which distinguished types of societies 
from each other: slave from feudal; feudal from capitalist; capitalist from 
subsistence. 
The main message here is that labour power can not be separated from the people who 
supply it, irrespective of sex. In a capitalist society, labourers are labourers, whether 
they are slaves, civil servants or factory workers. They all supply labour. What 
matters is class as a determinant of economic exploitation of human labour-power 
(called manpower). Being a man or woman and being rich or poor all assign human 
beings to different classes. 
In Africa labour power is obtained through kinship networks, and is distributed 
through traditionally determined age and sex categories within those networks (ibid. ). 
In a capitalist society, labour is obtained and distributed through a pricing system. 
Taking capitalist development in some English colonies of Africa, for example, Allen 
says that due to favourable climatic, geological and topographical conditions, 
101 
'[their] economic resources have been exploited in a classic sense. This was the case 
in Kenya and Rhodesia. The indigenous population was dispossessed of its fertile 
land, and then recruited both by physical and market pressures as wage labour. Poll 
(head) taxes were used extensively as a means of compelling indigenous Africans to 
enter the labour market, and were levied on all sections of African societies (ibid. 
p179). 
On the other hand, those countries that were not suitable for European settlement like 
Uganda, Tanganyika in East Africa and most of West Africa, were subjected to 
imperial control. There was no need for the European acquisition of land, only of 
mineral and land rights (ibid. ). Since independence, the force of European law that 
protects private property has continued to apply in all former colonies with no 
exception in Africa. This social engineering was much above the comprehension of 
African women feminists at that time. The European 'rule of law' that legitimised 
alienation of the private from the public land prevailed. 
The problem, however, is that this 'rule of law' was also in a foreign language. 'We 
need to remember, therefore, that language is more than an act of speaking, it is also 
an act of representation' (May 1997 pl. 18). As long as African themselves prefer to 
represent their own existence in European languages, gender inequality, exclusion and 
class mentality will continue to appear normal to Africans. 
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2.4.2 From Empire to Third World: Politics of Exclusion and Class 
in Africa 
Language and politics have both played a very crucial role in suppressing class 
consciousness in Africa. The very reason for the existence of a 'Third World' is 
basically to stigmatise it. Worsley (op cit. p520) defines the Third World as 
consisting of a subset of underdeveloped capitalist countries which are owned, run and 
underdeveloped by the First World. Marxists-Leninists, on the other hand define the 
Third World as 'that large and in many ways diverse collection of colonies, 
sernicolonies, and neo-colonies which form the base of the global capitalist pyramid' 
(Sklar 1976 p88). These definitions clearly show how colonial language has been 
used to stigmatize Africa. I have yet to come across an African language with an 
equivalent of Third World. 
Africa also fits into the structure of the peripheral world, where the Third World and 
the periphery would refer to the same thing. In this case, we find a European-centred 
world economy comprising core, semi-periphery and periphery. This definition is 
central to the analysis of the modern world-system animated by capitalism (Williams 
1993 op cit. p76). Africa is therefore both a periphery and a Third World. If the Third 
world includes Asia, Africa and Latin America, is there any reason for Africa not 
being at the periphery of the periphery? This is a notion of exclusion at its greatest 
extent. It is absolutely compelling to discuss its implications for Africa. 
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2.4.2.1 Third World or Excluded World? Imperialism, Gender and Class in 
Africa 
Any country in Africa that graduated from colonialism unf6rtunately became a Third 
World country because, (I repeat that) '[for] African countries, it is [important to 
understand] that a national tradition [cannot] be manufactured overnight. There is at 
least one factor that can be used to help manufacture a national identity- the colonial 
experience' (Sergeant 1978 op cit. p26; my emphasis). The colonial experience is 
critical to modem Africa because of its strong impact on the present socio-economic 
situation in Africa. The challenge now facing Europe is to turn their colonialism 
around from a history of exploitation to a future of hope for Africans. Is this possible? 
Fundamentally, I repeat that colonial inheritance contained two basic concepts alien to 
Africa, nation states and boundary lines (Griffiths 1995 op. cit. ). The concept of land 
reform was also alien because it imposed artificial boundary lines on land. The 
current boundary related problems in Africa, both within and between countries, are 
so critical that it is most urgent to understand their cause. First, colonial governments 
determined to change the structure of person-land relations and derailed authentic 
development in Africa. Cultural aspects of the native person-land relationship were 
largely ignored, underestimated and even directly suppressed. Other intrinsic issues 
were; loss of traditional sources of prestige, women's rights, the separation of related 
kinship groupings, and missing the important concept of culture in the system of 
African land ownership (Biebuyck 1963). 
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Another lasting factor of European imperialism in Africa was the Berlin Conference 
of November 1884, which was supposed to enable the great European powers to 
manage some of the conflicts in which they were involved in the African continent 
(Chapman 1989). 
The conference is often wrongly perceived as being concerned with partition of 
Africa, yet questions of sovereignty were never formally dealt with. Its interest here 
in relation to the future idea of Eurafrique is that the conference itself displayed the 
tensions between those in favour of detente in Africa and those preferring 
competition, or, to put it another way, it served to distinguish the 'intemationalists' 
from the 'scramblers' (ibid. p64). 
As long as European trade and exploitation was going on in Southern Africa: Angola, 
Mozambique, Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and the Congo, there was no 
problem. Congo was consistently a great source of immense wealth for Europe 
(Rodney 1973). 
The resulting differentials in the status of women in Africa has a connection with this 
Eurafrique because for Africans, there was no difference between Eurafrique and 
colonialism and patriarchy. Africans had to learn to live with a mixture of British, 
Portuguese and French colonialisms all over sub-Saharan Africa. How did they cope 
with the Leviathan? Assuming that wisdom is synonymous with sage philosophy let 
me take an example from the world of music. Having been divided by the scramblers, 
Africans had only one way of showing their internationalism; music. In the 60s, 
African sage philosophers (Odera-Oruka 1992) like Miriam Makeba of South Africa, 
made a historical song about Jorno Kenyatta, among many others (Fossu-Mensah et 
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al. 1987; Mazrui and Tidy 1984 op cit. ). Music was the main means for African 
women and men to raise class consciousness among Africans during colonial times, 
both at national and international levels. The point worth noting, however, is that most 
African international musicians, both male and female, such as Tabu Ley and Mbilia- 
Bel, are Zaireans. Another point is that these Zaireans sing in local languages such as 
Lingala, or in French language, thus making French the music language of Africa. 
Why have former British colonies in Africa not been able to match French colonies in 
music? Why aren't there as many African musicians living and performing in Britain 
as there are Zaireans in France? 
Going by evidence above there is very little hope for Europe to initiate a future of 
hope for Africa. The history of state formation, the imposition of boundaries, the 
differences between scramblers and internationalists and African's way of coping 
through music all underline the fact that Africans will have to carry their own cross. 
What Africans got from Europeans, especialy after independence was not hope, but 
exclusion. 
2.4.2.2 Exclusion as Underdevelopment in Africa. 
The reason is that the British were more interested in exploiting African labour and 
Africa's resources than in developing African human capital for the benefit of Africa. 
This was a special kind of underdevelopment by exclusion. Ethnic minorities who live 
in Britain know what it means to say that 'exclusion is a reality in every society' 
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(Dommen 1997 p485). It is still very difficult to justify the historical exclusion that 
African countries have suffered in the hands of Europeans. Eventually, 
[t]he Third World is now blamed for its own poverty. Each country is analysed 
separately by international institutions and by political commentators. Its problems 
are then explained in terms of its socialism, its corruption, the laziness of its people 
and such-like alleged national attributes. The fact that virtually all Third World 
countries , and certainly all the poorest of them, are 
in the same plight is largely 
ignored (Nyerere 1985 p489). 
Furthermore, another dilemma now facing Africa is that the developed countries, led 
by the Anglo-Americans, are firmly denying African countries the right to effect their 
own land policies. For example, 'the British media has made Zimbabwe known in 
Europe and beyond over its land policy' baptised 'Mugabe Land Grab'(Mukeredzi 
1998 p2). In Mukeredzi's own words: 
The history of land acquisition has been ignored in Zimbabwe and nobody has tried 
to justify the need for land among poor blacks robbed of their ancestral heritage. 
President Mugabe has suddenly become a land grabber and a breaker of the 
constitutional law that governs the land. 
First, by allocating land to indigenous people, is Mugabe not equally privatising 
land? Secondly, to what extent are Zimbabwean women landless? Do they also have 
rights to land in Zimbabwe? 
Another example is necessary to back up this argument. Zimbabwe is not the only 
victim of this game of exclusion. In fact Zimbabwe is just one of the Empire's 'social 
minorities'. Yet another one is post-apartheid South Africa. Barely four years after 
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attaining majority rule, there is already literature pouring out scom on the 
performance of the ANC government, such as (Lodge 1998). Kearney (1998) thinks 
that although the exclusivists would argue otherwise, both African Renaissance and a 
betrayal of revolution are occurring simultaneously in South Africa. However, the 
urge to declare South Africa as a betrayal of the revolution has a hidden agenda of 
making the ordinary South Africans believe that it is the ANC government that has 
failed to meet their hopes for their land rights. As in Zimbabwean case, gender is 
further behind the scene. Manicom (1992 p444) put it that 
gender does not feature in the race class debate, even in its more recent incarnations, 
and it is certainly far from conventional to refer to the masculinist state, the 
patriarchal state- along with the colonial / segregationist / apartheid / capitalist 
reformist state in South Africa. 
How does gender perform in this scenario? Specifically, I have yet to find evidence 
that the white people in South Africa, Zimbabwe or Kenya are showing explicit 
concern about landlessness among indigenous female citizens in these countries. 
In summary, I have examined the development of underdevelopment in Africa. I have 
discussed the role of European colonial language as a tool for underdevelopment and 
exclusion in Africa. Citing examples of Zimbabwe and South Africa, I have also 
discussed exclusion more extensively. I have shown that these countries are currently 
going through a second wave of exclusion. First, colonial exclusion resulted in the 
ordinary (South) African being denied ownership and rights to her/his national 
heritage. The second, post colonial exclusion is currently working to undermine any 
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attempts by African majority governments to include their people in access to national 
heritage. This is a situation where women's rights are completely excluded from the 
(underdevelopment) agenda. The main question that I have now to address is: Is 
Africa on the right path into her independent future? 
2.5 WHICH WAY AFRICA; STILL DEPENDENT? 
Everyday life in Africa is very different from everyday life in Europe. To be more 
exact, women's everyday life in Kenya, for example, is very different from women's 
everyday life in Britain. To make it worse, in Kenya as in Africa, this difference is 
also differentiated. Women in Africa do not even have a chance to talk of glass 
ceiling. Theirs is a divided glass, to use O'Laughlin's terminology. An ever increasing 
number of them live in failed states, unaccountable states, haemorrhaging states , etc., 
and are actually having to deal with a broken glass situation. This is a situation where 
hope for the future is history and where death from poverty stares at your face by the 
minute. This is the paradox that determines the differential status of women and men 
in Africa and the different between women in the South and women in the North. I 
now want to examine what I consider to be the real cold war in Africa before I 
examine what Africa can do about her future. 
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2.5.1 The Real Cold War in Africa 
The problem came from colonialism. Precolonial African political systems ranged 
from highly centralised kingdoms to stateless societies with a segmentary lineage 
system. Different ethnic groups interacted accross their teritories although each group 
jealously guarded its land 
(Deng 1996 op. cit. ). It is no surprise that 
the colonial state, with its rigid borders and centralized structures, was an artificial 
creation that tore apart regional ethnic groups. But while these groups were 
supposedly united by incorporation into the modem state, they were kept apart. 
indeed their relations were manipulated as part of the divide and rule strategy of 
colonial domination. Hostile historical memories and animosities were kept alive and 
fanned, but, through law and order, these animosities were not allowed to explode 
into ethnic violence. When they did, those responsible were severely punished. The 
colonial state was therefore a source of relative peace and stability (ibid. p222). 
Here is the reality behind the problem. Africans fought their wars of liberation and got 
their 'independence'. All this happened within the second half of this century, i. e., 
from Accra in 1957 to Cape Town in 1994. However, the real 'cold' war for and 
against economic, cultural and social independence in Africa, on the side of Africans 
and colonialists, respectively), started almost immediately. While African 
governments were just starting to address their pre-independence promises such as 
landlessness, ignorance, poverty and disease, for example, their former colonial 
masters were fighting to keep the structures of the colonial state. But since the 
colonial masters were the post colonial donors and economic advisers, did the African 
govemments have any room for manouvre? 
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This 'cold war' against Africa was yet another kind of exclusion that was meant to 
permanently keep the statist edicts of the colonial hegemony in Africa. It was right for 
European colonial powers to turn all 'fifty or so states of the colonial partition, each of 
which was formed and governed as though their people possessed no history of their 
own, to become fifty or so nation states, formed and governed by European models, 
chiefly, the models of Britain and France' (Davidson 1992 p 10). In fact, 
independence just changed the status of African countries from colonial states to 
nation states after which '[I]iberation led to alienation' (ibid. plO). The lesson from 
this is that Africans were the ones being made to alienate themselves. 
The unfortunate condition is that African states have to take a satellite position and 
remain pro former European colonial powers. We all know what happened to Guinea 
when Seiko Toure decided (page 91) to be realistic with de Gaulle (Martin 1995 op 
cit. ). We know what happened to Patrice Lumumba when he was realistic with King 
Baudouin of Belgium at Congo's independence on 30th June 1960. We know what 
happened to Nyerere's Arusha Declaration and to Obote's Common Man's Charter 
(Mazrui and Tidy 1984 op cit. ). According to the colonial powers, Africans bad to be 
modernised. By being modem, African states would forget their indigenous history 
and their right to their national heritage. By forgetting their history, they would be 
blinded to their national sovereignty and their land rights. They would then be 
modemised. But what does this mean? 
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"Modem" is usually associated with institutions containing literate, urban, secular, 
mobile individuals with preferences for western lifestyles, as well as patterns of 
consumption. These institutions and the individuals associated with them are usually 
found in the commercial and administrative sectors of peripheral societies (Petras 
1976 p30). 
Secondly, we know that 
[m]odernity refers to modes of social life or organization which emerged in Europe 
from about the seventeenth century onwards, and which subsequently became more 
or less world-wide in their influence. This associates modernity with a time period 
and with a given geographical location (Rengger 1995 p4l). 
Africans have to refuse this unnecessary interference with their land and lives. 
In practical terms, industrialized countries have an interest in seeking to improve the 
living conditions of the developing countries. If the goal of the developed countries 
is to expand their potential markets for [their] goods, then they need viable, stable 
markets with healthy, educated people to purchase their technologically advanced 
products. It is thus in the interests of foreign entities, private and public, to assist 
[African] countries in developing sustainable economies (Ostergard 1996 p 174). 
Furthermore, the western countries also know that African countries cannot develop 
into sustainable economies if they remain dependent. African countries have to remain 
themselves. As Latouche (1996 p75) observed, 
to remain oneself is in fact a necessary condition for the success of 'industrial 
mutation'. The endogenization of technical innovation and consumption, together 
with positive acculturation, is the basis for a success which remains aggressive, 
hegemonic and thereby exceptional. The universalization of the conqueror's 
mentality cannot engender order, but only chaos, the status of hellum omnium conira 
omnes. 
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2.5.2 A Way out for Africa? 
Although Africa continues to be full of unhealed wounds, Africa must move on. My 
understanding is that Africa has to fulfil three fundamental conditions in order to give 
some hope for the future; respect for African lives, ensuring equality before land 
irrespective of gender and a stop to unnecessary wars of identity and survival. 
First, Africans must ensure full respect for each other across age and sex, as people in 
developed countries have managed to do. African life must be as valuable as any other 
human life irrespective of colour, sex or age. African men should not be cheated into 
keeping their women locked in the state of second class citizens. As human beings, 
Africans should know that 
humans do not simply spring out of the earth. Humans are born of women. nurtured 
and cared for as dependent children, socialized into family and community group, 
and are perpetually dependent on nourishment and shelter to sustain their lives. 
These aspects of human life whose neglect is often justified by the argument that 
they are unimportant or intellectually uninteresting or merely "natural" are, not just 
coincidentally the area of life thought of as women's "work". If we grant that 
connection - to one another and to nature - is indispensable for human existence, the 
homo economicus appears in a new light. Far from being the rugged individual 
whose status as a modeling tool is dictated by rationality and realism, he might well 
be the projection or dream of a boy who, scared of the powers which might fail to 
protect his fragile hold on life, denies him his own dependence (Nelson 1996 p3 1). 
There is also real need to understand how lives of women and men are determined on 
day-to-day basis in Africa. This can be explained by what Dillon (1997 p228) calls 
&status worth, which 'derives from such things as one's essential nature as a person; 
membership in a certain class, group, or people; social role, or place in a social 
113 
hierarchy'. Differential status of women and men in all human societies must be seen 
in terms of 'merit, the measure of quality of character and conduct, which we earn or 
lose through what we do and become' (p228). Owning land and therefore becoming 
rich may mean being unequal to others, but it depends on how that land was acquired. 
The African modernists and husbandmen must be warned that the resource poor and 
the women will not be quiet for ever. 
The second condition is that if individual citizens are not equally endowed, then 
personal incomes may continue to be unequal even in a fully competitive, laissez-faire 
society with unrestricted mobility (Meade 1973). Land reform was imposed on an 
indigenous African system. But what was African was African, whether it was 
Yoruba, Kikuyu, Zulu, Luo, Baganda, Nyamwezi, etc. Wherever colonialism imposed 
land reform in Africa, it differentially endowed status, and therefore self worth among 
African women and men. The hope of women and men in Africa lies in reclaiming 
their rights, their heritage and their self worth that was lost by land reform. This 
reclamation is a definite possibility. 
The third condition relates to the fact that Africans must find their own answers to 
unnecessary wars of identity and survival. 
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So long as minorities have someone to whom they can appeal when they are in 
dispute, they can live peacefully together. When that arbiter is gone, they will be at 
each other's throats... The combatants are jQjng to answer the existential Question, 
Whose country is this? If it is mine, you cannot stay, and if it is yours, I cannot stay - 
or if I am allowed to stay, I must agree to accept a second-class status (Mayne 1999 
p 19) (my emphasis). 
It is fairly obvious that much of this question was imposed on Africans by European 
colonialism. Sadly enough, the struggle for independence, from Ghana to South 
Africa, and the Cold Wars, as explained above, will all ensure that Africans will 
continue fighting because of the existential question. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
The theoretical and comparative analysis employed in this chapter has clarified how 
land is related to the emergence and persistence of feminized poverty, social 
insecurity and class differentials in Africa. First, it has confirmed the fact that 
European '[hlistorical materialism, far from being completed, has not yet solved the 
issues of effective articulation of the various social realities: the basic ones of class, 
the state (and power), nation and culture (Amin 1990 op. cit. p160). Second, it has 
confirmed that the 'fundamental distinctions between different parts of black Africa, 
(divided between British and French West Africa, the Belgian Congo and French 
Equatorial Africa, and South and East Africa) derive from the manner in which the 
imperialists have settled the question of land' (Nzula 1979 p36) in their respective 
colonies. '[V]arious forms of exploitation of the indigenous population derive from 
the solutions to the land question in each individual group of countries' (ibid. p36). 
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I agree that the black man should carry his own cross. S/he has to be truly in charge of 
his/her own modernity and sovereignty in order to have a glimpse of hope for the 
future. Evidence from this chapter is that the white people still believe that space 
(land) and colour (race) cannot mix (Neame 1953 op. cit. ). Evidence from this chapter 
point to five conclusions. 
First, Africa cannot develop before delinking from Europe. In other words, 
'development of countries on the periphery of the world capitalist system must 
come through an essential 'rupture' with that system, a 'delinking' or refusal to 
subject the national development strategy to the imperatives of 'world wide 
expansion' (Amin 1990 op cit. p62). Decolonisation must be completed in all ways; 
politically, economically, socially and culturally. 
Second, Africans have to understand that their cross is gendered. History has yet to 
tell us how many explorers, missionaries, colonialist or settlers initially came to 
Africa with their wives and children. For example, when the South African 
Parliament was informed in 1924 that there were 160,000 white men, women and 
children "who would not be able to get on their feet unless they were helped"(Neame 
1953 op cit. ). Policy action was taken to wipe out the evil of poor whiteism (ibid. ). 
In the same way, African men should never allow women to be treated as second class 
citizens, under the guise of traditions and customs. 
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Third, Africa must be strategically aware of globalisation, now sweeping through 
Europe and Americas. Globalization implies that national governments cannot 
regulate, monitor or tax international activities adequately, nor can they redistribute 
resources on a significant scale to the world's poor (Stewart and Daws 1998). 'If 
globalisation. continues at an accelerating pace, which seems likely as a result of 
further deregulation and technological changes, the hole in the world governance, like 
that of the ozone layer, will get dangerously large' (ibid. p397). 
Fourth, Africans should understand that they are Africans, just as Europeans are 
Europeans and Indians are Indians. Above all, Africans must quickly realise that 
'[n]ations are not something everlasting. They have a beginning , they will have an 
end' (Teich and Porter 1993 pxvi). Since most African nations started only one 
hundred years ago, some teething problems must be addressed. How will the 
European Union affect the bilateral relations between each former European colonial 
power with her former colonies? In other words, how will France relate to Algeria or 
Senegal? How will UK relate to South Africa, Kenya or Zimbabwe? Above all, how 
will colour and space mix in the global arena of the 21 st. century? 
Fifth is the need to come to terms with the dynamics of disintegration that arise from 
ethnic nationalisms in diaspora (Shain and Sherman 1998). Can we argue that all 
South Africans are 'black' or that all Americans or British are 'white'? Is Kenya also 
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a rainbow country, given that Kenya was supposed to develop on a strictly separated 
racial basis, as in schema 1 A? If tragedy means 'unfulfilled potential with disastrous 
consequences' (Easterly et. al. 1997 p1203), then there is only one conditionality for 
addressing the African tragedy in the next century: to mix colour, sex and space 
together in one pot and in the spirit of equality, development and peace. It is up to 
white people to heal the unhealed wounds that they inflicted in Africans because of 
their land, and restore hope and need for life to Africans. The next chapter will 
examine the prospects for Kenya in this scenario of patriarchy, unhealed wounds and 
whether there is any need for black people to be alive. 
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Chapter 3 
LAND AS A DETERMINANT OF DIFFERENTIAL STATUS OF 
WOMEN AND MEN IN KENYA 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
No single word weighs heavier in people's hearts these days than colour. If some 
people are supposed to be coloured, then others are, presumably colourless. How can 
a human being be red, white, black, brown or green? If there are some people of 
colour, are others of no colour? Specifically, I have seen some animals that have 
distinct colour. For example, I have seen a black cow, a white rabbit, or a brown cat. 
Common sense tells me that what I see is not the colour of the animal's bare skin. It is 
the colour of the hair on the animal's skin. Even in Europe, there are Europeans with 
dark hair, others with grey and others with white hair on their heads. Why is it that all 
people grow white hair when they grow old? Why don't 'white' people grow different 
colour in the hair and same with 'black' people or Asians? 
These questions must be answered. Kittles (1995 p37) pointed out that human beings 
are just 'hairless apes. Modem human beings evolved in Africa and then migrated out 
to areas of the world where, due to adaptation, they were able to survive in different 
environments'. Martin Brookes (Guardian Education, 23 June 1998 p9) also revisited 
the old story about the possible routes of the Homo Sapiens. He reiterated the 
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talternative 'Out of Africa' hypothesis which says that humans had an exclusively 
African origin, [100,000 to 150,000 years ago] and then only spread to other parts of 
the world'. Rotberg (1965 p3) is very clear that 
[m]an began in Africa. About 750,000 to one million years ago, near man -a hominid 
-learned to make tools and therefore transformed himself gradually into true man. 
This process of evolution took place probably, not exclusively, near the shores of 
Victoria Nyanza and on the plateau that is now East Africa. 
Gore (1997 p90) added that 
in 1984, a team led by Richard Leakey began unearthing the nearly complete skeleton 
of a 12-year-old erectus boy who died 1.54 million years ago near Lake Turkana in 
Northern Kenya. 
Despite overwhelming evidence that human beings originated from Africa, race still 
wields a lot of power as a social category. But there is no scientific support to prove 
that human colour is not a biological, but a social issue. 
My opinion in this case is: Neverjudge a person by the colour, not even by any of the 
natural characteristics such as sex, height, weigh or age. All human beings are equal. 
We saw the reason in Chapter Two; that each human being must enjoy equal esteem 
with each other human being due to the fact that all share a common humanity. 
The comparative and theoretical approach in Chapter 2 told me that inequalities based 
on sex and race have a history too. This history is what contributes to human 
120 
inequalities as they have developed and are reinforced in the world. Singer (1978 
p543) told us that '[flnequality on the basis of gender is man-made and hidden behind 
economic dependence, which is now described as neo-colonialism, in the sense of a 
highly unequal distribution of wealth and power between countries. This is a clear fact 
of life today. What relates this fact of life to the question of this chapter is that 
citizenship, like democracy, has been ambiguous throughout much of the twentieth 
century, not just in colonial states and settler societies (Wilson 1994). The concept of 
citizenship in Kenya, for example, is particularly ambiguous. I will return to this issue 
in Chapter 6. 
Man-made gender inequality has ben quite remarkable in the West. 
French women only gained the vote after the Second World War, while the black men 
in USA, although technically given the vote in 1880s, had to wait until after the civil 
rights movement in the late 1960s for practical enfranchisement. Contemporary 
notions of race, class and gender in Europe and the United States meant that the term 
'citizenship' still bore the stamp of its origins in ancient Greek city states as a 
privileged status from which women, slaves and 'aliens' were excluded. Later, ... the Romans had adopted the Greek concept to co-opt native elites for purposes of 
imperial consolidation (ibid. p50). 
The fact that Kenya is both an ex-colonial. and a settler society tells a lot about gender 
differentials in Kenya. Chapter Two left me wondering whether Africa has no reason 
to look to Europe for an answer to its current and mounting social problems. The 
central issue is the same, only the contexts differ. It is difficult to agree with 
arguments that deliberately tend to justify Europe's role in underdeveloping the Third 
World in order to get away with it all. Here is such an argument, 
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The improved health, longer life expectancy and the increase in the rate of population 
growth in underdeveloped countries have come about largely as a result of contacts 
established by the West. There are thus many more people alive in poor countries 
than there would have been in the absence of these contacts. It is only in this sense 
that the widely publicized notion is true that the West has caused the poverty of the 
undeveloped world: it has enabled many relatively poor people to live longer (Bauer 
1984 p334-335). 
This statement clearly explains the attitude of some Europeans with relation to Third 
World underdevelopment. First, to argue that Europe enabled many relatively poor 
people to live longer in Africa does not say anything about why Europe colonised and 
underdeveloped Africa. Second, to hide behind the blanket term 'the West' does not 
specify which European nation did what, where in Africa. Obviously, 
social ideas should be placed in their historical context. Ideas should be seen as part 
of the culture and institutional life of a particular society at a specific time. 
Approaching social theory as embroiled in particular social struggles around, say, 
nation building or class and gender dominances necessary in order to challenge the 
still dominant view of social theory as part of an ongoing, universal dialogue about 
the general nature of the social world (Seidman 1998 p9). 
In other words, British colonisation led to land reform, deprivation of land and 
subsequent gendered landlessness in Kenya. That is the heart of the problem in this 
chapter. 
I will divide this chapter into two main sections. We know that the country now called 
Va Kenya emerged from the shadow of the struggle among European powers, especially 
Britain and Germany, almost as an afterthought. Section one will be concemed with 
the factors behind the evolution of land and gender inequality in East Africa. I will 
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start by examining the whole of East Africa, then compare Tanzania and Kenya, then 
Uganda and Kenya. We also know that had it not been for fertile land in the Rift 
Valley and the highlands of East Africa, there would have been no country called 
Kenya. Section two will therefore focus on factors that explain the present Kenya as a 
special case of a 'made in Britain' dependency and poverty in Africa. The uniqueness 
of Kenya as a former British colony is on her gendered landlessness due to land 
consolidation. 
Relevant examples from other parts of Africa will be used for purposes of illustration. 
I will show that land consolidation was a deliberate action to keep the natives of 
Kenya under perpetual subordination as labourers for the settlers. It was maintaining 
that gender inequality among natives by keeping them permanently poor that was 
behind land reform and land ownership in Kenya. From the times of the slave trade, 
'the British were fully aware of the difficulty of drawing a clear distinction between 
free labour and slavery in the circumstances pertaining to East Africa' (Ingham 1968 
p74) 
3.1 THE QUESTION OF LAND AND GENDER IN EAST AFRICA 
A major point in the history of Europeans is the fact that their ancestors 'conquered' 
the southem hemisphere. There are those who still cherish this triumphalism over 
what was latter called the Third World, especially the dark continent and the black 
natives. They are proud of the 'respectable trade' and they cherish their 'duty' to 
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modernise and enlighten the savage tribes of Africa that has no history (Davidson op 
cit. ). 
There are also those who are realistic and are concemed about how history will judge 
Europe with respect to the supposedly historyless black continent. Blacking (1987 
p527), argues that 
[t1he development of other countries creates new problems for Europe, and 
particularly for highly developed former colonial powers. This is partly due to 
circumstances of their development, which for both parties depended on colonial 
relationships, and partly because other countries' development has reversed the 
colonial situation and created cheap imports and competition with home markets, as 
well as problems of cultural identity. 
How did this problem start? If logically pursued, this European concern can become a 
big concern for Africans, historically, economically and culturally. Confining myself 
to the question of land, I want to'examine this concern with respect to the nature of 
unity that East Africans inherited from Britain. Secondly, I will examine some lessons 
that have been leamt and what efforts have been made by the people themselves since 
1963. 
3.1.1 East Africa: Economic Community or only Shirikisho? 
Shifikisho is Swahili word for Federation. The main rallying cry for independence in 
East Africa around 1960s was shirikisho. Everybody, from politicians' speeches to 
musicians' songs were about shirikisho. Common services enabled all East African 
natives' to live peacefully in any of the three countries. What then happened to 
shirikisho? 
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At independence, the most promising grouping was in East Africa. During the First 
World War British and Commonwealth forces occupied German East Africa, without 
completely defeating the small German army there and at Versailles were rewarded 
by being given the territory under League of Nations mandate. The British then 
administered the three contiguous territories of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda as 
well as the offshore islands of Zanzibar. The opportunity was taken to create 
progressively a wide range of 'common services' for the four territories (Griffiths 
1995 op cit. p171). 
The British took the opportunity to administer East Africa as an economic unit 
immediately after formal colonisation. The East African Court of Appeal was 
operational by 1910. A Customs Union was operational between Kenya Uganda and 
Tanganyika by 1927. The East African Currency Board was set up in 1919. The East 
African Posts and Telegraphs, Railways and Harbours, Meteorological Service, etc., 
were all operational by 1940 (ibid. ). The crucial question is: Who benefited from this 
economic set up, the British people or East Africans? 
In order to answer this question, I want to explain what it meant to be East African 
during this period. Being East African was as political issue as federation itself. It 
meant being included within the circle of beneficiaries from the resources and services 
that were going at that time. Griffiths (ibid. pl7l) says that '[flederation was a 
political issue disputed by the different interested parties inside and outside East 
Africa. African interests, the white settlers. mainly in Kenya, the Indian communit , Hy 
and the Zanzibaris all took different perspectives... ' (ibid. p171) my emphasis. My 
assumption is that by African interests, Griffiths implies the interests of African 
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'feudalists' and 'clientists' like the Baganda and Banyoro of Uganda (Goody 1963 
p6). Then, who was East African? 
Nanjira (1976 p13) has also tried to answer a similar question, but he put it in a 
different way. Ifis question was 'Who is an alien in East Africa'? which I assume is 
the same as 'Who is not an East African'? I would therefore support Nanjira (pl. 5) that 
[t]he citizenship and nationality laws of the East African states were modelled entirely 
on the British Nationality Act of July 30,1948. An alien in East Africa, according to 
the Tanzanian law. "is a person who is not a Commonwealth citizen, a British 
protected person or a citizen of the Republic of Ireland. " 
This Tanzanian definition of alien, according to Nanjira, was more-or-less the same as 
that of Uganda and Kenya. The status of African national of each of the three 
countries was clarified on the ground that they should not be called 'alien' wherever in 
East Africa they were living. He could live as long as he wanted, even permanently, so 
long as 'the wish of the host state and the person in question fulfils the conditions of 
&survival' in that state' (ibid. p16). 
It is now clear who qualified as East African. Another question is still outstanding: 
Why did the white settlers in Kenya and the Indian community dispute East African 
federation, as Griffiths (1995 op. cit. ) claims? It is important to keep in mind that 
Kenya was a colony, Uganda was a protectorate and Tanganyika was a trust territory 
of the British. Therefore distinctions were made between British citizens who then 
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lived in the colony of Kenya and British protected persons who inhabited Uganda and 
Tanganyika (Nanjira op cit. p26). 
Clearly the British citizens wanted absolute monopoly of Kenya. Recall David 
Livingstone's '3Cs' mentioned in Chapter two. It reminds me of a saying: A guinea 
fowl never leaves itsfeathers behind? '. 
The British colonial administrator Frederick Lugard [the architect of the divide-and- 
rule policy] believed it was the duty of the white man to assist the African. His belief 
that the white man had the obligation to "civilise" - that is, to develop - the African 
had been expressed by David Livingstone, who had declared his aim as being to 
introduce the black family into the 'corporate' body of nations (Nanj ira p32). 
This shows how deep the question of land was in the minds of the settler community 
in Kenya. Leakey (1936 p167) also expressed their belief in a more-or-less similar 
way: 
THE SETTLERS of Kenya hope and believe that one day Kenya will be the central 
figure in the Union between Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika and possibly other 
territories. They are confident that white settlement has come to stay that it will 
flourish and grow - especially if they are allowed to take over the reigns of 
government themselves - and that the Highlands of Kenya will be a flourishing centre 
of European civilization, a true white man's country, in the middle of the African 
continent. 
The divide-and-rule policy unfortunately spelt doom for the native Kenyans. 
IThis is a saying among the Luo people of East Africa. Translated literally, Awendo ok we yiege chien, means 
, People of the same 'nature' always behave in the same way'. 
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[I]n Kenya, the "white man's country, " the system of "native reserves" introduced 
by the British colonial administrators encouraged corruption and tribalism, 
particularly after World War 1. The policy of "native reserves" called for the 
protection of Africans in their own area and gave them the same security there as the 
Europeans were given in the White Highlands. The divide-and-rule policy 
impoverished the African, divided Africans, and made them not only hate but 
also envy and compete with one another. It was a system of local government that 
promoted the evil policy of racial segregation. It was applied throughout the region. 
(Nanjira op. cit. p32) (my emphasis). 
Let me go back to the first question: Was it an East African economic community or 
just a federation? I have not seen any reason why an ordinary East African native who 
only needed to survive in his/her 'host' country could oppose the federation. S/he had 
nothing to lose. The Kenyan white settlers had a reason to oppose it because they 
needed to have economic monopoly of Kenya, a monopoly which they could not get if 
the three countries succeeded as one whole economic block geared to the development 
of native EastAfricans. In order to 'rule' Kenya, they had to 'divide' East Africa. 
East Africans need to beware of the devil in the detail. Although it is good news to 
hear of the return of some kind of shirikisho, the remnants of the enclave may still be 
somewhere in the background. Ordinary Kenyans, Ugandans, and Tanzanians (women 
and men) will never benefit from a mere political community that does not put them at 
the centre. This means that the process of integration must be visibly gendered. How 
are gender issues reflected in the process. Are rural poor in Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania represented? How are the different approaches to land issues in Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania reconciled? Secondly, they should not forget that the lie of the 
land does not imply the lie of the mind. East Africans can only benefit from a social 
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community in which various indigenous ethnic groups settle their differences and 
agree to co-exist primarily as East Africans. 
This argument needs to be recast from a different perspective. I want to compare some 
of the underlying conceptual factors about land and the status of women and men of 
Kenya and Tanzania, then Kenya and Uganda. 
3.1.2 Kenya and Tanzania: Dependency or Independence? 
'We are not here to create a succession of Bulgarias, but to develop and civilise this 
continent as part of what I may call Western European civilisation and economics' 
(Davidson 1992 op cit. p179). This was the argument of Sir Philip Mitchell, then 
governor of Kenya in response to a proposal by the Colonial Office in 1947 that a 
consideration should be made for the development of African local government in 
provincial councils and the like. Nevertheless, by 1963, all the three 'Bulgarias' were 
independent: Tanganyika in 1961, Uganda in 1962 and Kenya in 1963. The first one 
to be independent was a trust territoly, the second one was a protectorate, and the 
colony came last. But a major question continued to affect prospects for unity between 
Kenya and Tanganyika: their different approaches to development since each of them 
became independent. We had seen that despite the large domestic economic market 
and the relatively 'developed' infrastructure, Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika became 
independent at different times. This was not by accident. Recall the speed by which 
decolonisation took place in West Africa. 
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The fact that Tanzania went through two colonialisms before it became independent in 
1961 was important for her future development in terms of land and gender. But more 
important is the likelihood that the Germans had greater impact on the lives of native 
Tanzanians compared to the British. 
In the German colonial hierarchy, Cameroon was a backwater. East Africa 
[Tanganyika], on the other hand was regarded as a prize possession. With its ancient 
links to the Orient and India, it had an air of romance that no other colony could rival, 
and for a long time, its image dominated popular imagination concerning the 
colonies. German scientists and scholars devoted more attention to it than to any other 
colony (Gann and Duignann 1977 p 17 1). 
However, the economic realities of Tanganyika were originally far more developed 
than the Germans anticipated. 'The colony was a meeting ground of many different 
cultures, a land where indigenous people such as the Chagga. had developed 
flourishing agricultural systems and where communities like the Nyamwezi had come 
to play an important part as porters and traders' (ibid. pl. 70). Furthermore, while the 
British discouraged cash cropping among Africans in Kenya, '[t]he Germans became 
convinced that only well capitalised plantations producing specialised crops such as 
sisal could succeed financially, and that African cash farmers would have to play a 
major part in the economic development of East Africa' (ibid. p 171). Wilson (1994 
op cit. p2l) says that 
Sir Donald Cameron, as much as Lugard believed Indirect Rule was the way to stop 
Africans following the Indian model of anticolonial nationalism. But he did think 
ahead. He was clear that Indirect Rule should be 'a means and not an end' with the 
native administration becoming foundations for wider African political organisation, 
possibly in the Legislative Council, should Africans want that. ... Cameron's rather 
sketchy scenario in 1930 was one imagined future. 
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This argument started from the history of colonial policy because it is still the best 
way to understand the past, present and future socio-economic life of ordinary 
Kenyans and Tanzanians. The powers that decided to make Tanganyika a trust 
Territory of the United Nations are also important here. Wilson (ibid. p84) says that 
America was at the centre (between Russia and China on the one hand and Britain on 
the other) of the decision to ensure true independence or dependence 'for the peoples 
of the Orient, as well as Africa and the Caribbean' (p85). American delegates took a 
'diametrically opposed views when Stassen aligned America with Britain, and against 
the Soviet Union and China, over the issue of 'self-government' as against 
'independence" (ibid. p84). Britain's stand was that of old colonial paternalism. 
Wilson (p85) quoting Evatt: "We are the Trustees of many great African 
dependencies, of which Kenya is one, and our duty is to do justice and right between 
the various races and interests, remembering, above all, that we are trustees before the 
worldfor the African population' (Evatt's emphasis)'. 
This is the conceptual basis of the subsequent ideological differences that plagued 
Kenya and Tanzania and that also determined the prospects for a successful East 
African economic community during Kenyattaa and Nyerere regimes. What was the 
origin of this ideological divide? 
f 
3.1.. 2.1 Roots of Ideological Differences Between Kenya and Tanzania. 
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What do these people want? They want liberty. Let us give them liberty. They want 
justice. Let us give them justice.... Let us help them to climb the ladder of self- 
government. That is the purpose ... so that ultimately dependent or independent they 
may play full part in a peaceful, prosperous and independent world (my emphasis). 
This is Wilson (ibid. 1994 p84) quoting Cranbome at the San Francisco Conference of 
1945. The implied fact was that the ultimate fate of the people would either be 
'independence' or 'dependency'. This dependency is what Nyerere has been against 
all his life. No wonder Nyerere expressed some doubt when he addressed the 
University of Edinbrough in October 1997 that the latest attempt to revive East 
African community will this time succeed. It was Nyerere who came up with an 
ideology of African socialism that was based on African culture of hard work and self 
help (Anyang-Nyon'go 1989 op. cit. ). Kenya's policy on socialism which appeared as 
Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1965 on African Socialism and its Application to Kenya was 
based on nothing original. It was just a confused reaction to African socialism. 
Theory needs history. This is the point I wanted to clarify about dependency and 
independence between Kenya and Tanzania. It is important for understanding gender 
equality in relation to land in these two countries. First, Tanzania inherited nothing 
from both German and British colonial masters as far as unity is concerned. The lack 
of anything that could be applied to positive development forced Tanzanian 
government to be realistic by looking East (socialism) and, also by forging a sense of 
social contract from within (Ujamaa). It was only Ujamaa that could provide welfare 
in (Rawlian terms) as primary goods. 'These are defined as the basic "rights and 
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liberties, ' powers and opportunities, income and wealth", which a society has to 
distribute' (Mueller 1989 op. cit p412). 
Since Ujamaa implies human equality, the Tanzanian bitter colonial experience 
engendered better prospects for gender equality, development and peace compared to 
Kenya. Tanzania took their imposed poverty with pride and went ahead with the social 
contract (Ujamaa) to forge a united democratic state in Africa. 
In sum, Tanzania benefited in two ways, first, by starting off with a charismatic leader 
at the national level, and secondly, by having a realistic project at the local level. 
Tanzania was capable of developing as a society in a state of moderate scarcity, 
where the poor are being made better off without great sacrifice to the rich (ibid. 
p413). But when it later came to land reform and gender, Tanzania exposed similar 
problems as Kenya. Manji (1998 p661) describes four gender issues that are prevailing 
in the process of land reform in Tanzania. First, the preoccupation of women groups 
with employment as an indicator of women's status has led to a failure to recognise 
the importance of land as their most valuable asset in a predominantly rural economy. 
Second, once women became involved in the debate, their approach was largely 
technocratic and legalistic. This means that women have not been in a position to set 
the agenda on their land rights but rather find themselves playing a reactive role to 
reports and other happenings about land issue. Third, the origin of feminist groups and 
their membership of largely urban-biased, middle-class women have limited their 
ability to engage with the issues which most concern rural women. Fourth, the land 
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issue in Tanzania has crystallised a conflict which was potentially inherent in the class 
constitution of the dominant women's groups. This is the potential conflict of interest 
for women who may benefit from the liberalisation of the land market, either as 
business people in their own right or in conjunction with their families. As will be 
clear later on, there is a striking similarity between Kenya and Tanzania in this 
respect. The main lesson is that land policy in Tanzania is still a debate, while women 
are largely excluded. I now want to examine the main factors behind land and gender 
differentials in Uganda and Kenya. 
3.1.3 Uganda and Kenya: African Failure or Imperial 
niumphalism? 
Uganda, like Kenya, is a clear case of a nation whose destiny was destroyed by British 
colonialism. The difference is that Uganda, like Gibraltar, was mainly needed for its 
strategic importance. Uganda was the source of the Nile, the lifeline of Egypt, while 
Gibraltar was the gate to the world. Furthermore, the Pearl of Africa had the richest 
soil in East Africa. On this soil lived the most advanced system of indigenous 
government in East Africa, where the status of women and men was clearly defined. 
There are two factors that are important to understanding land as a determinant of the 
status of women and men in Kenya. First, is the history of European land ownership in 
the present Uganda, and secondly, the origin of labour for land in Uganda. Let me 
discuss them in turn. 
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3.1.3.1 Ownership of Land in Uganda 
Current land problem in Uganda is a continuation of a process that was started by 
Lugard and his indirect rule. 'In 1890 Lugard forced Kabaka Mwanga to sign a treaty 
giving the IBEA formal control over Baganda's external relations in return for IBEA 
'protection" (Jorgensen 1981 p45) (my emphasis). Other parts of Uganda were added 
on gradually. Sir Harry Hamilton Johnston (a first-class man) was chosen as her 
Ma . esty's Special Commissioner for Uganda in 1899 in order to get things on a sound 
footing (Sathyamurhty 1886 p7l). As Kabwegyere (1974 p55) says, '[o]ne aspect of 
colonialism is the search for "economic territory"'. During the process of colonial 
consolidation in Uganda, 'the British acted according to the fairly well-known 
constitutional doctrine of imperial rule which they had evolved over a long period of 
time' (Ibingira 1973 p285). 
Largely because of their policy of indirect rule, part of the doctrine of imperial rule, 
the British perpetuated the feeling of a separate existence for and in each tribe; they 
procrastinated the participation of Africans in Uganda-wide institutions like the 
Legislative Council and the national civil service, where a feeling of wide belonging 
could be cultivated. (ibid. p285) my emphasis. 
The result of this was a kind of separatist tendencies among different Ugandan ethnic 
groups that continue to thwart efforts to promote the emergence of Uganda as a united 
nation-state. My concern is that as long as Uganda is not able to live as an 
independent, united and peaceful country, it is the ordinary East Africans that will 
continue to bear the blame and the burden. They will be told that their failure lies in 
their inability to harmonise the centre and the periphery because 
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[p]recolonial African states were unstable in so far as they divided rulers from 
subjects by kin and caste. Precolonial nationalities, as perhaps Ashanti or Buganda, 
were stable to the extent to which recruitment to political office by merit fostered the 
concept of national integration; loyalties were political rather than ascribed. (Lonsdale 
1968 p215) 
Is it correct to conclude that Buganda was a precolonial state or nation? Note that 
[when] Lugard arrived at Mengo, the capital, in 1890 as agent of the IBEA, the 
Christian chiefs were deeply embroiled in disputes about control of land and usufruct. 
These disputes demonstrate that possession of land and usufructuary rights rather than 
possession of political office was the base of economic and political power in 
Buganda (Jorgensen op cit. p47). 
When Johnston arrived in Buganda in 1900, he had instructions to negotiate an 
agreement with the chiefs on land tenure and fiscal support for the colonial 
administration (ibid. ). The then dominant Protestant faction shifted from its 1891 
position of ownership by faction to ownership of land by individuals. Land ownership 
changed from communal to individual (ibid. ). Since only men were chiefs, only men 
had the right to individual ownership of land. Further, Johnston's original proposal 
and the chiefs' counter-proposals implicitly recognised that land would henceforth be 
a marketable commodity (ibid. ). 
This is the short history of land ownership in Buganda. Note that while colonial 
expansion started from Buganda, the competition for land within Buganda started 
before Lugard and Johnston. The struggle for land moved from chiefs who previously 
used free (slave) labour to competing Protestant and Catholic factions who viewed 
land as a commodity that would attract and keep subjects willing to pay rent and taxes 
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(ibid. ). The other side of the story concerns the emergence of land problem among 
other ethnic groups in Uganda. Assuming that all other Kingdom based ethnic groups 
such as Banyoro, Basoga, Toro, etc., has similar arrangements as the Baganda; how 
about the Nilotics in the North, like the Acholi, the Alur, the Langi, etc.? A study of 
the Nilotic Alur of East Africa by Southall examined the process of domination by 
which the Alur dynasties become rulers of neighbouring, chiefless communities 
(Goody 1963 op cit. p7). Goody pointed out that the Alur had no bureaucracies, and 
they exhibited a kind of 'segmentary state' (as opposed to unitary state) which has one 
of his most characteristic features the way in which both local and central authorities 
exercised very similar powers (ibid. p8). The traditional Alur society qualifies as 
egalitarian. I assume that all Nilotic societies like the Langi, Acholi, etc., are also 
egalitarian ONLY in the sense that their traditional societies were segmentary. 
3.1.3.2 Land and Labour in Uganda 
Problems of land and labour always go together, since they were also introduced the 
same way from Buganda into Uganda. I have explained the origin of the land problem 
in Uganda. Now I want to examine the origin of the labour that was used to work on 
the land. The British used the Baganda for the expansion of their interests- through 
the agent systern- in Uganda. Kabwegyere (op cit. p79) notes that 
The British attitude towards the Baganda was unique in the Uganda context and 
indeed in the rest of East Africa. ... Educated Englishmen arriving in Uganda, whether 
missionary or military, looked upon Buganda as having for East Africa the pre- 
eminent position which England had for Europe. 
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The Baganda, having a special position in British awareness, were employed as 
agents; a tool for imperial penetration and colonisation, while the British were 
overseeing the progress with clean hands (ibid. ). The role of agents at grassroots level 
was instrumental for subordinating the egalitarian Nilotics to indirect rule. An agent 
was a person from a group which the British considered superior to the group where 
he was sent, e. g., Baganda as agents throughout Uganda (ibid. ). When the British 
entered Lango, they allegedly found no authority structure similar to the one they had 
left in Buganda(ibid. ). They decided to use the Baganda controlled Assistant District 
Officers who would instruct and guide the newly created native Acholi chiefs (ibid. ). 
When administration had taken root (through native chiefs) and taxes were being 
collected, agents were withdrawn. 
Labour became a problem in Uganda as land tenure varied and changed over time and 
place. What separated the Buganda in general forni the rest of Uganda was that in 
Buganda, was a unique land tenure system, the mailulkibanja system, under which the 
more ambitious peasants could rise from tenant status to that of capitalist farmer 
(Jorgensen op cit. p87). Although capitalist fanning was identified with the Bantu 
Baganda, not all Bantu were capitalist farmers. The non-Bantu-speaking Sebei were 
capitalist farmers while the Bantu speaking Bwamba were without capitalist farmers. 
Among the Acholi, for example, land tenure contained a mixture of hierarchical and 
egalitarian elements, and by 1963 inequality in land holdings was significantly higher 
in Acho'li than in Teso and Lango. Among the Lango land was communally owned by 
the clan, which also regulated the inheritance of cattle and personal property (ibid. 
P99). 
138 
The emerging labour differentials can also be pinned to the Baganda. In traditional 
Buganda, food was grown by women, and law and order maintained by men who also 
fought wars and served at court (Sathyamurthy 1986 op. cit. p33). Labour force was 
highly mobile. Most men, especially Buganda moved to and fro between work on their 
farms and work for an employer. The Baganda did not see wage employment as 
alternative to their rural homestead, but rather as supplement to it. The Baganda and 
the Luo (of Kenya) represented different types of compromise with and partial 
commitment to industrial labour. Where a large amount of semi-skilled and skilled 
labour was required, industrial development depended on the availability of 
reasonably stable workers and these tended to come mostly from Buganda and to a 
lesser degree, from the migrant Luo labour force from Kenya (ibid. pý5). Let me 
briefly examine the relation between women and land in Uganda. 
3.1.3.3 Women and Land in Uganda 
Agricultural labour force in Uganda consisted almost entirely of processing of the two 
main British introduced cash crops; cotton and coffee (ibid. ). Jorgensen (op cit. p94) 
argues that 
[a]lthough the husband and wife each contributed labour to growing the new cash 
crops, men controlled the product and kept the proceeds from the sale of coffee and 
cotton. In a stable marriage this instability might be partially offset by the husband's 
purchase of cloth for his wife. But, given the high divorce rate, women resented 
contributing labour to crops which enriched the husband, especially coffee, a 
perennial crop whose productivity might far outlast the marriage. Women preferred 
working on food crops, whose product they controlled, including rice, which was a 
cash/food crop. 
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Since women are usually the ones in charge of food crops, they needed land which 
they could call theirs and which could be used for producing family food. 
IN Uganda, the garden and its cultivation have always been a woman's department. 
Princesses and peasant women alike looked upon cultivation as their special work; the 
garden with its produce was essentially the woman's domain, and she would under no 
circumstances allow her husband to do any digging or sowing in it. No woman would 
remain with a man who did not give her a garden, and a hoe to dig it with; if these 
were denied her, she would seek an early opportunity to escape from her husband and 
return to her relations to complain of her treatment and to obtain justice or divorce 
(Roscoe 1965 p426). 
First, women wanted land from their husbands. This meant a lot for marital stability 
among women and men. A person who had no land at all to give his wife could not 
marry if he were living in rural areas. If he were employed in town, he needed to buy 
land in a rural area, where he could put up a home and find a garden for his wife. 
Secondly, women wanted hoes from their husbands. This meant that husbands had to 
be able to afford a hoe. Before entering into marriage, a man had to have a piece of 
garden in the rural home and also be able to afford a hoe. What a paradox for a man 
who had no land and no employment since his wife could not be a princess! 
Compare this case of woman and land in Uganda with Figure 1-1 in Chapter One. The 
left side of the figure showed how rural land consolidation can lead to men's inability 
to pay dowry, and then loss of value of rural girl child. If a rural woman refuses to 
marTy a man who has no land, she has refused to become a victim of landlcssness. If a 
rural woman loses value because no man has enough dowry io give her a higher 
status, she has become a victim of landlessness. The lesson we need to learn here is 
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that '[d]emands may well be mediated by cultural factors but what usually emerges in 
response to externally initiated programs [like land consolidation] are interests which 
can hardly be explained by reference to traditional values or structures 
alone'(Doombos 1975 p56). 
It is the same story of landless men and valueless women. It is also a story of power 
struggle in the context of poverty. Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo (1989 p85) say that 
'[power] is not a question which is easy for men of Siaya to settle; and it is no easier 
for all the voices that refer to the station of women in the wider society'. 
I conclude with a few words which they 'heard' from ordinary men of Siaya talking 
about women on their way to Ndere market: 
One of them may suggest that 'proper women are women who know how to 
subordinate themselves to men'. and that 'this is the way it should be'. Another may 
remark that 'this is hardly the way women behave', for there are uncountable 
examples of women assuming major roles, of seizing the initiative from the men - fathers, brothers, husbands and sons - around them. Still another may remark that 
certain women 'have the power to tame men'; 'they wield powerful words and have 
learned the secrets of imposing their will upon their husbands' (ibid. p85) . 
3.1.3.4 Conclusion 
This section has dwelt with what lies behind current status differences between men 
and women in East Africa. I have demonstrated that the current poverty and 
landlessness in East Africa is man-made. It started in Tanganyika and Uganda by the 
German and British colonialists respectively. 
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When Tanzania became independent, it had a leader who was aware of the source of 
the poverty in his country. Since a guinea fowl never leaves its feathers, that was real 
luck. The problem with Uganda, however, lies in what Leys C (1967 op. cit. p97) has 
called 'a cabinet of divergent views', a comparison similar to Odinga's view of 
KANU as an amalgam of divergent tendencies.. This is the incompatibility of 
contentions between Buganda and Uganda for dominating the political centre. Such a 
cabinet will always have a problem of harmonising the political centre with the 
periphery in order to foster a united nation. 
I had three reasons for discussing these regional factors. First, they are factors that are 
specific to Africa and specifically help understanding the black man's burden in East 
Africa. Secondly, they are the regional factors that are necessary for understanding the 
uniqueness of East Africa in the African set up. These factors are also central to 
understanding the effect of land reform on gender differentials in Kenya. I have also 
given a specific example from Siaya District of Kenya, which shares boundaries with 
Uganda and Tanzania in the middle of Lake Victoria. Another factor is that 
geographically, Siaya District lies at the geographical heart of East Africa. I now want 
to focus on Kenya. 
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3.2 PROBLEM WITH KENYA: DEPENDENCY OR EXCLUSION 
FROM LAND? 
Dependency breeds exclusion. A permanent nightmare for Kenyans is to understand 
how colonialism created a scenario in which they continue to be dependent as well as 
excluded from their national wealth, i. e., land. It also started with colonisation and is 
likely to become Kenya's permanent political heritage from the British. From 1885 to 
1999 is now 114 odd years! Let me discuss a few specifics that are a matter of life and 
death of native Kenyans and Africans in this regard. 
3.2.1 Kenyan Alternatives or Dilemmas? 
Kenya is still living with the dilemma of inability to handle the dependency that was 
imposed on her by settler colonialism. Subsequently, Kenya has no way of dealing 
with the structures of dependency and exclusion that were imposed on her by land 
consolidation. Colonialism and land consolidation imposed three factors that native 
Kenyans are yet to understand. Kenyans are yet to answer the following questions: 
Who is a Kenyan? This is a matter of being a native and a citizen of Kenya. Secondly, 
Kenyans need to answer the question: Who owns the land? Thirdly, who provides the 
labour needed on the land and in the so-called nation-building? This is a question of 
citizenshin, landlordship and labour. Remember that 
no society can achieve'greatness except with the framework of a set of ideals, 
assumptions and ideas about economic and political organisations which command 
the clear and committed support of an effective majority of the population (Manley 
1982 p55). 
These are issues that can only be handled by a country that is in control of herself, 
within the principle of self determination. 
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3.2.1.1 Who is a Kenyan? 
In other words, who is a citizen of Kenya? Assuming that Kenyans are all those in 
schema I-B in Chapter one, let us examine to what extent schema 1-A is correct, i. e., 
whether Europeans are also Kenyans. This question is about those Europeans who say 
that they are citizens of Kenya, who claim Kenya's citizenship. It is also about those 
Europeans who also own land and therefore claim landlordship in Kenya. Remember 
that those who control land are in a better position to influence government. It is 
therefore extremely important that only citizens control land in an independent 
country. The first issue to discuss is citizenship. 
Turner (1997 p17) says that 'the idea of citizenship is a central aspect of the modem 
struggle for democracy and an essential concept for the analysis of international 
conflict over scarce resources within a world economy'. My understanding of 
citizenship fits in Turner's revised model as shown below: 
A REVISED MODEL OF CITIZENSH 
Period Person Rights 
City-state Denizen Legal rights 
Nation-state Citizens Political rights 
Welfare-state Social citizen Social Rights 
Global capitalism Human being Human rights 
Source: Brian S Turner: Citizenship Studies: A general Theory in Citizenship 
Studies, Vol. 1 No. 1,1997 p 16. 
I assume that Kenya is a nation-state with indigenous Kenyans as citizens with 
political rights, that Britain is a welfare state with the British as social citizens having 
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their social rights. It is understood that Britain became full a welfare state in 1950 
after many Acts of Parliament that came after the Beveridge Report of 1942 (such as 
Education Act of 1944, Town Planning Act of 1947, National Assistance Act of 1948, 
Housing Act of 1949) (Townsend 1975, Hill 1993). Britain, therefore moved from 
being just a nation-state. Note' that when Britain became a welfare state, Kenya was 
her colony. This begs the question: Why did the white man's country not become a 
welfare state as well? Didn't the whites in the colony also need the insurance and 
assistance that were the cornerstones of a welfare state? 
Let me discuss citizenship first because I will argue that landlordship is a right only to 
indigenous Kenyans. It is a political right. One is a Kenyan if and only if his/her 
ancestors were Kenyans. Those who used force to become landlords in Kenya can not 
claim that they are native Kenyans. Why? Because one can not use force to become a 
native. One can only conquer others and then settle on their land, but the conqueror 
will ever remain a settler! Also note that it was the European's arbitrary creation of 
African state boundaries that is responsible for many boundary problems in Africa 
now. Creating the current boundary between Kenya and Uganda, for example, was 
entirely a responsibility of Britain. Who gave Britain the responsibility? 
Kabwegyere (op cit. p56) says that '[b]efore boundaries were finally settled, the area 
included under Uganda Protectorate was much larger than present Uganda. The area 
extended as far as Kiambu and Lake Rudolf in present Kenya'. Who eventually 
became a Kenyan was a'creation that split African families into different nationalities. 
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Ethnic groups all along the present Kenya were victims of British engineered 
political boundaries. According to Griffiths (1995 op cit. p85), 
[t]he First World War wrought other colonial boundary changes. Jubaland was given 
by Britain to Italy in 1924 for joining against Germany in 1915. Kenya was 
compensated in 1926 when its western frontier was moved at the expense of Uganda. 
Too bad for those Africans who grew up to find that their land was divided by an 
international boundary and some of their relatives in a different country. Examples are 
like the Masai, the Sebei, the Samia etc. in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. They may 
know who was responsible, but do they know the reason why that person acted the 
way s/he did? It was to change the structure and create a culture of cheap labour and 
dependency on Europeans. This happened all over Africa during colonisation. More 
important, however, was the difference between the individual European colonial 
powers and how they were treating the natives in their colonies. Were the natives also 
equal citizens, whose welfare and social security was also worth the attention of the 
government or were they just labourers and squatters on white man's 'country'? It has 
to be emphasised that human welfare and social security could not be encouraged by a 
system that was not concerned with human equality in the first place. 
ideas of equality in Africa had indigenous origins as well as external sources. The 
latter included the impact of Christianity and the principle of human neighbourliness, 
and that of Islam which sometimes demonstrated greater racial tolerance than was 
achieved by most Christian churches in Africa. Internally, there was the historical 
background of the African who, partly because of relative isolation from other races 
in the past, and partly because of certain values of fellowship and hospitality within 
the tribal ways, had not accumulated as many racial prejudices as the paradoxically 
more 'cosmopolitan' white man. Latest among the channels through which the ideas 
of equality have entered Africa is that of European socialism - of Marxism, the British 
Labour Party and other shades of belief (Mazrui 1974 p354). 
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There could only be equal citizens if it was a matter of equality for all races, Asians, 
Europeans, Africans, etc. This could not happen. The British made sure that all social 
services, education, health facilities, social clubs, etc. were separate for Africans, 
Europeans and Asians. Secondly, the British discouraged inter-racial marriage, and 
that is why there was no miscegenation and the presence of mixed races in Kenya 
(ibid. ). The important question was the 'belonging' of the European settlers in Kenya. 
3.2.1.2 Settlers: British Kenyans or Europeans in Africa? 
This is a matter of whether these settlers considered themselves as British Kenyans or 
just Europeans in Africa? In Chapter one, I argued that Kenya is not a multi-racial, but 
a multi-ethnic society. The arguement is that none but native Kenyans have a right to 
rule themselves in their land. Had it not been for the geography that suited 
agribusiness, settlers would not have come and therefore Kenya would not have been 
created. We know that 
in Kenya, as in other territories with important immigrant minorities the political 
centre was already preempted; it was natural for Africans to seek local defences 
especially as the settlers at the centre were known to have designs upon the tribal 
lands. But land has in many areas of Africa played an Important role In the 
development of political focus, not least because its status was directly connected 
with treaties, the first legal instrument of European and African contact (Lonsdale 
1968 op. cit. p210). (my emphasis) 
There was nothing like equality in Kenya, because the British interest in Kenya came 
as a result of the British interest in Uganda. That is why Kenyan colonisation started 
with the Uganda Agreement, which was initially forced on the Baganda, but which 
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was used by the British, through the Baganda agents and local Chiefs to subdue and 
control other ethnic groups in Uganda and the Eastern province which became part of 
Kenya in 1926. Secondly, assuming that the important minorities were white settlers, 
recall that the British government had been advised by the law officers as far back as 
1833, that the exercise over the protection of a state did not carry with it power to 
alienate land contained therein (Ghai and McAuslan op cit. ). To resolve this issue, the 
East Africa Lands Order in Council (1901) vested crown lands 2 in the whole of the 
protectorate to the Commissioner. 
I have yet to find a reason why the white settlers could even bother about equality and 
welfare of natives in Kenya. Padmore (1949) said that for capitalists, there are no 
permanent friends, only permanent interests. The most serious obstacle to an 'orderly 
transition' in Kenya through the two crucial conjunctures in her history (colonisation 
and decolonisation) was the land question, centred on the fate of the White Highlands. 
Resolving the land question would not only guarantee the continuity of the colonial 
capitalist economy, but would also act as a mark of socialisation of Kenya's new 
leaders in managing the inherited colonial system (Wassermann 1976 op. cit. ). A 
question that now faces those who believe in human equality in Kenyan and in Britain 
is: Do Kenyans have to continue managing the inherited structure of land 
consolidation and settler agribusiness? 
2Crown Lands were defined as all public lands within the East African Protectorate which for time being are 
subject to the control of Her Majesty's Protectorate, and all lands which have bccn or may hereafter be acquired 
by her Majcsty under the Lands Acquisition At 1894 or otherwise. 
148 
I 
This is the question on which the future of indigenous Kenyans depends. If export 
agriculture is still dominated by Europeans, then one can see why Kenya is an 
agricultural country. According to van Zwanenberg (1972 p215), '[e]conomic 
developments were not intended to develop the domestic economy, but to satisfy 
external demands'. Towards the dawn of independence, the colonial government had 
ensured that native Kenyans were cheated into believing that the economy of their 
motherland was good for nothing except agribusiness. After colonialism, they were 
again cheated that Kenya was a paradise for international tourism, and they believed 
it. The British therefore managed to be in complete control of economic development 
in Kenya. Mazrui (1967) said that the path for Kenya and Rhodesia 
was supposed to be a gradual one towards majority rule. The path for Kenya and 
Rhodesia was one of indefinite white leadership, with the ultimate goal of some kind 
of multiracial division of power between whites and non-whites. 
That was true for Kenya and Rhodesia. But for Kenya and Uganda, it was based on a 
different strategy: the Kenyan settlers became economically dependent on the 
indigenous population (Mosley 1983). But in $peasant export' colonies such as 
Uganda, Ghana and Nigeria, the white immigrant population was purely 
administrative. In colonies such as Australia and Canada, the indigenous population 
was so sparse as to be unimportant either as a market or as a factor of production in 
the colonial economy. What distinguished Kenya from Uganda was the economic 
dependence of European producers on the Kenyan indigenous population. This point 
must be repeated and emphasised because the Luo ethnic group as well as what 
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became Siaya district were at the centre of both peasant and settler economies in 
Uganda and Kenya respectively. How was this scenario ensured? 
3.2.1.3 Land and Labour in Kenya: From Incorporation to Dispossession? 
This question concerns the origin of underdevelopment of the Luo people generally 
and those in Siaya in particular. Since dispossession in this case means exclusion, it is 
a question of how settler colonialism managed to subordinate the Luo labour, first in 
Uganda and then in Kenya. 11istory tells us that during the time of Luo migration into 
Nyanza, Alego, Siaya was the initial base of Luo presence in Kenya. Those who 
initially settled in Alego were Jok'Owiny, who were 
perhaps closely related in their migrational history with the Lwo speakers who 
comprised the Adhola group. Passing along the western foothills of Mount Elgon 
from northern Uganda, they crossed what is now Budarna to the eastern side of 
Busoga where they joined the other Lwo speakers in establishing camps at Budoola 
and Banda in the mid-sixteenth century. They were probably in the camps for more 
than fifty years, for they were moving south-westwards into Alego in Kenya by the 
early years. At Alego they found a number of Bantu speaking groups whom they 
defeated. Some of the Bantu were absorbed into the Lwo linguistic group while others 
were driven off to Samia and Bunyala coast of lake Victoria near the Kenya-Uganda 
border (Cohen 1973 p 1147). 
Another major account of underdevelopment in Siaya and Kenya starts from here. 
That is why it also needs both theoretical and empirical examination. if past injustice 
has shaped present holdings in various ways, some identifiable and some not, then 
what now (if anything) ought to be done to rectify these injustices? We cannot know 
what to do until we go back to the nature and the cause of the past injustices. 
Following are three points that illustrate the nature of the injustices. 
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First of all, the nature of the injustices partly lies in European attitudes and policies in 
relation to colonialism. When faced with realities of decolonisation, Britain (carefully) 
and France (hastily) adopted a more 'enlightened' attitude - of ensuring a retention of 
the links with the mother country after independence; through the Commonwealth in 
Britain's case and CFA in French case (Urwin 1991). We now hear that ghosts of the 
Cold war, diamonds, oil, colonial boundaries, arms dealing and ethnicity seem all to 
fuel Africa's disasters (The Independent, Saturday 30th. January 1999 p15). But how 
and when did the disasters start? 
When it came to land, the situation was different. In Kenya and Rhodesia, white 
opposition to independence was bitter because of a congenial climate that had 
encouraged significant European settlement. That is why Mau Mau became the most 
intense war of liberalization that Britain faced in Africa. 
Second, during the process of African decolonisation, South Africa was considered 
already independent. According to Wilson (1994 op cit. ) South Africa became 
independent in 1910. Assuming that was true, the nature of the injustices could be 
seen in the core-periphery policy to incorporate various southern African countries 
into the Union. This eventually led to total economic dependence upon South Africa 
flowing from the system of migratory (male) labor and the pattern of capital 
accumulation in the South African cities (Wilson and Ramphele 1989). With, men 
migrating to work in South Africa, women, children and the aged were left in the 
periphery. ' 
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Third was the emergence of a split labour market theory. 
The central tenet of split labor market theory is that racism emerges from a difference 
in the initial price of labor between groups. A complex class struggle develops from 
the price differential which drives the wedge between the groups of workers still 
deeper.... The price of labor varies along "racial" lines in part because of national 
differences in evolution toward capitalism, with western European "whites" leading 
the way. Imperialism exarcebated the difference by undermining indigenous 
economic development in the colonies. In addition, colonial conditions of a high ratio 
of land to labor combined with the attachment of indigenous peoples to precapitalist 
modes of production to create special colonial labor systems, based on various 
degrees of coercion of both "native" and imported workers. Thus a contrast emerged 
between " free white labor" in Europe and " coerced colored labor" in the colonies 
(Bonacich 1981 p243). 
To clarify this concept, I must quote Donacich (ibid. p243) at some length. 
Within Europe, many people who were being displaced by the increasing 
concentration of capital fled to the 'settler' colonies. For Britain, these were the 
United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa... These white 
settlers sought to re-establish themselves as indifferent farmers and artisans. They 
brought with them fear of big capital, knowing it could undermine their independence 
and turn them into "wage slaves". Although not strictly speaking "labor, " they 
were nevertheless "highly priced" in the sense that it took a very attractive offer to 
induce them to enter the labor market, while they were prepared to resist coercion 
with arms and fight to the death. Thus a split labor market emerged not only on a 
world scale, between Europe and the rest, but also at a local level within some of the 
colonies. Today, the movement of Third World peoples into Western Europe and the 
(now imperialist) United States, we see another split labor market in the metropolitan 
territories. 
If we see the regional problem posed by South Africa in the context of the 'national' 
problem posed by the settler minority in Kenya, then the cause of injustices posed by 
land consolidation and labor migration in Kenya should be clear. A central argument 
of this thesis becomes clearer when the whole logic behind dispossession of land is 
considered from a gender perspective. This is when women in agrarian societies are 
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made to suffer from land reform as well as multiple colonialisms and racisms resulting 
from their landlessness due to land consolidation. This process is well illustrated by 
Engel's argument in the schema adopted from Whyte (1978 p162) below: 








END OF MATRILINY 
MONOGAMOUS MARRIAGES SUBJUGATION OF WOMEN 
DECAY OF KINSHIPGROUPS 
RESTRICTED WORK ROLES FOR WOME 
Source: Martin King Whyte: 7be status of Women in Preindustrial Societies, Princeton, Princeton University Press 1978 p165. 
agree with Engels, although Whyte points out some areas in which he does not agree 
with him. First, Whyte argues that private property is not simply the product of 
advanced agriculture or the influence of foreign colonialists. The opposite is exactly 
what I have tried to show above, i. e., that land consolidation in Kenya, for example, 
was due to influence of foreign colonialists. Consequently, since a colonialist is an 
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invader, s/he cannot be a citizen of the colony. Second, Whyte says that there is no 
evidence for a general matrilineal stage in human evolution. He then agrees that where 
matriliny exists, intensive agriculture tends to undermine it. Third, I do not think, as 
Whyte does, that Engels exaggerates the difference between the lot of women in 
stratified, agrarian societies and in simpler societies. As societies move through the 
stages, from simpler to stratified, status of women varies differentially. For example, 
if we closely examine the Kikuyu, Kamba and Masaai societies, as refeffed to in 
Chapter 1, we find that Kikuyu women are stratified, and therefore more unequal 
compared to Masai women. I therefore support Engel's famous statement quoted by 
Whyte (p166): 
The overthrow of mother right [as a result of the advent of private property] was the 
world historical defeat of the female sex. The man took command in the home also; 
the woman was degraded and reduced to servitude; she became the slave of the 
husband and a mere instrument for the production of children. (emphasis in text) 
The worst kind of overthrow of mother right was when women became landless and 
had to sell their labor to survive. Among Kenyan Kikuyu women, for example, the 
overthrow of mother right was was caused by Mau Mau triggered land consolidation, 
and among Luo women it was caused by underdevelopment triggered land 
ýdjudication. I know that there are many people who might also not agree with 
Engel's famous statement despite the, fact that millions of people die of hunger in 
Africa almost daily because nobody is available to utilize their labor! This point must 
be restated in a different way. I will use an example of a true family experience to in 
Alego, Siaya. 
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3.2.1.4 Reconceptualising Dispossession of Land in Kenya 
There was a conversation within a family in Alego: an old man, his two sons and his 
grandson. The Mzee (old man) fought in the Second World War. 11is first son was a 
baby-boomer, bom three years after the end of the war. He is usually called Bwana3. 
Another son is called Uhuru. Uhurus are those people who were bom around 1963 
when Kenya became independent. Mzee's grandson is Bwana's son, called Nyayo. 
Nyayos are those people born around 1978 when Moi became the President of Kenya. 
Mzee is 85 years old, Bwana 50, Uhuru 35 and Nyayo is 20. 
Bwana: Mzee, tell us your life history in brief. 
Mzee: Ijoined KAR (Kenya African Rifles) in 1940. We were taken to Siaya, then to 
Kisumu where we were baptized I was given the name Jacobo. After the war, I came 
back and married your mother. I paid 20 shillings and ten heads of cattle as dowry. 
We then went to Uganda and I got a job in a coffee plantation and worked there for 
many years. Men land was being consolidated I came back and built my home on my 
plot where we are now. 
Uhuru: Do I also have land? 
Mzee: No. This land is in my name. 
Uhuru: VvWat about my sister Turfena, she is not married and has children. Where 
will she live? 
Mzee: I do not know, but she can not live here all her life. 
3 'Bwana is a characteristic term of East African English, and has spread into the general language in that context: 
typically in colonial tales of explorers and white hunters in old Kenya, Tanganyika, and so on' (John Ayto, 
1995, Diction= of Foreign Words in English, Ware, Wordsworth). 
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Uhuru: Who said that land be consolidated? 
Mzee: Sirikal (Govemment). 
Nyayo: How much money did you payfor being baptized? 
Mzee: Nothing, we were just baptized sirikal (i. e., free). 
Nyayo: Since you were baptized as Jacobo, are you a Christian? 
Mzee: What is that? 
Nyayo: I mean ... and the talk continued. 
There was a problem. Uhuru has realized that he and his family, including his sister 
and her children are completely landless. - He has become conscious of his status or 
class as a landless man. Bwana does not realize that he is also landless, since the land 
is in the name of Mzee. The law says that the land belongs to Mzee. Bwana and Uhuru 
can only rely on custom, which says that only men have the right to inherit parental 
land. Worse still, they are all staying at the rural home, jobless. Nyayo's problem is 
that he can't understand why his grandfather was baptized free of charge while he had 
to pay so much to be baptized. Why was Mzee baptized by the govemment. 
The effect of land consolidation on the life of ordinary Kenyans is enormous. Who 
will address the problem that now faces Mzee's family? Is it an individual problem, a 
family problem, a community or national problem? Imagine how many Kenyans have 
become landless since land consolidation was started in Kikuyuland in 1956 until it 
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was stopped in 1997, a whole 40 years of mounting landlessness! Imagine the reasons 
why it was stopped: 
The consolidation program which was started in 1956 and aimed at gathering land 
fragments into reasonable sizes and shape. Customary laws of some communities did 
not allow this kind of consolidation and hence the program did not fully achieve its 
objectives. The program, however, succeeded in Central Province where 
consolidation work is now complete. Work is in progress, in Meru, Taita Taveta and 
Baringo districts and is scheduled to be finished within the Plan period. Due to the 
constraints faced while implementing the program, it is to continue only in those areas 
where it is at its advanced stage; otherwise the aim is to phase it out during the Plan 
period. It is expected that consolidation in other areas will be taken care of by 
economic exigencies (Rep. of Kenya 1994 p109). 
Where is a policy that can rationalize the beginning and the end of land consolidation 
in Kenya, i. e., that can show evidence of any logical connection between the origin 
and end of land reform in Kenya? There are many questions that need to be answered 
about Kenyan way of planning. The same development plan made a bigger blunder on 
gender and land: 
Owing to land inheritance patterns which favour males over female offsprings, policy 
measures will be taken to encourage joint decision making on land utility and its 
accruing benefits between spouses (ibid. p254). 
Land and labor have such a long history that cannot be ignored by those concerned 
with gender equality and social justice in Siaya and in Kenya. 
Why the ownership of land is distributed, as it is ultimately a historical question. 
When population was sparse and land abundant, the issue was not so much of the 
appropriate use of land as the appropriate use of labor. Thus the beginnings of 
modern history are marked not so much by battles for land, but struggles for the 
control and use of labor ... The notions of property rights slowly began to emerge, beginning with notions of community or tribal rights to tracts of land and culminating 
in the structure that we know today in many parts of the world: ownership rights by a 
single individual or family. (Ray 1998 p445) (emphasis in text) 
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The point is that individualization or 'familisation' of land had already historically 
evolved in Kenya (every ethnic group to itself) by the time indirect rule came in from 
Uganda. This is what the colonial land consolidators wanted to stop so that they could 
turn all Kenyans into their laborers. This is what the people in charge of land policy in 
Kenya are still not clear about. The difference between women and men becomes 
clear when women's labor is discriminated against by potential employers, i. e., when 
valueless women become both landless and jobless. Where do they go? This is what 
differentiates the status of women and men, not 'land inheritance patterns which favor 
males over female offspring', as Kenyan economists tend to believe. 
Kenyans need to watch out because development economics pegged on public 
administration is very underdeveloping. Killick (1980 p367) said that 'outside the 
diplomatic convenience of international agencies and other aid donors, there is a real 
sense in which the Third World no longer exists'. According to Townsend (1993 op. 
cit. p18O), Kenya's independence was not accompanied by planning concepts of a 
more egalitarian or reconstructional kind, as derived from the objectives of African 
socialism. In an account of the poverty in Kenya, he sees similarities with poverty in 
the US and the UK. Inequalities in land ownership had become very marked indeed 
and had been perpetuated and even reinforced under the different changes in 
government (ibid. p184). Moreover, the poverty of many rural areas is the 
consequence of new impositions rather that of the practices, styles of life and 
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traditions of centuries beforehand (ibid. p185). This is because, as Denman (1997 
pl6l) says, 
State Planners (with capital P) have come to assume a kind of imperium, and to 
borrow, or hide behind, the political power of the State. The manoeuvre does not 
negate the property power axiom, merely masks it... Planning power is negative, 
however powerful; property power is positive. When the two are fused in State owned 
resources, the contention fades away and the property owner, the State, has a free 
hand. 
Who can claim unawareness that landlessness and poverty in rural Kenya resulted 
from land consolidation which was imposed on all Kenyans in total disregard of the 
practices, styles of life and traditions of centuries before hand? In view of the 
foregoing analysis, I hope that it is now possible to understand how ordinary Kenyans, 
the majority of whom live in rural areas, have continued to be underdeveloped, and 
how Siaya District has been a special case for underdevelopment. 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that the irrefutable basis for human equality is that human 
beings started in Africa. Second, color or sex are irrelevant in explaining European- 
made inequalities that Africans are suffering today. Third, the responsibility for 
creating this historical inequality and poverty in East Africa, and for ensuring that 
indigenous Kenyans are permanently dispossessed of their land irrespective of sex is 
on Britain. Fourth, Siaya District is a special case in the process of British 
underdevelopment of East Africa and of Kenya. The next Chapter is a report on the 
field work done on the effect of land consolidation on the differential status of women 
and men in Siaya. 
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Chapter 4 
LAND CONSOLIDATION AND THE DIFFERENTIAL 
STATUS OF WOMEN AND MEN IN SIAYA DISTRICT 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the findings of the Siaya fieldwork. As I explain in more detail 
elsewhere (Appendix 2), 1 spent three months in Kenya and interviewed 48 individual 
respondents; I had 4 focus group interviews, a total of 29 in-depth interviews with key 
infonnants in Siaya, Nairobi and in Bristol. I also observed one 'court' proceeding in 
Siaya. 
I will first discuss language, tradition, culture and customs of the people of Siaya. The 
terms and concepts that are necessary for understanding Luo consciousness with 
regard to my topic have to be clarified. I will then report on the question whether 
Siaya District is a spent force in Kenya. I will examine the evolution of the current 
relationship between Kenya as a system and Siaya as a society. I will then analyse 
how the process of land reform and landlessness as currently perceived in Siaya. 
will also analyse and report on whether education empowers women in Siaya. Lastly, 
will make a brief interpretation and theoretical explanation of the findings from 
Siaya. 
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4.1 A MISSION TO DEVELOP SIAYA DISTRICT? 
I did this field research in a society that has had at least four centuries of experience in 
land use and ownership. The local conventions predate the country by at least three 
centuries. This was a Kenyan society. No sooner was Kenya as a country imposed on 
Siayan society than a whole foreign civilisation was also imposed on them. This 
imposition, described at the time as 'civilisation', had lasting effects on the language, 
tradition and customs of the people. 
4.1.1 Language, Land and Status in Siaya 
The majority of people I interviewed in Siaya belonged to the Luo ethnic group. 
Almost all the key informants and the focus group discussants held their discussions 
in Luo, language. I talked in Luo and took notes in English. Concerning the concept of 
land ownership, Siaya people simply said: 'Yes, I have land' or 'This is my land'. 
There is no difference between land that is owned and land that they can only access, 
additionally there was no clear difference between individual and family land. Even 
those who own no land at all but only have access to family or clan land say that they 
have land. I thought that this was the way of expressing their sense of belonging to a 
common origin. For example, if everything happened to go wrong with an individual 
Luo adult person anywhere in the world, all s/he knows is that s/he has somewhere to 
land on. This is the dala (rural home). That is their perception of their roots, as 
exPressed in their mother tongue. 
Sadly enough, during my research in Siaya, I saw families (and coffins) who were 
returning from the Coast Province because of the killings that were going on there at 
161 
that time. Some of these families had stayed away from their rural homes for over four 
decades. They had even bought land on the Coast and had built homes there. These 
people, dead or alive, had to return to their land and their roots. 
The Luo concept of land has a very strong cultural and traditional history. I used two 
languages, i. e., the local language (Luo) and English. I had a good reason for doing 
this. According to Becht (1975 p 183), 
[t]he depth and feeling with which people perceive land is expressed in such terms as 
'Fatherland', 'Motherland' or simply 'my land'. And national mottos or other such 
forms of inculcation have helped prepare or condition people to accept death (for 
some) for the sake of their country. Land thus perceived is part and parcel of man, 
and man can not be studied meaningfully without consideration of land. 
Among the Luo, or any other ethnic group for that matter, 'my land' may not mean 
the same thing as among the Aborigines in Australia, for example. Obviously, 
considerable knowledge of the local culture and language is needed in order to gain 
conceptual or as some call it "functional equivalence" of 'my land (Mitchell 1983). 
If I had been interviewing native English speakers in Siaya, and speaking in English, 
their perception of land ownership would have been very different. However, I did 
everything to clarify any confusion that may have resulted from the native perception 
of land ownership and landlessness. For example, I prompted the same concept in 
different ways and at different times in the discussion. I 'shot' the same question from 
162 
different angles until I felt I had obtained correct and not incorrect information vital in 
understanding Luo cultural perception of land. 
4.1.2 Land and the Luo Culture 
A number of local concepts must be specified. The first one is chira. There is no more 
important way of understanding Luo societal power relations than getting to know 
what is meant by chira. Chira is a lethal punishment that befalls an individual adult 
person who has knowingly disobeyed a particular Luo indigenous rule. One of the 
most lethal types of chira is the one that is related to land disputes. For example, chira 
will befall those who swear an oath in a land dispute that is not genuine. This 
particular type of chira is not curable. Since land belonged to the clan, inter-clan 
disputes over land were minimised because people were afraid of chira. 
Secondly, the Luo argue that women should not claim or inherit land in their parents' 
homestead because of chira. Since Luo society is patrilineal, land traditionally 
belongs to men and the clan. Where a girl claims the parental land the girls' brothers 
will suffer. Therefore, most claims of this kind are never made. It affects residence. 
Brothers want their sisters to marry out of the family as soon as possible. I was told of 
instances where physical fights have occurred between brothers and sisters because 
brothers would not allow sisters to own their parental land. 
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But Chira can be cured by a herbal medicine called manyasi (pl. manyase). The 
traditional medicine-man who had the manyasi and knew how to administer the curing 
process was called ajuoga (pl. ajuoke). I found that there is one serious chira problem 
that is related to land in Siaya. Most good ajuoke who knew how to deal with chira 
are now dead. In Siaya, chira is now like AIDS, a disease without a cure. 
Apart from chira, there is sinohonoho. If a case of chira occurs in a family and fails to 
be cleansed, the Luo believe that it will occur again. For example, members of the 
same community or the same clan are not allowed to get involved in a dispute over 
land. Luo elders knew that land disputes could easily stir up emotions and fights. This 
was a particular reason why the Luo did not allow women to be involved in land 
issues. Luo elders argued that women tend to be emotional and try to keep women out 
of land disputes. It was believed that women could easily be overcome by emotions 
and start crying or wailing. This could trigger a fight between the community 
members or clansmen involved in the dispute. Such a fight could lead to someone 
being killed. This would be a very bad chira requiring a big cleansing operation such 
as sacrificing a bull for all members of the community or the clans involved to eat. 
Drinking a mixture of the bulls' blood mixed with manyasi was the 'cure' for this 
misfortune. Note that this was a very expensive process because a bull was wealth. If 
nothing is done to prevent chira, -the punishment- from taking place, it becomes 
sinohonoho, which meant that the problem will arise again and again. The main 
problem is that a sinohonoho arising from land dispute can finish a whole family, or 
even a clan, since there is no manyasi for chira arising from land disputes. 
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The daunting prospect caused the Luos to develop rules to cure the problem of land 
ownership at individual, familial and community levels. That was the law and order, 
as spelt out by custom and traditions. It dealt with the traditional environmental and 
land questions. But unfortunately, on top of the traditional environmental questions, 
there came (from on high) another one, i. e., land reform. Land reform in the 1960s and 
70s created a real recipe for social disorder in Luoland. Given that throughout both 
colonial Government and post colonial governments of Kenya, vital registration is not 
yet complete, Siaya people just assume that when someone grows thin and eventually 
dies, that death must be due to chira. I found an unbelievable devotion to African 
traditional medicine in Siaya. 
Another cultural practice concerned what is known as msiro. Msiro is an event that 
has to take place in some particular situation. For example, if an old man dies, four 
days after burial, there is a traditional ceremony called ywe liel (literally, sweeping 
the grave). On that day, all children have to be shaved clean, beginning with the first 
=. Then there are other things the son must do on that particular day. For example 
he must sleep in his (first) wife's house that night because he has formally taken over 
the position of his father in the family. If a particular msiro is not done in a family, 
then it can never be done down the lineage of that family. For example, you can not 
do it when your father dies if it was not done when your grand father died. It then 
becomes a sinohonoho in your family line. The problem with that is that the rule 
regarding succession to the family throne ceases to be valid and this is locked in the 
memories of the elders. The family institution in the society then disintegrates. There 
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is nothing the Luos respect in a society more than a family. Note that a girl can not be 
allowed to undertake this msiro in case there is no boy in the family. All girls are 
expected to marry away at some point in time. They cannot undertake the msiro 
because, in adult life, they do not belong to their parents' home. Their station in life 
changes to that of their husbands. That is the tradition and custom as well as the 
dilemma with land reform and status of women among the Luo of Kenya. 
4.1.3 Land, Tradition and Custom in Siaya. 
One of my findings from Siaya is that the Luo people are very clear about their 
traditions and customs. In fact, like other ethnic groups, customary land law dictated 
the level of rights of use and control over land by the individual members of the 
family, and generally, only sons and not daughters inherited land (Mbithi and Barnes 
1975). Like the Kikuyu, the Luo had specific reasons why girls could not inherit land 
from their parents. Firstly, a girl or daughter of a homestead is not allowed to plant 
seeds before the head of the homestead does so. That would invite chira. The big fear 
was that if girls were allowed to own land, they could unknowingly go ahead to plant 
their land disregarding the rule. Secondly, a Luo girl who has been married can never 
be buried inaL& her father's homestead. That too would invite chira. She will be 
buried outside beside the homestead. I asked why this is so. The answer was: 'because 
this will enable her mother to perform her funeral rites as if she died away from the 
home. If her funeral rites are held inaL& her parents home, as if she were a boy, other 
children, especially girls will be 'spoilt', i. e., will not marry successfully or lead 
normal marital lives. Thirdly, a child bom to a son of the homestead belongs to the 
166 
clan of the father. But a child bom to a girl belongs to the clan of the father of the 
child, who is not a member of the clan from which the girl came. This child does not 
belong to this clan and can not inherit land in this clan. It was therefore important that 
girls marry out in order to have legitimate children who can have a right to inherit 
where they are bom. These are some of the Luo traditions regarding land and control 
of land ownership within the family and the clan. They have been documented for a 
hundred years by social anthropologists studying African societies such as Gluckman 
(1969 op. cit. ). 
These traditions and cultures have assumed the status of law of the land for Siaya 
people. People obey the rules. Nobody wants to die from chira or to be in a situation 
of sinohonoho. For example, the Luo people may never see the difference between 
AIDS and chira because chira existed among them from time immemorial while the 
first case of AIDS was reported in Kenya in 1983 (Chirimuuta 1987 p103). What did I 
learn from this field research? Basically, it seems that colonialism failed to change 
Luo culture in relation to land. All it did was to change the land structures by 
introducing land consolidation. To function as a viable economic system, this change 
needed the main factors of production: land, labour and capital. I now want to report 
my findings on how Siaya people became a spent labour force. This is the story of 
how Siaya District produced much of the labour used in developing much of the rest 
of Kenya. 
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4.2 THE ROLE OF SIAYA DISTRICT IN THE SERVICE OF 
COLONIALISM IN KENYA 
This analysis will start with the rise of the Luo community in Kenya. The central 
concem is to explicitly analyse the information with regard to Siaya District. But 
remember that the current Siaya District only came into being in 1967. Before then 
Siaya was part of Central Nyanza, which includes the present Kisumu District. After 
analysis of the rise, I will report on the fall of the Luo in Kenya. 
4.2.1 The Rise of Siaya Luo in Colonial Kenya 
Land consolidation was imposed in Kenya by the English settler colonial 
goverment. What was the East African Protectorate also covered the present Luoland 
which was transfeffed from Uganda between 1894 and 1902 (Ogot 1963 op. cit.. ). Had 
this transfer not taken place, the present Luo-land would have become part of Uganda 
or an independent country. Even more important, how did the Luos initially receive 
the Europeans? Ogot (ibid. ) for example says that the Luo offered no armed resistance 
to the new-comers. This was due to the injunction that had been issued by their 
diviners Yobilo), against such resistance. The coming of the 'red strangers', who were 
supposed to emerge from the sea, had been foretold by them, and the people were 
advised against showing any hostility to the intruders lest they incur the wrath of the 
ancestors. Hence, the Luo people welcomed the Europeans cordially, and even co- 
operated with the administration in all possible ways. For instance, a prominent Luo 
leader, Odera Ulalo, from Siaya District, gave unflinching support to Hobley in his 
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punitive expeditions to subjugate the warlike Nandi, Kitosh, Tiriki, Uyoma, etc. 
between 1895-1900 (ibid. p250). Could that support be the beginning of the fall of the 
Luo community? Of course, the Luos did not realise what the European wanted from 
them, i. e., their labour. No European was allowed to help the African. For example, 
John Ainsworth [Provincial Commissioner Nyanza 1907-1910] was strongly 
condemned by many of his European colleagues as being pro-African. At a time 
when African agriculture was sadly neglected owing to Government policy of 
developing the settled areas only, Ainsworth introduced major agricultural and 
economic schemes in Nyanza ... His achievement was bitterly criticised by the 
Europeans on the ground that it discouraged the flow of labour to settled areas. (ibid. 
p 255) 
Nevertheless, the Luo people did their best in the service of His Majesty's 
goverment. I was told that two of the three statues that stand on Kenyatta Avenue, in 
the middle of Nairobi are of ex-Luo soldiers in the First World war: Owuor Misere 
and Myoyo Osolo, both from Siaya District. The third one, not dressed in uniform, 
was said to have been a porter, who was probably not a Luo. I gathered that Owuor 
(as a Major) and Myoyo (as a Lieutenant) were the first Kenyan Africans to be 
commissioned. The performance of the Luo as good soldiers was again repeated 
during their service in the Second World War (WW2). I interviewed a veteran of the 
WW2 (No. 6094), who had the following to say: 
was born in 1919. Ijoined as driver in 1940, promoted to Full Corporal in 1946.1 
then joined Kenya Infantry Depot in Manyuki in 1947. In 1948 1 came to Nakuru 
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depot. In 1949 1 went to Mauritius as infantry man. I came back in 1950 and was 
posted to Langata. In 1953,1 went to Lanet as Sergeant, where I 'taught Mulinge. I 
retired in December 1954. 
The competence of the Luo from Siaya and their service to the colonial administration 
I can never be exaggerated. Without mentioning names , many 
Kenyan Africa pioneers 
in colonial service were Luo from Siaya. For example, the first two Commissioned 
Officers in Police Service were from Siaya. In public administration, the first and 
second black District Commissioners, and the first Provincial Commissioner were 
from Siaya. The first black Minister in the Colonial Government and the first African 
Permanent Secretary were from Siaya. The first qualified Barrister at Law in Britain 
who was also first Law Practitioner was from Siaya. The first African to be a 
commercial in-flight Engineer in Kenya was from Siaya. When it comes to women-in- 
development, the first woman to become a Mayor, who was also the first woman to 
elected as MP in Kenya was from Siaya. in the field of academics the role of the Luo 
from Siaya as pioneer academicians in Kenya and then in Kenya is clear. 
According to Crowder (1987 p 11), 'the colonial state was conceived in violence rather 
than by negotiation. This violence was often quite out of proportion to the task at 
hand, with burning of villages, destruction of crops, killing of women and children, 
and the execution of their leaders'. The colonialists never recognised the tradition of 
native peoples. For example, the life of the Luo of Kenya was described as fragmented 
'Most of these people are still alive today (1997/8) 
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(Lonsdale 1970). First, this disregards the fact that the Luo gave perfect service to the 
British during colonialism. Second, it ignores the fact that the Luo people made initial 
contribution to human welfare in Kenya by being at the forefront of the Kavirondo 
Taxpayers Welfare Association. A major question here is: how was Luo, life 
fragmented? When Archdeacon Owen tried to help encourage development initiatives 
among the Kavirondo, didn't many white settlers hate him for this, some of them even 
naming him 'Archdemon of Kavirondol (ibid. p608) (my emphasis). 
Furthermore, despite the fact that the Luos were first among Kenyan ethnic groups 
that fought and died for the British in their First and Second World Wars, the 
remainder of them were just returned and dumped in Kavirondo to lick their wounds. 
Why did the British governrnent not even care about the welfare of widows of those 
Kenyan soldiers who died in the two World Wars, many of whom are still trapped in 
poverty? 
4.2.2 The Fall of Siaya Luo in Kenya. 
The fall of Siaya Luo started after independence. This fall had its origin in colonial 
land policy. I will explain the origin of this policy in Chapter Six. What became 
nationalist politics was started mainly by the Kikuyu and the Luo independent of each 
other. But '[t]he Kikuyus had greater grievances against the colonial goverment and 
white settlers; although the Kikuyu had not lost as much land as the Maasai, there 
were far more landless among the Kikuyu than among any other community' (Mazrui 
171 
and Tidy 1984 op cit. p104). The Luos, on the other hand, were generally against 
oppressive colonial laws, such as excessive poll tax, kipande system (identity cards) 
etc. There was a lasting difference between the Luo, and the Kikuyu approach to 
politics. The Luos were egalitarian and receptive in approach and discussed their 
affairs in the open. Even in pre-colonial days, there is no evidence that secret societies 
ever existed among the Luo (Ogot 1963 op cit. ). The Luo believe in their homily: 
hura onge omera, which means "there is no favouritism in justice". In the Luo sense 
of justice, both women and men were equal. Mazrui and Tidy (1984 op cit. p105) 
underlined this by mentioning that 'the murders Mbotela and Ofafa completed Kenya 
African Union's (KAU) demise by flaming inter-ethnic hostility, although Ofafa, [a 
Luo from Siaya], on his death bed called for co-operation between Kikuyu and Luo'. 
With regard to the Kikuyu, Iliffe (1992 op. cit. p148) stated that 'the society of 
precolonial Kikuyuland was markedly inegalitarian'. Was it the egalitarian nature of 
the Luos, their sense of social justice, their loyalty to authority and their sense of duty 
and hard work that resulted in their 'fall'? What is important here, however, is that 
people like Odinga and Ofafa were from Siaya. Furthermore, I was also informed that 
when KAU was formed, the first Treasurer, and Executive Officer were Luos from 
Siaya. In fact Luo politics started in Siaya District as initial political rallies were held 
at a place called Lundha in Gem, Siaya. 
What emerged from my field research was that the fall in the status of the Luo 
community was initiated by the British colonial government and has since been 
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continued by Kenya African National Union (KANU). There are two ways of 
understanding this conclusion. Firstly, the land of the Luo people was not alienated by 
the Europeans, except for a small portion in the present sugar belt. The point is that 
land adjudication made the Luo, people alienate themselves from their ancestral land. 
That is the reason for incessant land disputes in Siaya. Secondly, I was told in Siaya 
that it was Odinga's sense of justice and 'honest politics' that made him refuse to take 
over leadership of KANU before Kenyatta was released. This view was also 
expressed to me in one of the intensive interviews I held in England in January, 1998. 
What is important, however, is that the fall of the Luo started when Odinga was 
pushed out of Kenyatta's government in 1966, only because his principles of social 
justice cause him to be branded as a communist. This was during the cold war when 
Kenya was very successfully alienated from the basics of African socialism. Only 
Tom Mboya, a Luo from South Nyanza tried to explain his version of African 
Socialism to Kenyans. It was Mboya's version of African socialism that has since 
remained as Kenya government's statement on African Socialism. For example, 'the 
Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 on African Socialism and its Application to Planning 
in Kenya set out as one of the major developmental objectives the need to achieve 
high and growing per capita incomes equitably distributed among the citizens' (Kenya 
National Development Plan 1997 p I). 
The Luo people have ever been law abiding citizens both in colonial Kenya and in 
post-colonial Kenya. If the foregoing analysis clearly demonstrates what the Luo of 
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Siaya got as a reward for their dedicated service to colonial and post-colonial Kenya, 
then there is currently a clear unmet need in Siaya. This unmet need has its origin 
from poverty and landlessness which resulted from colonial land reform that was 
deliberately continued by the Kenyatta Government despite the recommendations of 
the Lawrence Commission. It is this nature of the problem that I now want to 
examine. 
4.3. LAND REFORM AND LANDLESSNESS IN SIAYA 
DISTRICT 
If land reform is the example of development that the colonial government gave to the 
people of Siaya, then it is important to understand how the latter benefited from it. 
Before I report on the state of landlessness in Siaya, I must state firstly, that 
landlessness by itself is gender blind. Landlessness is the social result from land 
reform as a structural effect on the society. Secondly, land consolidation was imposed 
by colonial state law and not by the Luo, customary law. Thirdly, land refon-n resulted 
from a policy of colonial market fundamentalism in Kenya. It had nothing to do with 
the needs and benefit of the Luo of Siaya. The development of an institutional ised 
market system in Kenya has paradoxically encouraged an inequality of opportunity 
rather than reduced it. It is this inequality as landlessness that is gendered. 
Remember that the field research was done in a society that was very bitter about 
land. This was one particular way in which my field work became sensitive. Some 
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people did not want to talk about land at all. Others were not able to talk freely. 
Women and men had different and sometimes similar reasons for not being willing to 
talk freely about land. This depended on the individual. The seriousness of this issue 
emerged during focus group interviews and the key informant discussions. 
The word lowo (land) almost immediately raised emotions from both women and 
men. Some did not want to remember the losses and sufferings they have had to go 
through in relation to land disputes. Others did not want to talk about land because 
they had been or were involved in buying land without the knowledge of their 
spouses. Land was a top secret. During my three months stay in Siaya, I never 
interviewed a single person who had never been involved, either in some kind of land 
dispute since land reform, or in buying land within or outside the district. Most of 
them were involved in multiple disputes, some of which had not been resolved. 
Unfortunately, I also happened to be in the field at the time of the bloody tribal 
confrontation in the Coast Region of Kenya. Many people, mainly from up-country, 
were brutally murdered and families were wiped out. This started in August 1997. 
Many individuals and families fled the Coast and had to return to their up-county 
areas of origin. One of the reasons for the blood-bath was that the indigenous people 
from the Coast were chasing away the up-country people from their land. This event 
charged the atmosphere a lot more for my research. In view of the forthcoming 
elections and the pressure for democratisation, the political climate in Kenya was also 
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very unsettled at that time. That was not an ideal time for researching on the land 
question in Kenya but it could not be avoided. 
4.3.1 Land Rcform in Siaya District 
The first sub-location where land reforin was finalised (i. e., land registration finished) 
was in 1966 and was Ndere sub-location in Yala Division of what became Siaya 
District in 1967. This was land consolidation. In 1968, when the Land Adjudication 
Act was passed in Kenya, three more sub-locations of Yala Division were already 
registered. They were: Got Regea, 1967; Sirembe, 1967; Marenyo, 1967. 
The time factor has an important relationship to current landlessness in the District. 
2- Landlessness is currently a big problem in Siaya. It now depends on many factors. 
The first one is when land consolidation or adjudication is finalised in a particular 
sub-location. That part of Siaya district that has had a long experience of very serious 
and often fatal conflicts because of physical landlessness is Yala Division 3. This is 
also the place where the land market and conflicts have been most active. As those 
who owned land during refon-n sold away their pieces of land, their children and 
grandchildren became more and more landless. I learnt that in Yala Division, you 
could find a whole sub-location where the current land-owners are immigrants while 
the indigenous people are landless. 
2 By physical landlessness I mean having no piece or parcel of land however small. This is land that you can say is 
yours whether you have acquired or not yet acquired a title deed for it. We shall see other types of landlessness 
in the next chapter. 
31 happened to interview one person from Yala Division who lost her father in law because of land conflict. 
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Secondly, using an individual questionnaire (see Appendix 2) 1 interviewed 48 
respondents, 28 men and 20 women in a sample of sublocations scattered all over 
Siaya. Note that I could not sample at random from a list of names, but I did my best 
to ensure that there were interviews in different divisions and locations and with 
different members of households. The main reason was to find out exactly how Siaya 
people perceive land ownership. Out of those who said they owned land, 7 or 23% 
were women while 23 or 77% were men. Out of those who did not own land, 13 or 
72% were women while 5 or 28% were men. One in three women, but more than four 
in five men owned land. As to how they got the land, 20 men or 80% said they 
inherited the land, compared to only 5 or 20% who were women. Two women and 
three men said that they bought the land, while the rest, 13 women and 5 men did not 
answer the question. I was also interested in finding out from those who had inherited 
the land, whom they inherited the land from. Two women said they inherited from 
their father-in-law, while three women said they inherited from their late husbands. 
All 20 men inherited the land from their [dead? ] fathers. This was clear landlessness 
on the part of the women. Even if a few women claimed that they had land, it was 
clear that more men had land. 
Another method I used to find out the degree of landlessness among women was to 
find out how much of the public land in the District was owned by women. There 
were plots in Siaya Township, those in Divisional Urban Centres such as Yala, 
Ukwala, Ugunja, Bondo, etc. and those in rural market centres, in the District. The 
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Clerk to Siaya Municipality did not give me the exact number of women who own 
land in the Municipality. Again out of the people that were individually interviewed, 
only three women and nine men agreed that they own land in an urban area, while 16 
women and 15 men said they did not own land in an urban area. Note that with 
respect to urban areas, land means plot. Thus, owning a plot and owning land mean 
the same thing. 
I also investigated a possibility of women and men acquiring plots in rural market 
centres. Since this did not have anything to do with land consolidation, it could have 
a compensating effect as there would be no inheritance involved. To get a rough idea, 
requested the Clerk to Siaya County Council for the number of women and men who 
own plots in all rural markets in the District. He agreed to give me the information for 
two divisions randomly selected, since the information was to be copied from files by 
hand. One Division was Ukwala where 31 or 5.4% of those who owned plots were 
women while 539 or 94.6% were men. The other was Ugunja Division where 7 
women and 89 men owned plots in various market centres. 
in sum, the lesson I learnt was that more women than men were landless and that 
there still existed formidable obstacles for women to own land in the District. Added 
to this was the fact that the average monthly income of all women that were 
individually interviewed was KShs. 2551 while that of men was KShs. 3904. 
Furthermore, the percentages of women who 'own' plots in rural market centres must 
also be interpreted with caution. I was told that some men, especially politicians, 
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businessmen and civil servants tend to acquire many plots and register them in names 
of their many wives, sisters, and other female relatives. 
4.3.2 Siaya People's Perception of Landlessness 
The method I considered most ideal for gauging the respondents' understanding of 
landlessness, or its effects was to find out what they could remember in relation to 
land in the twelve months previous to interview. Compare the four answers I had 
from female and the male respondents, respectively. From the female respondents, 
there were the following answers: 
1. Rich people are huying agricultural land ftom poor families at a very high rate, 
and as a result, non-indigenous people are now owning huge parcels of land in the 
village causing landlessness. 
2. Family members had a serious land dispute about ownership and the village elders 
had to come in and distribute the land afresh. 
3. Land owned by my late husband was subdivided to mY two sons. 
4. Most of the land has been sold, especially to foreigners. Other people have also left 
their land and have moved to towns. 
From the male respondents I got the following answers: 
I donated a bit of my land to a school compound 
2.1 sold one acre ofmy land in February 199 7. 
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3.1 divided my six acres of land to my three sons. 
4.1 bought one acre of land this year. 
The main difference between women and men's responses was that women still think 
of land as "ours", while men think of land as "mine". Women still believe that land 
is communally owned, while men talk as if they individually own the land. Does it 
mean that men are more 'modernised'? What it means, I think, is that women are 
more concerned with access than with ownership. Furthermore, because of patrilineal 
communal ownership under customary law, women do not realise their state of 
landlessness. They only believe in the custom which continues to favour men. On the 
other hand, men believe they own land as heads of families. They hold the title to land 
for their families. These concepts of land ownership did not indicate any beneficial 
effects of land reform in Siaya. This raises the question of how Siaya. people thought 
that they benefited from land reform. 
4.3.3 Benefits of Land Reform in Siaya 
Another question that proved infort-native was whether the respondents thought that 
land reform was good or bad; and why? Women and men had very different reasons 
why they thought that land reform was good. Most women thought that land reform 
had brought peace between and within families and also reduced the average distance 
to the farms especially in cases where members of the same clan mutually agreed to 
exchange plots during adjudication. People then remained with those plots that were 
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nearer to their homesteads. For men, land reform brought individual and family 
independence. 
Here are some of the examples of answers that I got from women: 
-It has broughtpeace among brothers. 
-You can stay peacefully in your home. 
-It has brought peace among the members ofthe community. 
Secondly, men's answers were as follows: 
-After death, yourfamily will not be robbed. 
-Standard of living has improved because of being independent 
-You canplan how to develop yourfarm. 
-You can sell it or lease it. 
Also mentioned was that land consolidation has brought landlessness and the problem 
of squatters in the rural areas. This was a sign that women were more aware of 
landlessness among themselves, although they were 'enjoying' the 'independence', 
some peace and the relatively shorter distance to farms. But landlessness was not 
necessarily good. 
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Note that both women and men agreed on one thing, that land reform created 
problems in the whole society. Some problems that were mentioned are: 
-Some people are still grabbing others'land 
-It has brought landlessness and squatters. 
-It has created divisions in the Afticanfamily. 
Note the difference in gendered societal consciousness with respect to land 
consolidation. The women can live with it because it somehow ameliorates their 
practical concerns. The men are not generally comfortable. They are worried about the 
future of the family, poverty (landlessness, squatters), and peace in the community. I 
found that the fundamental issue underlying all concerns about landlessness in Siaya 
was conflict. The main thing that people wanted was peace. 
4.4 CONFLICTS OVER LANDLESSNESS IN SIAYA DISTRICT 
The respondents' comments that land reform caused landlessness, squatters, divisions 
in the family, etc., need further elaboration. Firstly I will analyse the paradoxical 
situation in which both societal (customary) and system imposed alternatives for 
conflict resolution are operating simultaneously. For illustration, I will present a case 
which I witnessed as a participant observer. Secondly, I repeat that land reform 
continues to cause inequality and poverty within the society. In order to illustrate this 
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I will again present some views expressed to me by Siaya people with regard to 
conflicts and landlessness. Then I will compare and contrast specific views held by 
individual women and men in relation to landlessness and land conflicts in the society. 
4.4.1 Old or New Methods of Land Conflict Resolution in Siaya? 
A significant move in the direction of inequality in Siaya was the enactment of the 
Land Adjudication Act in 1968. According to this official legislation, I was told, 
only interests in land were adjudicated, registered and issued with Title Deeds, while 
land itself was left untouched. The change from consolidating land to adjudicating 
interests was meant that it became a matter of survival for the fittest. To the extent 
that women were likely to be inferior, they were also likely to be the losers. 
During adjudication, I was also told that the Government imposed some ground rules 
in relation to women acquiring land. This was in addition to the Luo customary rules 
that generally favour men. I learnt , with dismay, that only young widows or older 
widows with male children could be given land. Other women could not. A woman 
who was widowed, past reproductive age, and had no male child(ren) was only 
allowed to use land. 'Her' land was registered under the names of her brothers-in-law, 
for example'. The ostensible reason was to try and make adjudication appear relevant 
to the people. The truth was that it furthered the relative deprivation of women in 
relation to acquiring land at the time of adjudication. How is the approach 
administered? 
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An interesting development about the land question in Siaya District was that Siaya 
became one of the few4Districts where the Government had decided to institute some 
kind of 'elders court' to deal with the numerous and increasing number of land 
disputes. Officially known as the Land Disputes Tribunal, it is made up of three elders 
appointed by the District Commissioner. The ones that were sitting at the time of the 
field work were three men, two of whom were retired Locational Chiefs. The third 
who was the Chairman, was also a retired civil servant from the Ministry of 
Education. The elders were supposed to be paid a sitting allowance of 300 shillings, 
depending on the availability of funds in the District Treasury. 
This is a classic example in which public administration in Kenya disregards 
customary law and continues to undervalue and underdevelop Kenyans, especially in 
rural areas. These people are supposed to be local elders who know the traditions and 
customs regarding the resolution of land conflicts. But first, they were former chiefs. 
Everybody knows how Chiefs have been used as instruments of indirect rule since 
colonialism. I will discuss more on this in chapter Six. Secondly, these people are just 
authorised by the public administration to hold illegal Kangaroo Court sessions and 
make legally binding decisions! Thirdly, one of them even complained to me that the 
Siaya District Commissioner occasionally directs them on how to conclude particular 
cases. Furthermore, the District Magistrate also had a right to nullify their decisions. 
'I was told that Kisumu and Kisii Districts also had the Tribunals. The other tribunals were not working 
effectively because the nominated old men did not agree with the pay. 
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A lot of questions remained unanswered about these people. For example, why were 
they nominated and charged with this responsibility in the first place? What does the 
District Land Adjudication Officer do? What legal training do they have? Who 
decides on their pay and how? These people were obviously very busy. This is a clear 
case of the Provincial Administration controlling, and from some respondents, even 
looting a poor and helpless society. The reason why the 'Court' was busy in Siaya is 
that there was some chai ya wazee (elders' tea). Only the poor people who feel 
dispossessed but are too poor to take their cases to the District Magistrates Court or to 
Appeal Courts come to them. All that the poor can produce is, for example, 200 
shillings (U) for the old men's' tea. If you did not have the tea money, it could be 
very difficult for you to win the case. 
I also had a chance to visit the 'court room' of the tribunal and found one case in 
progress. When it ended, another one started immediately. I attended the second one 
from the beginning to end. I will summarily report on the second one, but not the first 
one because I did not know how the first one started. A summary of the case was as 
follows: 
A man ftom Kathieno Sub-location, East Ugenya Location of Ukwala Division 
(claimant) wanted a piece of his late brother's land to be given to him. The 
defendants were his late brothers' two wives and two grown-up sons of thefirst wife. 
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The man argued that he had a right to his brother's Piece of land because his piece 
was small and that hisfather had agreed to his taking a piecefrom his elder hrother. 
The defendants argued that the claimant was on several occasions called and asked to 
come home from town when land consolidation was in process and he refused. That 
was when his elder brother and hisfather were still alive. After many attempts, the old 
man decided to give every son hispiece ofland The claimant, as the last son, got the 
homestead parcel as per custom. When he came back, he peacefully stayed and 
developed his parcel until he heard that there was a land dispute tribunal in Siaya 
Town. Asfar as the defendants were concerned, the issue was closed by the old man 
before he died The tribunal decided that the case could not be concluded then. The 
claimant was asked to go for more details of the parcel he wanted, such as the aerial 
photographs, etc. andpresent them before the tribunal at another time. 
This was an example of many land cases in which members of the same family were 
involved in disputes. After this hearing, I interviewed the three members of the 
tribunal for about half an hour. They informed me that a high proportion of the cases 
they were dealing with involved members of the same family. Significantly, women 
were being more and more involved in land cases. These were cases where the 
husband had died. They were also hearing cases where grown up children took their 
parents to court for some injustice that happened during land consolidation. The main 
problem with the tribunal was that it could not cope with the number of land cases 
arising from all parts of the district. Its presence was simply opening old wounds, 
aggravating poverty among women and increasing tension and violence in the district. 
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Some of these views were also expressed by the people themselves. Now I want to 
look at what came out of other methods that I used in the field. 
4.4.2 Local Views on Landlessness in Siaya District 
What did the people of Siaya say about land consolidation and landlessness in their 
district? I got these views from men and women that participated in focus group 
discussions, the individual questionnaires and the key informant interviews. I will also 
elucidate on major similarities and differences in the views that women and men hold 
concerning land disputes in Siaya. I particularly wanted to hear what people say about 
two issues: 
- Land consolidation and landlessness 
-Poverty and the status of women 
These opinions are reported. I took as much care as possible to record the main points 
as presented by the respondents and discussants. 
a) On land consolidation and landlessness, there are the eight main points: 
1. Land cases should never be taken to court. Taking them to court is only a wayfor 
rich people grabbing poor people'S land 
2. Land consolidation is resulting in many deathsftom land disputes in the district. 
3. Local elders are the ones who should arbitrate land cases because they are the 
ones who know how the land was passedftom one generation to another. (Note that 
local elders are not necessarily chiefs). 
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4. The problem is that after the government got involved in land reform, cases of land 
disputes have then got to go to court. This is because when a Title Deed is involved, 
the case can only be settled in court. 
5. Since land consolidation, even places for communally herding cattle or drawing 
water, grass, timber etc., are not there. 
6 Most people with land are not even developing their land. 
7. These days, a person can write a will regarding his land andproperty. But before a 
person writes a will, s1he must take a lot offactors into consideration. If Luo men 
will still build their homes as before, traditions regarding building the homes and the 
houses will have to be strictly observed In cases like these, even wills and Title Deeds 
can be contested by the people. 
8. People who migrate to towns alsojust come back after retirement or afterfailing to 
find employment or in coffins. Then land disputes start over again. The government 
brought land consolidation but did not bring something that can absorb the landless. 
Conditions willforce people to stop the idea of land adjudication. 
These are some of the problems that people live with daily in Siaya District. Clearly 
they can only arise in such numbers in a system that does not have a viable land 
policy. A system that cannot guide the people about those problems are a result of 
imposed land reform. Something needs to be done about this growing problem. 
188 
Secondly, on land reform and the status of women in Siaya, I recorded the following 
points: 
1. Land comes first and a wife comes second. If a man has no land completely, he 
might even have no place to put up a house. There is no reasonfor him even to marry. 
2. Again if girls were allowed to get involved in land disputes, then educated ones 
would also start owning land When they become land owners, they would not be 
compelled to marry out of their parental homes. This can not be allowed because it 
would also result in sinohonoho. 
These comments showed me that differential status is a complex issue in Siaya. The 
problem is that it does not necessarily favour women at all. From my experience in 
Siaya, I argue that the main factor responsible for this differential status of women and 
men in Siaya is lack of education and the absence of a public policy to deal with 
gender inequality in the society. I will discuss the policy aspect further in Chapter Six. 
The next topic in this report is women's education in Siaya. 
4.5 EDUCATION AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT IN SIAYA 
Education is the key to individual development, and especially to women9s 
development in Africa. Education plainly has a bearing on the legal title to land as 
well as capacity to manage it properly. Present and future leaders in all walks of life 
can only come from educated people. Education was therefore a major issue in my 
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field study, especially as it would be a factor in determining women's perception of 
their status in relation to land in Siaya. I brought the question of education into two 
focus group discussions and in discussions with all female key informants. I also 
visited some education facilities in the District for first hand experience. 
I start this section by presenting a report on the visit I made to Hawinga Girls High 
School and the interview I held with the Headmistress. Secondly, I will report on the 
prospects for women's participation in education in the District, both as students and 
as leaders. Thirdly, I will report on the discussants' views on poverty and education in 
the District. 
4.5.1 A Report on Hawinga Girls High School 
I visited Hawinga Girls Secondary School, Siaya District, referred to in Chapter 
Three, and held a long discussion with the Headmistress. I wanted to find out what 
impact, if any, the sad event5 that happened to the school in 1994 could have had on 
the education of girls in the school, community or the District at large. This event, 
regrettably, had a very negative impact on the school and on girls' education in the 
District. 
These are some points that the Headmistress told me. Firstly, apart from the 
Headmistress herself, no female teacher has since agreed to stay at the school. When a 
5 The school was attacked at night by thugs who raped and brutalized the girls. 
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female teacher is posted to the school, she just reports and goes back never to return. 
The Headmistress is the only female teacher in the school. She was in a dilemma 
because she had stayed in the school since it started over ten years ago. But as a 
mother and a parent, she cannot abandon the school. Secondly, there has been no 
change in the Goverment's assistance to the School since the sad event in 1994. 
When the girls were attacked in 1994, the Government posted a few ill equipped 
administrative police to the local market place, about three kilometres away. The girls 
still are and feel lonely, unprotected and vulnerable while the Government still keeps 
making unfulfilled promises to the school. 
Thirdly, out of fourteen members of the school management Board, only four arc 
women. This makes it difficult for the Board to be realistic in terms of the girls 
education and needs. Further, I was told that the main problem with the education of 
girls in the school and in the locality is poverty, especially among women. Poor 
women heads of households cannot pay secondary school fees and provide for their 
daughters' financial needs. 
For most families with girls in the school, girls always come second to boys when 
family resources are stretched to the limit. This often results in the girls failing to take 
up a chance to pursue secondary education or to a drop out of the process. This 
happens the more because in most families, the men (husbands) are the ones who 
decide on who should go to school. Invariably, the boys come first. Secondly, poverty 
is more extreme in all female headed households, especially those headed by 
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widowed women. That is where the family size is also likely to be bigger. Poverty 
was also typical of all other girls Secondary Schools in the District. Most of the girls 
who successfully go through secondary education in the Schools are the ones whose 
parents can afford school fees. Most of them come from districts bordering Siaya, 
such as Kisumu and South Nyanza. 
4.5.2 Prospects for Women's Education in Siaya District 
The prospects for the education of women in Siaya is very discouraging. I learrit this 
from the discussions I held with other women leaders in Siaya. These women leaders 
are aware and acutely concerned about the poor status of women in the district. The 
men that I interviewed, on the other hand, were mainly concerned with gender issues 
in general, and not with practical realities that affect the education of women. Some 
factors that are responsible for the discouraging prospects for the education of women 
in Siaya are the following: apathy, lack of social security, polygamy and the stigma of 
higher education. My main source of information on these factors were the women 
opinion leaders that I interviewed. I will discuss each in turn. 
I was told that most women in the District, particularly primary school teachers are 
very discouraged. As a result, they are no longer interested even to improve their 
economic status. They are very apathetic. My initial assumption was that women 
were being discriminated against by men. What I was told, surprisingly, was that 
women themselves are the ones to blame in this case. For example, out of about thirty 
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primary schools under Siaya Municipality, only three have female head teachers. 
Women themselves, I was told, are reluctant to apply for promotion whenever a 
vacancy comes up. Furthermore, I was told that married women teachers in the 
District were said to prefer to keep a low profile in order to keep their marriages. Most 
men also tend to marry women of lower educational status, whom they could easily 
keep at a lower level. 
Secondly, women in Siaya, and Luoland in general increasingly have to cope with 
what was called "co-wife syndrome". The situation is more frustrating when an 
elderly woman has to cope with a younger co-wife, married by the husband especially 
after retirement. This situation becomes more complicated when the elderly women, 
such as grandmothers and mothers-in-law, etc. still support polygamy. They often 
encourage their sons to marry another woman for whatever reason. In some cases, 
even children will not allow their mother to disagree or take legal action against this. I 
saw a big need to educate these elderly people about the future of younger people in 
order to resolve this inter-generational paradox. 
Another dilemma women face in Siaya is that they have to choose between being 
accepted in the society or being social rebels. Of particular importance here are 
problems that arise between the co-wives when their husband dies. A particular 
recommendation that was made to me was that marital property should be registered 
in the full names of the man od his wife, not just as Mr. and Mrs., because 
competing claims can be made to the designation. on numerous occasions, when a 
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man who is somehow successful dies, other women have been known to come up at 
to the dead man's home with some kind of evidence, such as children, marriage 
certificates, etc., claiming to have been wives of the man. In the absence of social 
security, increasing divorce and separations, extramarital births, this situation can no 
longer be ignored. The main problem is that these 'unmarried wives' who come up 
when their 'husband' is dead are usually more educated and more urban than the first 
wives that was customarily married. 
Even more puzzling was the finding that higher academic achievement is stigmatising 
for women. I was told that graduate women working in the District as teachers or civil 
servants, for example, can't find suitable men within the District to marry. In despair, 
most of them then tend to migrate to urban areas or other Districts in search of future 
partners. This is why and where they often marry men who are already married - and 
perpetuate the co-wife syndrome. The fact that educated women tend to stay away 
from Siaya results in a serious brain drain from the district. 
In brief, women living in Siaya are in a big dilemma. Firstly, women need as high an 
education as possible to survive in the present world that belongs to men and money. 
But educated women, who can bring positive change in an African rural society such 
as Siaya are not yet able to fit in the same societies. Secondly, these are also the 
people who can buy land to practice modem agriculture (not necessarily agribusiness) 
or build better houses in rural areas. As women go through this life cycle, the 
differentials in status between women themselves also becoming a problem. Women 
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in Siaya are divided into antagonistic groupings such as educated versus uneducated, 
employed versus unemployed, married versus unmarried, etc. This is one of the 
interesting dimensions of the differentials in the status of women and men in Siaya. I 
want to give them a brief theoretical explanation. 
4.6 CAN THE SITUATION IN SIAYA BE EXPLAINED BY 
THEORY? 
I agree with Browne (The Guardian 15 August 1998), that 'policies are easy to state 
but their ultimate expression lies in the way we behave'. I also agree that the problems 
Siaya is going through at the moment resulted from the fact that Kenya African 
Democratic Union (KADU) and KANU politicians compromised the future of Kenya 
by agreeing to concensual decolonisation, leaving the land question untouched. Had 
land consolidation been gendered or stopped before independence, the people of Siaya 
would not have gone through this kind of underdevelopment. I will give five 
examples from theory and secondary sources to explain what I mean. 
Firstly, the fact that women in Siaya are now divided into antagonistic groupings is 
reminiscent of the history of class struggles: 
Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and 
journeyman, in a word, the oppressor and the oppressed, stood in constant opposition 
to one another, carried on uninterrupted, now hidden, now open, a fight that each 
time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the 
common ruin of the contending classes (Marx and Engels 1934 p 10). 
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My view is that continuing with this struggle for status will completely ruin women 
in Siaya. There is urgent need for action in order for this situation to be arrested. 
Secondly, this situation is more serious in view of the fact that KANU as the ruling 
political party has not had a clear policy statement on land, apart from Kenyatta's 
statement, since independence. A search for a statement on land through the 1997 
election manifestos of the three political parties (that took the first, second and third 
positions, Kenya African National Union (KANU), Democratic Party (DP), and 
National Development Party (NDP)) will show what I mean. Of the three, only NDP 
had a specific statement about land. 
LAND has historically been a contentious issue in Kenya, both before and after 
independence. The independence struggle revolved around land issues and land 
questions remain unresolved to date. 
The NDP believes that land, as a natural resource belongs to all Kenyans 
and must be used with the necessary prudence, equity and productivity. 
(NDP Manifesto 1997 p2l). 
The DP Manifesto (1997) is full of the message that Kenya is a 'land of plenty', and 
promises '[flo settle the landless .... no more squatters'(p30), and nothing more. 
Further, the KANU Manifesto says nothing about land policy. 
Thirdly, the urgent need for a helping hand in Siaya. In view of the foregoing issues 
that the fieldwork discovered in Siaya, I repeat that Siaya deserves immediate helping 
hand, especially by Britain. I cannot agree with Stonc's (1997 p150) rationalist 
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argument that 'helping hand equals incentive to the needy'. This argument, called 
'law of unintended rewards' is that 
[a]ny social transfer increases the net value of being in the condition that prompted 
the transfer. [This means that] helping people who have problems (such as poverty, 
illness, homelessness, or drug addiction), especially giving them money or services, 
actually rewards them for having the problem and creates an incentive for them to 
stay or become poor, sick, homeless, or addicted. Therefore it is important to mount 
any kind of social welfare programs which don't simply perpetuate or even increase 
the problems they support or ameliorate (ibid. p150). 
Obviously that law could only apply in a society or country where land, food, water, 
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housing, health care, etc., are guaranteed by the goverment. It can apply in the UK or 
US where the unemployed will not die of hunger because the government is strong 
and responsible and at least assures them of a breadline. Furthermore, Stone's 
argument is deeply problematic. How do you withhold care from the aged on the 
grounds that you will be rewarding them for being old? Isn't it common sense to 
reward them so that they can be alive as long as possible? How do you withhold 
support to poor mothers with babies on the ground that they will be encouraged to 
have more babies? Doesn't the survival of those already born determine the need for 
more babies? In other words, the future of a country relies on the quality of mothering 
process? Who should ensure that quality, the mother or the government? If the KANU 
government of Kenya has only succeeded in further marginalising Siaya, the 
government of New Britain, with its newly elected labour majority should step in. 
Britain and KANU were part and parcel of the cause of this problem. 
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Fourthly, responsibility of KANU goverment with respect to people of Siaya. 
Briefly, Kenyans desperately need a responsible government. Kenyans need a 
goverment that is aware that public responsibility is a question of squaring the 
welfare circle, which means managing the macro-econQmy, limiting the jaxo, 
providing welfare needs, such as land, education, housing, etc. and then getting the 
votes (George and Miller 1984). Being Luos, Siaya people are egalitarian and believe 
in democracy and responsible governance. As the poor, they know that the 'deep 
roots' of poverty are not different from the deep roots of the larger economy. They 
also know that powerful national and international interests are ranged against them 
(New Internationalist, Nov. 1997). The present KANU approach of a wooden and 
unusable 'district' focus for rural development will only continue to further 
impoverish and underdevelop the poor in the rural districts, creating more and more 
dependency. That is why they need assistance from the international community, not 
as an incentive to have more babies, but as an empowerment to stand on their own 
feet. I will discuss more of this in chapter 6. 
Fifthly, consensual decolonisation and KANU's 'do-nothing' approach to land policy 
has plunged Kenya into another paradox of boundary tensions. Here I agree with 
Stone (op cit. ) that the main duty of a responsible government is the management of 
boundaries of all descriptions; social, physical, cultural, economic, etc. For example, 
being bom female or male should not be a problem because it is natural, but in Kenya, 
the boundary between being male and female is a big problem. There is too much 
male violence against women in Kenya, due to killings, beatings and rapes, as well as 
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gang attacks to girls' boarding schools. Examples are Hawinga, Shinyolo, St. Kizito, 
etc. The government of Kenya must manage the sex boundary in its own country. 
Could this male violence against women in Kenya be related to land consolidation? 
We saw the effect of land consolidation on the value of women in Figure 1-1 Chapter 
1. But this differential status between men and women resulting from land 
consolidation could lead to gender inequality before death. Then the boundary 
between life and death or the risk of death, would itself be gendered against women. 
Why should land consolidation lead to women being more exposed to valuelessness 
and more risk to death compared to men? Women have the right to demand for a 
satisfactory answer, otherwise they should stand up and fight and die now, instead of 
waiting for a more painful death later. 
In other words, the goverment of Kenya should realise that boundaries, whether they 
are ideological, physical, political, economic or social, create differences and 
problems. The central issue in responsible governance is the realistic and peaceful 
management of boundaries. Kenyans also need to reconsider and fully discuss those 
administrative boundaries that were initially drawn by the colonial government in 
order to exclude some people and include others in the development process. The fact 
that KANU goverment has continued to balkanise the country by creating 
unnecessary administrative boundaries in terms of districts, divisions, locations and 
sublocations is simply neo-colonial and underdeveloping. Land adjudication is a 
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further process of creating an unnecessary network of unmanageable boundaries in 
rural areas, leaving large farms for agribusiness intact. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
What I learned from the intensive interviews with the key informants underlined the 
fact that history is also important for understanding gender differentials in a social 
context. The field research helped to get a cross-sectional picture of this historical 
process of women's impoverishment in Siaya. 
The field work also proved the relevance of qualitative methodology in research that 
examines events that happened in the past. During intensive interviews and focus 
group discussions, there were opportunities to discuss the why of 'yes' and 'no' 
answers that came out. This was possible because I created a consultative context with 
my discussants. This was also the only way to see why they hold particular views on 
various issues of the inquiry. 
An objective interpretation of the data from Siaya confirms that the decline of the Luo 
status in Kenya was political. First, the whole process of land consolidation or 
adjudication was undemocratic, unrepresentative and unfair. Second, the tribunal 
method of resolving land conflicts is most irresponsible and should also be stopped 
forthwith. Tbird, there was a clear lack of policy action to empower women and 
200 
counterbalance the former 'customary patrilineal' structure in order to release women 
from severe violence, discrimination and exclusion from owning land. Fourth, land 
consolidation imposed a very big problem of boundary on the people of Siaya. The 
Luo people had their traditional way of managing the boundary issue, but this was 
until the British came into their lives. Fifth, the social life in Siaya is very 
discouraging for women's education and individual advancement. Behind this 
situation is land consolidation which has escalated the sense of dispossession and 
helplessness among women. 
In view of the findings in this chapter, it is imperative that I discuss the implications 
in more detail and also present the remaining field reports in the next Chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
POVERTY IN THE PERIPHERY: LAND 
CONSOLIDATION, GENDER AND LANDLESSNESS IN 
SIAYA DISTRICT 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
The lessons of chapter 4 are: 
i) The question of public consciousness, social capital and the reality of landlessness 
in Siaya. 
ii) The problem of land ownership and inheritance in Siaya. 
iii) The complexity of the agrarian question in Kenya. 
iv) The political economy of under-development in Siaya District. 
These are the issues that are subject to analysis in this chapter. I will focus on their 
effect on Siaya people over time. This chapter examines the extent to which this state- 
sponsored landlessness is felt at thefamily and at the individual level in Kenya and in 
Siaya District 
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5.1 SOCIAL CAPITAL AND LANDLESSNESS IN SIAYA 
The main argument in this chapter is feminized poverty in the periphery as a result of 
the main findings discussed in chapter 4. The central concern is to find out how this 
process of ferninizing landlessness and deprivation in Siaya was caused, who took 
part in this process and why. I found that the main cause of this deprivation is land 
ownership as it underlay the distribution of life constraints and opportunities between 
women and men in a paradoxical manner. Herein lies a justification for the fact that 
Africans have to act now in order to avoid sure extinction in the near future. 
Unfortunately, a social problem like the one in Siaya cannot be solved by just 
producing more questions. I take note of the argument that 
[w]hat historians produce is always a question. Neither scientific proofs nor entire 
fictions, their texts are torn in three directions by time - future, present and past; and 
between three moral dimensions - by the demands of power and the limits of 
perception that simplify history and the intellectual honesty that recognises 
difference and diversity. Instructive pasts and intended futures are cyclically linked 
by the ambitions stirred in present conflict (Lonsdale 1992 p282) my emphases. 
But a big problem is that deliberation is always situated in time and place. In short, 
'[t]here is no escape from time, no means by which reason may transcend history and 
still prove to be any sort of guide to thought and action'(Ameson 1999 p107). I want 
to demonstrate this problem by explaining its nature, the methodology I used to 
understand it and the related question that this thesis wants to answer. It is important 
to keep in mind that the answer to the main question in this thesis is not just land 
policy or gender, but development of social capital. 
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First, the nature of the problem and how it arose. Land ownership became a question 
in Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe because of British settler colonialism (Francis 
E and Gavin Williams 1993). Some people argue that before the British came to settle 
in Africa, there existed (human) society in Southern Africa which dates back 30,000 
years. Furthermore, the Bantu-speaking African people moved across the sub- 
continent in a remarkably short space of time, colonising southern Africa less than 
2,000 years ago (Beinart and Coates 1995 p4). Therefore, when the British decided to 
settle in Africa, beginning with South Africa, Africans were already there, at home, 
with their laws and traditions. Even before the British settled in Kenya, the Luo were 
already settled in what became Siaya District, having arrived between 1490 and 1517 
(Geheb and Binns 1997 p76). Other attributes of settler colonialism such as the 
expropriation of land, tenanting and subordination of the masses to their masters and * 
the definition of property rights were just circles around the central fact that African 
land belonged to Africans. 
This point can be explained in a different way. It is fundamentally a question of 
social justice. If we adopt the Rawlian argument quoted by Flew (1997 op. cit. p 126) 
that "the first principle of justice" is "one requiring equal distribution ... undeserved inequalities call for redress; and since inequalities of birth and natural endowment 
are underserved, these inequalities are to be somehow compensated for". 
To borrow Harvey's (1973) phraseology, it is a question of who owns what, where, 
why and how? The who is the ordinary indigenous Kenyan man or woman. In the 
historical question, let us assume that it is the colonial settler. The what is land and the 
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where is the reserves, such as Siaya District. In the historical question, it was Kenya 
which later became the present Kenya. The how is the means by which this what was 
acquired. In the historical question, it is the grabbing of land from the people. The 
why in my case is the Swynnerton Plan. We shall see the why in the historical question 
later in this chapter. 
The point is that a person who was colonised was not supposed to have human rights 
or be conscious of his/her social existence. S/he was supposed to say 'yes sir' to 
everything s/he was told by the man. Otherwise, there was always a carrot and a stick, 
both in the possession of the district 'sovereign', the District Commissioner. In this 
way, the British took away the Luo male labour force into the enclaves, and 
deliberately planted a process of gendered underdevelopment in Siaya. I will return to 
this argument in section 4 of this chapter. 
How would Siaya people understand this particular problem? Establishing a 
connection between the current landlessness in Siaya district and colonial settlerdom 
before independence can only be done by historical evidence. This is because the 
nature of all the variables involved, from the partition of Africa to the determination 
of property rights, can not be stated, except contextually. But all contexts are unique, 
just as Kenya is unique and English settler colonialism was also unique. Such 
concepts which are non-parametric and continuous and have non-linear relationship to 
each other, are immune to data (ibid. ). Class is such an analytical construct that is not 
directly observable. But status in a rural society is frequently a basis for power, 
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influence and respectability. It is usually accompanied by land ownership and 
financial means (Abdullah and Zeidenstein 1979 op. cit. ). Differential status of women 
and men in Siaya is therefore a question of class differentials among families. It 
focuses on the degree of landlessness among adults, their marital status, their family 
solidarity and their commitment to the ideal of social equality. In other words, 'You 
are in a higher status because your father, brother or husband has land'. It is rare to 
find a situation where: 'You are in a higher status because your mother, sister or aunt 
has land'. 
This patriarchal way of defining status in rural Kenya is also related to the 
preservation of class at national level in Kenya; a process which was described in 
Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 as the major developmental objective, i. e., the need to 
achieve high and growing per capita incomes equitably distributed among Africans. 
But for Siaya people, the development of a class society was and still is based on land 
ownership. How is this development related to social capital in Siaya? That is the 
central question. 
My field research found that one thing Siaya people are conscious of is the fact that 
they are landless. I did not find concrete evidence that Siaya people are aware of the 
importance of social capital in managing their differential statuses. What is social 
capital and why are Siaya people not aware of it? 
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First, the need for developing social capital in Siaya. Let us say that the main physical 
capital in Siaya is land, and the main human capital is people, one of the reasons why 
Siaya is poor is because it does not have financial capital. Siaya does not have 
financial capital because of the inequitable distribution of (whatever) per capita 
incomes there is in Kenya. I had examined the rise and fall of the Luo, people and how 
they have been systematically underdeveloped in chapter 4. Second, Widner (1998 
p2) refers to social capital as 'features of social relations that can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions'. 
Ordinarily, social capital operates by reducing the perceived level of risk or the costs 
associated with co-operation. For example, where levels of interpersonal trust is 
high, exchanges that take place over time, and therefore carry risk, are more likely to 
occur than they are where interpersonal trust is low. Compromise is also more likely 
where levels of interpersonal trust are higher (ibid. p 2). 
Third, a society cannot develop without fully utilising all forms of social capital 
available to it because social capital is gender neutral. A major effect of poverty in 
Siaya is that all forms of social capital has been destroyed. The level of IrUSI and 
information among people at family and community levels is very low. Patterns of 
association at the community level, such as women and self help groups are also 
erratic. Why are Siaya people not aware of this? 
Only one reason will be sufficient here. This is Kenya's (statist) reliance on bourgeois 
science that systematically falsifies. Official statistics in Kenya are really 'exposed to 
political and social influences whether they are the by-product of routine 
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administration or the outcome of recurrent or occasional research (Townsend 1993 op 
cit.; Chege 1998 p218). Since the production of knowledge is a thought process, and 
people's social existence determines their consciousness (Marenin op cit. ), it is not 
surprising that Kenya's official statistics systematically falsify in order to suppress the 
people's consciousness. On the other hand, the people's social existence eventually 
wakes up their consciousness. This is the political awakening which has already 
started in Siaya. It can also help to explain the voting pattern in Siaya district in the 
1997 general elections. 
The main factor behind poverty and political polarisation in Kenya is land. The types 
and numbers of families living in poverty in Kenya were classified by, Townsend 
(1993 op cit. ) as pastoralists, small farmers, rural landless, urban poor and the 
handicapped. It is a fact that the majority of Siaya people, especially the women are 
either small farmers or landless rural workers, while most men in the working age 
group are part of the urban poor. My assumption is that pastoralism and nomadism 
are traditional ways of life that are more difficult to change, and that disability is a 
reality of life. This means that disabled people or pastoralists can still own large 
pieces of land. But by definition, the urban poor, the rural landless and the small 
farmers cannot own much land. 
But these are only categories of families. How about individuals who could as well be 
categorised as the unemployed, the handicapped, the aged, the youth, etc.? How does 
the Kenya goverment account for their right to own land? Is there any policy to 
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attend to the needs of families and individuals in Siaya or in Kenya? I will raise this 
question again in the next chapter. 
The fact that Kenyans started killing because of land in 1991/2 is evidence that the 
colonialists were not stupid by postponing the land issue in the run up to 
independence. They knew that after independence, the burden of proof would be on 
the government of the day to take action on the land issue. This is a sad story for the 
future of Kenya, as it is for Zimbabwe and South Africa. Notice that the bourgeois 
science, particularly pathological politics and development economics now blame the 
government of the day in Kenya and avoid the real question, which is 'how to manage 
landlessness-as-poverty among the natives of Africa. A conference was recently held 
in London with the title: Land Reform in Zimbibwc: The Way Forward'. Under a title 
called Mugabe's 'Land Grab' in Regional Perspective, the world was told that 
[a] deeply corrupt and widely unpopular regime today stands indicted within and 
withoutý even by those who genuinely wish Zimbabwe well and were once firm 
supporters of its government. When friends of Zimbabwe find themselves nodding in 
agreement with Ian Smith and the IMF, we have indeed entered strange waters 
(Palmer, 1998 pl). 
This is a matter of opinion, but still subject to challenge. We should also remember 
the rights of those individuals, families, clans and whole ethnic groups who are 
currently landless and also ow ir ancestors lost the land. We should remember 
'Centre for African Studies, University of London, SOAS, and the Britain Zimbabwe Society with the support of 
Zimbabwe High Commission; SOAS, II March 1998 
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their social existence, their future, their poverty, their exclusion and also their 
consciousness of all these. 
There is yet a third way of looking at this particular problem. Most research and 
studies on agrarian change in Kenya have not been based on empirical evidence. 'The 
majority of studies and polemical writings [are] focused on Central Kenya, or, if they 
had a wider scope, extrapolated Central Kenya experiences to other smallholder 
regions' (Francis and Hoddinot 1993 pl 15-116). Research done by Alila (et al) 
(1993), on Rural Landlessness in Kenya: Problems, Dynamics and Policies argued 
that Kiambu district in Central Province was chosen mainly because it is a leading 
disiricl in terms of rural landlessness problems in Kenya' (page X) (my emphasis). Is 
there any reason why Kiambu could be a leading district in terms of rural landlessness 
except that land consolidation started there 1956? The problem is that there are still 
very serious constraints in getting to the root cause of landlessness-as-poverty and 
gender inequality in Kenya. 
Aware of all these problems, my methodology has been guided by realism all the 
way. I now want to examine the issues that have got realistically historical and 
contextual dimensions because the arguments involved have been prompted by a 
realistic concern for the lack of social policy and equality in the life of Kenya since 
independence. There are also questions of institutions in the differential contexts of 
Kenyan and British life styles and social consciousness. Remember that the 
institutional values that formed the foundation of Kenya's future social and economic 
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development were laid by Britain during colonialism. The single most important 
institution in this regard is the family as the subject and object of power in pre- and 
post colonial Kenya. 
Briefly, managing landlessness in Siaya, involves a sensitive balance of personal and 
institutional interests. Personal as concerns social existence of individual landless 
Kenyans; and institutional as concerns the affected families, clans, communities, 
political parties, relevant departments and sectors. I know that the Govenunent of 
Kenya has no policy to address the needs of the landless Kenyan Africans2 per se. 
That is why I must build my discussion of gender and landlessness on a forceful 
theoretical foundation in order to hammer out a solid background indicative of a clear 
policy proposal in Chapter Six. I also know the danger of living in the past with 
respect to issues of social injustice such as landlessness. But if Kenya cannot move 
on fast enough, the past can easily overcome the future and things could go the wrong 
way. Nobody in Kenya including the black and white settlers would benefit from this. 
What (Palmer 1998 op cit. p4) has called the 'Rift Valley phenomenon' of acute 
landlessness in Kenya and Rwanda has nothing to do with overpopulation in Kenya 
but to exclusion of the majority of Kenyans from land. It is already haunting Siaya 
district as well. I have to discuss it now. 
2 Note that the ruling (political) party since independence in 1963 up to date, 1998, is called 'Kenya African 
National Union'! (emphasis added) 
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5.2 UNDERSTANDING LANDLESSNESS IN SIAYA: THE 
QUESTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP IN YCENYA 
There are many reasons why Kenya is not one of Britain's most favoured countries. 
This is a problem for those who have realised the rapidity with which Kenya's 
significance in this peripheral context is diminishing - actually to the extent that 
Kenya is now almost at its last point of social, political and economic elasticity. It is 
now clear that the main reason for this diminishing significance is basically the same 
as in Zimbabwe and other settler colonies in Africa. 
5.2.1 The Land Question in Rural Kenya 
Each moment of human history is, to a greater or lesser degree, an open ended 
situation; a situation which is not entirely determined by the structure of its own past, 
and from which more than one string of events can follow (Bauman 1976 op. cit. 
PIO). The present human history of Kenya is also determined by a string of events. 
According to Berg-Schlosser and Rainer Siegler (1990 p3 1): 
At the turn of the century, Governor Charles Eliot and Hugh, Lord Delamere, both 
large scale farmers, paved the way for the immigration of European settlers to 
Kenya, influencing both the form of colonial rule and future social structures. The 
White Highlands in the Rift Valley became an enclave of European land owners, 
while African peasants were confined to densely populated reservations. Harsh 
taxation compelled many Africans to work as hired labourers on the settler's farms, 
creating an infrastructure that guaranteed that the central area around Nairobi and the 
White highlands would have a head start in development. The settler's production 
was also subsidised by a system of monopolies, favourable railway tariffs, and 
protective customs duties at the expense of the African peasantry. Marketing boards 
and co-operatives controlled by European farmers were set up as parastatals. The 
flourishing settler economy during World War II and Nairobi's function as the 
centre of finance and commerce in the East African Region led to a first wave of 
industrialization in the capital city after 1940... Immigrants from the India 
subcontinent tended to dominate trade and crafts. (my emphases). 
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There are six issues relevant to this argument. These are: the form of colonial rule 
and future social structures in Kenya; an enclave of European land owners in relation 
to Africans confined to densely populated reservations; a guarantee that the central 
area around Nairobi and the White Highlands would have a head start in development; 
the settler production system that was supported by monopolies and protective 
customs duties at the expense of African peasantry; Nairobi's function as a centre of 
finance and commerce in the East African region and the first wave of 
industrialization; and the domination of trade and customs by migrants from the 
Indian sub-continent. 
These issues arise from the concern about the effect of an enclave of white land 
grabbers on the African peasantry that was confined to densely populated reservations 
and the strategy to ensure that the central area around Nairobi and the White 
Highlands would have a head start in development. There is public concern about the 
initially racial, and later supposedly corrupt system of subsidised economic 
monopolies, which is the precursor of the current tendency to tribal monopoly of 
economic resources in Kenya. There is also a concern about the way European 
farmers controlled marketing boards and parastatals, and how this has led to 
continuity of dominance of foreign and multinational capital in the parastatal sector. 
The return of the colonial Kenya Farmers Association (KFA) and the rise and fall of 
Kenya Grain Growers Co-operative Union (KGGCU) underline this concern. It is 
important for Kenyans to understand to what extent their corruption and tribalism is 
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part of post Cold War game being played by the West (Szeftel 1998). Is it 
recolonisation by the back door? 
What aggravates this concern is that all these events are first tied to the central 
question of land-ownership in Kenya. It is not possible to see any way for the native 
Kenyans to deal with this situation and peacefully get out of it. Had the British 
government agreed with the interpenetration policy, the story would now be more 
pleasing. Perhaps Kenya would now be an independent country where the natives, 
Asians, Arabs and Europeans equally share the six types of colonially imposed 
poverty described above. It is only the British Government, and not the World Bank, 
for that matter, that is able to undo the trap of landlessness-as-poverty in Kenya. It 
was designed by them. 
By the end of the colonial period, a total of 7.5 million acres had been alienated and 
were in the hands of about 3,600 European farmers. About 6,350,000 acres of these 
were owned under a 999 year lease, 591,000 acres under 99 year lease, while 
560,000 acres were freehold.... This meant that over 8.36 million Africans had only 
11.65 million acres of good land for cultivation (an average of 1.45 acres per person) 
as compared to about 7.5 million acres for about 55,759 Europeans (an average of 
134.5 acres per person) (Alila et al. (op. cit. ) 1993 p3-4) 
All this alienation was legal, by English land law. It is this concept of 'legal' 
alienation of land that can explain the current understanding on land alienation in 
Kenya. 
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In historical terms at least, the doctrine of tenures served the purpose of describing 
the relationship between tenant and lord. The relationship between tenant and land 
was left to be explained in terms of a rich taxonomy of estates. Because, on 
medieval theory, the underlying or radical title to all land vested in the crown, it 
seemed to follow that no individual tenant could ever properly claim ownership of 
land as such. Instead, ... English law created an abstract entity, in the form of a 
conceptual "estate" in land, and interposed this highly artificial construct between 
the tenant and the physical object of his tenure. Each tenant therefore owned not land 
but an estate in land, the nature of his precise estate being graded by reference to its 
temporal duration (Gray 1996 op cit. p247). 
Kenyans need to understand that as long as they are still subjected to this system of 
law as well as African customary law, they are not yet legally independent. With 
regard to land law, Kenya's dependency on Britain as yet appears permanent. One 
hopes that they (the people of Kenya and Britain) will do something about it. For the 
moment, I want to focus on the question as it connects Siaya district to this picture, 
both nationally and internationally. 
5.2.2. Land Question in Siaya. 
The problem with the way the British Government dealt with the land question in 
rural Kenya is that it answered the question by ignoring it. It ignored the question of 
land ownership and decided to dwell on the peripheral question of African agricultural 
development, which was different from the land question as stated above. But the 
main question was: Who actually owns land in Siaya District? 
Let me start with an historical brief. Themain reason why the Lawrence Commission 
put the clan at the centre of land reform in Luoland was because it recognised that the 
Luo understanding of land ownership is deeply rooted in their history. The Kenyan 
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Luo, refer to themselves as Jo-Ramogi (the people of Ramogi) because they are 
descendants of a common ancestor called Ramogi (Ogot 1987 op cit. ). In the same 
way, the people of Alego Location in Siaya District are Jo-Alego, the people of 
Onyango sub-location in Alego Location are Jo-Konyango, the people of Kodero gj_M 
in Onyango sub-location are called Jokodero. Note that Rarnogi, Alego, Onyango, 
Odero are names of administrative areas as well as names of forefathers of different 
interlocking Luo clans. 
Before land reforrn, Onyango sub-location, as an estate, customarily belonged to 
Onyango people. When land consolidation started, the sublocation became officially 
known as an adjudication area and therefore subject to state law, i. e., English law. 
Onyango's people's land was parcelled, individualised by their men, through 
administrative orders from the government. Often the Land Adjudication Officer was 
someone from another ethnic group, who was not even interested in legitimate 
arbitration of the ensuing disputes and conflicts over land. This is how Swynnerton 
ignored the legal right of the Onyango people for the benefit of the White Highlands. 
Through various means; inheritance, bribery, power, etc., the strong (men) in the 
community deprived the weak (women) of their only means of survival. The strong 
were also the ones who were likely to be working in the European estates in towns or 
white highlands. They were the ones able to buy tea for the whole lot of hungry civil 
servants that were involved in the process, such as surveyors, recorders, adjudicators, 
etc. The more Siaya women lost in this struggle for land, the more poverty was 
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feminised in Siaya. Of course the colonial and the KANU government had no time to 
mind about women's right to own land in Kenya. That was the victim's business. 
But how can the present KANU government of Kenya continue to be so mindless of 
her own people's welfare, creating victims out of innocent people? Is it impossible for 
it to realise that customary tenure is custom specific although it was undergoing 
natural evolution, and that the change imposed by the grafting on of foreign legal 
concepts was not part of the evolution. Is this Kenya African National Union really a 
party of Africans, for Africans by Africans? 
When I was in Nairobi, I interviewed one of the most prominent land lawyers. The 
question I asked was: Who actually owns land in Kenya? Here is the answer I got: 
In 1915, the first Law relating to ownership of land was passed i. e., the Crown Lands 
Ordnance which divided land into three; urban land to be leasedfor 99 years from 
Her Majesty Agricultural Land to be released for 999 years from Her Majesty 
Native Lands which was held by the Local Councils on behaýf of the lVatives. This was 
just held in trustfor the natives. In the urban Councils, land was zoned into Africans, 
Asians and Europeans without time limits. This was how land policy came up in 
Kenya. 
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Apart from the fact that I could not see a difference between this structure and that in 
former apartheid South Africa, I learnt two lessons from this answer. First, that the 
real land problems in Siaya started in 1915 when what became Siaya officially 
became a native reserve. Second, all land in present Siaya has since been held in trust 
by the Siaya County Council. This is the fact on the ground now, but it also begs two 
questions: What is the meaning of trust? How does this relate to the current 
landlessness in Siaya? 
[T]he essence of a 'trust' is the idea that the trustee is the nominal owner of property 
but the real or beneficial owner of that property is the 'beneficiary' or 'cestui que 
trust'. The central feature of a trust lies in the fact that the formal or 'titular' interest 
in property vests in a nominee (or 'trustee') whose duty is to deflect the beneficial 
enjoyment of the property to those who hold the 'equitable interests' under the trust 
(Gray 1994 p34-35). 
We saw in chapter 4 that Luo customs vested trusteeship with the clan elders. All 
members of the clan would have interests in the land as stakeholders. Before reform, 
land belonged to all stakeholders. What makes it even more complicated is that Siaya 
County Council became a trustee of land. Firstly, who gave Siaya County Council the 
right to be a trustee of customary land in Siaya? That is the first question. Secondly, 
why was land consolidation or adjudication not done under the auspices of the County 
Council itself? What does the Ministry of Lands have to do with land consolidation in 
rural native areas? Who is the trustee of all land in rural Siaya? Is it SCC or the 
Ministry of Lands? 
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Thirdly, why did the Kenyan reform process have to change from consolidation 
started in 1956 to adjudication since 1968? In fact, these two processes were legally 
and structurally different. They had only three common characteristics. First, they 
furthered the confusion of land reform in Siaya District. Second, they aggravated the 
differentials between women and men in Siaya. Third, they both scored the same 
economic point, i. e., those who have will be given more and the poor will get poorer. 
This is another nightmare in the life of the people of Siaya. It deserves further 
examination. 
5.2.3. Was it Land Consolidation or Adjudication? 
Before I answer this question, I must reiterate the importance of the change from land 
consolidation to land adjudication on the lives of people in Siaya. Consolidation was 
known in Luo language as luoro lowo, i. e., enclosing the land; while adjudication was 
known as ngado lowo, parcelling the land. Adjudication is very contentious because it 
raised more questions than answers. People are still fighting over land because of the 
increasing number of land questions in Siaya. I saw it when I went to Siaya for field 
work. 
The two forms of land reform could = have the same effect on the people of Siaya. 
For example, a key informant told me that he was a chairman of the local land board 
when land consolidation started in his sub-location. He managed to parcel out a 
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consolidated rectangular piece of land. He said that he does not intend to subdivide 
the parcel among his sons. He wanted his descendants to live on the land because he 
did not believe in land being parcelled into smaller and smaller pieces. He said that he 
was the owner of the land, and that even after his death all his descendants 
irrespective of sex, had the right to live on the land. Was this man arguing like a 
native or a white settler? 
I also got some statistics on the distribution of land in the district from the office of 




DISTRIBUTION OF LAND IN NORTH GEM LOCATION, SIAYA DISTRICT 
SUB- DATE No. OF APPROX APPROX 






Ndere 11-5-66 761 4063 5.3ha 
Got Regea 18-9-67 867 2448 2.8ha 
Sirembe 6-10-67 743 2808 3.8ha 
Asayi 9-11-70 753 1292 1.7ha 
Ludha 19-4-71 1209 1013 0.8ha 
Siriwo 3-5-72 828 846 I. Oha 
Maliera 7-7-75 1208 731 0.6ha 
Malanga 26-5-77 1066 1339 1.3ha 
Malunga 1-7-77 1460 1339 0.9ha 
SOURCE: OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT SURVEVOR, SIAVA 
Gem location started with consolidation before 1968 and changed to adjudication after 
1968. It is clear that in Gem location, those sub-locations which went through 
consolidation such as Ndere, Got Regea and Sirembe have higher acreage per head 
than the average, which is 2.0 ha. The rest that went through adjudication, i. e., where 
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registration took place after 1968, have acreage per head that are smaller than the 
locational average. It is clear that in the case in which land was consolidated 
throughout the district we would now be studying the effect of one aspect of land 
reform on the differential status of women and men in Siaya. But now we find 
ourselves in a double system of reform being applied to Siaya. Of course 
consolidation and adjudication could not have the same impact or the same effect on 
the differential status of women and men. 
The Land Adjudication Officer also told me that when the Land Adjudication Act 
came into effect in 1968, the reforni process changed. In adjudication, the scattered 
pieces are registered where ever they are. One gets as many titles as pieces. The 
registration system is based on the Torrens System of Australia, that use aerial 
photographs to show the boundaries of the parcels. In this case, what is actually 
registered is not the physical land, but people's interest in the land. This means that 
only those who were able to make their interests prevail got land. 
He also said that the adjudication process is a method of legalising and ascertaining 
land ownership. Legalise is to create a document relating a property to a particular 
person. To ascertain ownership is to have it identified both in the map and on the 
ground. Once both processes are completed, an economic viability for development is 
created. Somebody is now sure that the land is his/hers which s/he can sell or use as 
an asset. 
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But a Law Dictionary told me that adjudication is 'a judgement of decision of the 
court' (Rutherford et al 1994 p14). This means that a decision of an adjudication 
officer would not be superior to that of a court of law. Furthermore, the 'Australian 
System of land ownership is based on Britain's- there is freehold and leasehold, there 
are national parks and vacant Crown Land' (Sunday Telegraph Magazine 11 Jan. 1998 
p12). The fact is that there is no difference between the Torrens system and the 
Kenyan system as per the Crown Lands Ordnance of 1915. 
From here onwards, I will refer to land consolidation and land adjudication as if they 
are synonyms. The whole problem had been started by the colonial government 
(consolidation), and worsened by the KANU government (adjudication). For 
analytical purposes, I will treat them simply as different aspects of land reform. What 
then was land refonn supposed to achieve here? This raises the agrarian question, 
which I have yet to discuss below. But first, Lipton's (1974 p270) theoretical 
definition of land reform is useful: 
Land Reform (agrarian reform, reforma agraria) comprises (1) compulsory take- 
over of land, usually (a) by the State, (b) form the biggest land owners, and (c) with 
partial compensation; and (2) the farming of that land in such a way as to spread the 
benefits of man-land relationship more widely than before the take-over. The State 
may give, sell or rent such land for private cultivation in smaller units than hitherto 
(dustributivist reform); or the land may be jointly fanned and its usufruct shared, 
through co-operative, collective and State farming (collectivist reform). 
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What actually happened in Siaya was a compulsory take-over of land rights by the 
State under the pretext of distributive reform. First, the Land Adjudication Act of 
1968 simply completed the take-over that had already started during colonialism. 
Second, as far as Luo customary law was and still is concerned, land reform was 
illegally imposed on them by the settler colonial authority. The current experience for 
the Luo is that although land reform was and is still customarily not accepted, the 
sense of justice among the Luo, was further disregarded by the post independence 
Government of Kenya. 
Briefly, I have examined the land question in Kenya and have derived a context for an 
argument that the differential status between women and men in Kenya is not due to 
the physical environment or subsistence agriculture, but to settler colonial history, 
economics and politics. Worse still, the Government of Kenya has never bothered to 
address these questions with a view to correcting them. This scenario has resulted in 
the present poverty and inequality that people of Siaya and all rural Kenyans are 
undergoing. The fact is that if Kenyans cannot satisfactorily address the structural 
land problem, then they cannot sort out the agrarian problem. All native Kenyans are 
stuck in a nightmare. This is the agrarian question as it applies to Siaya and rural 
Kenya in general. Let me now discuss it. 
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5.3 THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN KENYA AND THE 
AGRARIAN CRISIS IN SIAYA 
It is very unfortunate that 'British imperialism succeeded in establishing the African 
landowning class in political power, and it also determined, thereby, that Kenya's 
subsequent independent economic development would be curtailed' (Good 1987 op 
cit. p616). This is the answer to the why of the historical case which I raised at the 
beginning of this chapter. In Chapter One we also saw that in Africa, no less than in 
England, he who controls the land is in good position to influence government. We 
saw that when the political balance shifted from the colonialists to the nationalists at 
the dawn of Kenya's independence, the colonialists cheated the nationalists in two 
ways. First, the nationalists were made to postpone the land question until after 
independence. Second, the enclosure movement which was started as a punitive 
measure during the emergency was reformulated to become a plan to develop African 
Agriculture. The Europeans knew that when native land ownership went to men 
through consolidation, productivity would have to decline as the land owners were 
still working for them in urban areas and settlement schemes. Third, when Kenya 
bccamc indcpcndcnt, it tumcd 'overnight' from a setticr colony to an agricultural 
country as the attention of Kenyans was shifted from the European ownership of land 
to the agricultural production of land. In other words, Kenyans were told that the 
mainstay of their economy was agriculture, still centred on large farms. Meanwhile, 
the agrarian crisis, which had been triggered by land refonn, continued in rural areas. 
How was it in Siaya? 
225 
5.3.1 The Agrarian Crisis in Siaya 
The agrarian question in Kenya is basically a question of whether Kenya could 
develop a viable agricultural capitalism within the structures created by land 
consolidation. However, the agrarian crisis comes from the fact that the great 
majority of Kenyans who live in rural areas cannot assure themselves of food 
sufficiency all year round. This is currently a deep political issue in Kenya. N 
It would be difficult to overestimate the contemporary political impact of the 
Swynnerton Plan. One measure of its significance is that it was taken over virtually 
intact as a cornerstone of rural policy by the postindependece government of Kenya. 
The program, renamed land adjudication, is now administered by the Ministry of 
Lands, Settlement and Physical Planning. The Principal difference between the 
present policy and the earlier program of land consolidation and adjudication is that 
the consolidation aspect has been dropped as too cumbersome. Land adjudication, 
since independence, simply requires that an individual's land holdings be carefully 
demarcated, and that traditional entitlement be fully established, before title is 
awarded. Under this system, further consolidation of small land units into 
economically viable farms is left to the operation of the marketplace (Lofchie 1989 
p188). 
Since Siaya district went through both types of reform, (consolidation and 
adjudication), the impact of the Swynnerton phenomenon had a double effect on 
underdeveloping Siaya. The Plan itself 'involved consolidating land fragments into 
single holdings and issuing registered freehold titles to individuals. The householder 
would then be able to borrow from commercial banks or from government on security 
of their titles' (Anyan'g-Nyon'go 1981 op. cit. pl 15). First, this could happen only in 
situations where land became completely privatised after consolidation. Second, it 
depended on the economic incentive for borrowing from the financial institutions. In 
districts like Siaya, where people, mainly women continued with subsistence 
agriculture after land consolidation as before, there was almost no need for 
agricultural loans. Moreover, subsistence agriculture and food production in Siaya are 
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mostly in the hands of women, who as shown above, lost out during the scramble for 
land. 
Third, my interview with the Manager of the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), 
Siaya Branch, revealed a big agrarian problem in Siaya. I here below quote him: 
The Siaya AFC branch opened in 1981. Up to 1985, we have been giving unsecured 
loans. From 1985 onwards, AFC decided that all loans had to be secured A number 
of women benefitedftom the unsecured loans though the figures are not available by 
sex. The future of agriculture in Siaya is very bad There is lack of organised markets 
for local agricultural products. Mostfarmers are livingfi-om hand to mouth because 
poverty is serious in Siaya. There is lack of factories, though Siaya District can 
produce tobacco, sugar cane, coffee, milk etc. This is due to neglect by the Ministry 
of Agriculture. There are also lots of crop failures and continuation of badjarming 
practices, especially along the Lake shores. Almost hay of our loanee farmers in 
Siaya District are dead, together with their wives. This is mostly due to AIDS and 
diarrhoeal diseases, specially along the beaches. 
Theoretically, industrial development resulting from rural land reform can result in 
higher status for both women and men. In Taiwan, for example, land reform 
promoted industrial development in at least three ways. First, it changed the structure 
of the social economy, raised the intellectual standard of the 
farmers and sharpened 
the farmers' political consciousness. Second, it laid down a sound foundation for 
227 
private enterprise. For the first time, private enterprises came into existence that were 
not run by wealthy families but by the general public. Third, it brought about a 
favourable social environment for promoting industry. Poverty and turmoil are 
obstacles to industrial development (Brown and Lin 1947 p375-376). 
I hope that the Taiwan experience describes what Mr. Swynnerton meant when he 
'proposed that an African Loan (or Land) Bank be set up with sufficient funds to 
finance developing farmers under the present plan and to finance district cash crop 
boards or co-operative societies in the construction of processing plants' (Swynnerton 
1954 p6l). He even proposed 'further development of farm institutes and training of 
women instructors... and the needs for practical agricultural instruction in schools' 
(p6l). I was happy to find that the Principal of Siaya Farmers Training Centre was 
female. To this extent, Swynnerton meant well for Siaya farmers of both sexes. 
The problem, however, is still that Swynnerton did not care about the possibility of 
land reform causing landlesness among native Kenyans. He wrote: 'Former 
government policy will be reversed and able, energetic or rich Africans will be able to 
acquire more land and bad or poor farmers less, creating a landed and a landless class. 
This is a normal step in the evolution of a country' (Anyan'g-Nyon'go 1981 op cit. 
pi 15). If landlessness was a non-nal step in the evolution of a country, then where was 
the need for the government policy or for the plan itself? Was the plan and policy not 
colonial strategy to cheat the Africans that landlessness was normal, forget their 
claims and then sell their labour cheaply in order to pay their taxes and stay alive? 
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No debate on the agrarian problem in Kenya has ever answered this question. Even if 
Kenya was not colonised by the British, there was going to be population pressure on 
land in (what became) Siaya, because 'agricultural density acts as a progenitor of land 
inequality [and] as population grows, there is a geometric subdivision of the land so 
that at a later point in time, an exponential distribution describes the landholdings' 
(Midlarsky and Midlarsky 1997 p58). The argument is that as population growth 
continues, landlessness also continues, to the point of no return, when some calamity 
ensues. But this is a Malthusian proposition that should never be allowed to succeed. 
People always know how to deal with it, but when it is imposed on the people by 
foreign powers, who also want to settle around, then it becomes a difficult problem to 
deal with. 
Briefly, the agrarian question in Siaya was triggered by the colonial social 
engineering. The Swynnerton phenomenon was the main element behind the colonial 
agenda to establish the African land owning class in political power, so that the 
energy of Kenyans would be spent on selling their cheap labour as 'shamba boys' and 
squatters in the enclaves and slums. The rural residuals would also be busy fighting 
themselves over poverty and landlessness caused by land reform. Why did 
Swynnerton talk of evolution of a country instead of development? Are the conflicts 
and poverty in Siaya a sign of evolution or development? To what extent are women 
particularly victims of these circumstances? Let me discuss this question briefly. 
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5.3.2 Women and the Agrarian Question in Kenya. 
'In reality, [African] rural women are so grotesquely underprivileged that it is almost 
impossible to capture the magnitude of their oppression' (Tadesse 1982 p209). I agree 
with Tedesse, but how are those women who are conscious helping those that are not 
conscious in this class dominated world? The problem is that these kinds of concerns, 
although correct, do not help at all. They mostly tend to isolate women into objects of 
study. This sisterhood approach has only succeeded in polarising women into peasants 
and professionals. This approach has mainly been promoted by their sisters mainly 
armed with sociological and anthropological methodologies in a kind of centre- 
periphery relationship. Women professionals and senior civil servants do not seem to 
be interested in doing something about the reality of poor women's deprivation and 
peasantry. They continue shouting gender equality without action while relying on 
the normative bourgeois science to lord over their sisters. 
If we argue, like England (1997) that ferninisation of poverty increases when 
dependence on husband backfires, and when the woman has to survive on her own, 
then we can understand the situation of women in Siaya district. A glance at a few 
statistics can tell it all. The 1994 Kenya Welfare Monitoring Survey found that Siaya 
wornen would qualify as the poorest in Kenya. In terms of female household heads, 
Siaya leads the whole country with 45.5%. In terms of illiteracy, Siaya leads all six 
districts surveyed in Nyanza Province with 48% of adult women (aged 15+) unable to 
read and write. To make it worse, Siaya has the highest percentage of widowed 
female household in Kenya, 27%. 
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Again recall that the colonial design was to privilege Nairobi and the central area 
against other areas. The gendered impact would then have to show over time. Using 
data from the 1989 Kenya Population Census, Siaya and Kiambu districts compare as 
the least and the most privileged districts within this colonial underdevelopment 
programme. Table 5.2 below shows the mortality indicators for Kenya, Nairobi, 
Kiambu, Siaya and Nyanza Province. 
Table 5.2 






Expectation Expectation Expectation IMR* Crude Death 
of life for of life for of life for Rate per 
Males Females both sexes 1000 (PER 1000 Population 
live births) 
57.5 61.4 59.5 66.0 10.6 
65.3 66.8 66.1 49.0 5.4 
66.7 69.0 67.9 38.0 6.6 
67.7 69.1 68.4 30.0 7.0 
Siaya 46.3 
Nyanza 49.5 
Infant Mortality Rate 
50.1 48.2 135.0 17.9 
53.5 51.5 111.0 15.1 
Source: Republic of Kenya 1996(a): Kenya Population Census Analytical Report Volume V 
sMortalityl, Table 4.5 page 50. 
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It is difficult to deny the fact that Siaya's predicament stems from settler designs to 
underdevelop the periphery of Kenya. The 1989 population census found the 
expectation of life in Nyanza to be the lowest in the country, (51.5), closely followed 
by Coast Province (56.5) and Western Province (56.7). Compare these with Central 
Province (68.4). 
Despite theoretical arguments on the agrarian question as was perceived, for example 
by the 'Nairobi discussants' (Anyan'g-Nyon'go 1981 op cit. ), the main point is that 
the Swynnerton Plan did not want to see any development of a middle peasantry in 
Nyanza or among native Kenyans in general. The problem was that the present Kenya 
goverment is confused as to whether to support the survival of the peasants or the 
large scale farmers. 
Engels once wrote that the worst thing that can befall the leader of a party advocating 
fundamental change is to be compelled to assume power at a time when the 
movement is not yet ripe for the domination of the class he represents. Such a leader 
must find himself in an insoluble dilemma (Mamdani 1988 pI 180). 
This is the KANU dilemma between rational colonial principles or realistic peasant 
base. Kenyans will not find a way out if they continue to be trapped in this dilemma. 
An examination of this exploitative structure is now imperative. 
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5.4 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
IN KENYA: FOCUS ON SIAYA. 
Some people argue that there is a difficulty of reconstructing how land was distributed 
in pre-colonial Kenya because of 'pre-colonial Africa 'data limitations" (Haugerud. 
1995 pI 11). But the early history of the East African interior is well described by 
historians such as Twaddle (1975). The problem is in the definition of the pre-colonial 
baseline from which measurements of economic or agrarian change and their 
connection with the magnitude and direction of rural class differentiation processes 
have evolved. Since the present Kenya becarne a British colony only at the turn of this 
century, what is important for the future of Kenya is the interpretation of the evidence 
left by the nyayo (footsteps) of colonialism. For example, 'By the late 1920s, 
European officials and settlers in Kenya had forced the African population as 'a 
whole' to play its assigned role as a cheap wage force' (Good 1976 p603). In 1947, 
unskilled agricultural labourer in Kenya was earning Shs. 23 to Shs. 28 per month; 
while the skilled or headman was earning Shs 33 to 100 per month (Gordon-Brown 
1947 p850). In fact, Kenya's wage force was described to be probably the cheapest in 
the world. 
The fact that 'harsh taxation compelled many Africans to work as hired labourers on 
the settler's farms, creating an infrastructure that guaranteed that the central area 
around Nairobi and the White Highlands would have a headstart, in development' 
(Berg-Schlosser, 1990 op. cit. ) was a long tenn policy of the British government. 
Apart from Mombasa, which is the main port of Kenya, the pattern Of urbanization in 
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Kenya has been confined to Nairobi, the Central Area and the White Highlands. 
According to the Kenya Population Censuses of 1969,1979, and 1989, Nairobi, 
Central and Rift Valley together had respectively, 65%, 57% and 59% of the Kenyan 
urban population. Further, the 1989 population census confirmed that 
the net receivers were either urban centres or the less densely populated arable lands 
of Coast and Rift Valley Provinces. On the other hand, the net losers were either the 
highly productive densely populated areas, or the inhospitable sparsely populated 
regions. This implies that internal migration to a large extent was either in search of 
arable land for settlement, or employment in urban areas (Republic of Kenya, 
1996(b) p28). 
Kenyans are still moving from rural areas to seek employment in the Rift Valley or 
Nairobi, Central and other 'privileged' areas. This is because the Kenya goverment is 
only managing the structures left by colonialism while pretending to be 'dedicated to 
creation in Kenya of a society based on the principles of African socialism and to 
planning as a principal instrument for achieving that society (Goulet 1971 p62). 
Recall that 
capital in its struggle against societies with natural economy pursues the following 
ends: (1) To gain immediate possession of important sources of productive forces 
such as land, game in primeval forests, minerals, precious stones, and ores, products 
of exotic flora such as rubber, etc. (2) To 'liberate' tabour power and to coerce it into 
service. (3) To introduce a commodity economy. (4) To separate trade and 
agriculture (Luxemburg (1997pl8). 
Land consolidation was a policy designed to incorporate the native areas into the 
national market economy. This policy resulted in two contradictory effects. Firstly, 
234 
the labour power that became landless were supposed to migrate to the privileged 
areas to sell their 'sweat' for bare survival. Secondly, the native rural economy was to 
be commoditised in order to become a market for the food produced in the urban 
areas. The contradiction came when the same labour power could not be in the 
'urban' and 'rural' sectors at the same time. This is a deep sense in which capitalism 
ensured future rural underdevelopment in Kenya. 
This rural underdevelopment is also gendered. First, by losing the right to inherit land 
equally as men, women have become landless and propertyless. Second, as the 
working age male population has moved to urban areas, the traditional rural family 
unit has been destroyed. Third, management of this political economy of rural 
underdevelopment in Kenya is the duty of the state, i. e., public administration. 
5.4.1 Administration and Rural Underdevelopment in Kenya 
This reminds me of the chattel slave drivers who used coercion, force and violence to 
extract surplus from the slaves. In rural Kenya, administration simply means death; 
economic, social and political. To explain this, I want to examine the role of two 
institutions, the District Commissioner and the Locational Chief. 
5.4.1.1 The District Commissioner 
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Because it is axiomatic that every public activity during the colonial period was 
perforce acted out against the backdrop of the ubiquitous colonial administration, so 
that the District Commissioner took the role of producer or prompter where he was 
not already playing the lead.... To missionaries and merchants, soldiers and settlers, 
to the professional and technical branches of the colonial service, to all Africans - 
princes, peasants and politicians alike - the omnipresence of the D. C. constituted an 
ineluctable consideration in their every thought, word and move (Ranger 1979 p 
463-464). 
Who needs the omnipresent D. C. in Kenya? Ironically, the DC is still almost 
everywhere in Kenya. That is why the number of districts is increasing in Kenya ad 
infinitum for closer administration. Isn't this what has been called the 'second 
colonial occupation'? (Mueller 1984 p403). The problem is that Kenya is still under 
the grip of a structure that benefits only the former colonial goverm-nent. Why is this 
so? Because of the patron-client pyramidal structure which ensures that the 
opportunities for rural people to accumulate wealth are structured in part by their 
vertical ties to influential patrons (Haugerud 1995 op cit. ). Who would expect 
ordinary rural Kenyans to understand the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 or any 
other land act passed by the KANU/KADU government? 
During field work in Siaya, for example, I was told that the DC is in charge of 
everything concerning land in the District. 
He is the Chairman of the District 
Development Committee; head of all departmental heads; signatory to all 
departmental payments. The truth is that there is no difference between the present 
DC in Siaya and the colonial DC of Central Nyanza, Bwana Hoblo (Mr. Hobley). 
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5.4.1.2 The Locational Chief 
In Siaya, public administrators are in charge of almost everything to do with 
development. Between the DC and the Locational Chief, there is the District Officer, 
who is usually from a politically correct ethnic group. Behind the DO is the Chief, 
who is usually the tool for rural underdevelopment in the sense of patron-clientism. 
In Africa, rural community has a kind of corporate status, whether imposed and/or 
claimed (Bernstein 1996). The claim is that of a common identity and inheritance in 
relation to specific land. The political structure in this specific land may be seen in 
three key institutions: patrilineal kinship, rulership and clientship (Fallers 1955). 
Generally speaking, the Luo fall within the patrilineal kinship group, the Luhya in the 
rulership group and the Kikuyu in the clientship group. The main message is that 
'[a]mong the Luo, the chief was essentially a leader, rather than a ruler' (Ochieng' 
1972 p49). The present chiefs and DCs are not leaders because they are not elected by 
the people. The are imposed rulers. 
My key informants told me that when the British colonialists came to what is now 
Siaya District, they found a kinship group whose political structure was based on 
clans. The people of Alego, Gem, Uyoma, Asembo locations were more-or-less 
independent kinships on their land. In order to colonise and rule Alego, for example, 
the British used the nearest rulership structure, Mumia son of Shiundu who was a 
'King' of the Wanga people. Mumia in turn imposed his 'governors' in different parts 
of the Wanga chieftainship. In Alego, he imposed N'gon'ga son of Odima. N'gon'ga 
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in turn imposed people like Okelo Obingo, to rule West and South-West Alego; 
Okaka to rule Kaluo area; Adeya to rule Ulaf and Umala; among others. This is how 
chieftainship started in Siaya. But a person called a chief in the current sense is a 
misnomer in grassroots Luo society. The Luos did not have chiefs, but elders who 
used to exercise parental powers over a clan as a kind of extended family. The clans 
coalesced into communities, which became sublocations. That is how egalitarian 
power relations were expressed in Luoland. This point needs further explanation. 
5.4.2 Equality and Land Use in the Luo Community. 
A brief theoretical discussion of the concepts of freedom and equality is important for 
a better understanding of the Luo people. Adopting Ingram's (1994 p106-109) 
interpretation of Rawls, citizens regard themselves as free in three ways: as self 
originating sources of valid claims, as having moral independence, and as capable of 
taking responsibility for ends. It is important to ask whether the Luo, as citizens of 
Siaya regard themselves as free in all the three ways. One has to base the analysis 
either on the state level, the family, or the individual level. In case of land, we saw 
that the local authorities in Siaya such as Siaya County Council and Urban Councils 
are only impositions on Siaya people's traditional land arrangements. 
The question then is: What is the essence of freedom and equality in Siaya? Does an 
individual have the right to assume that s/he is born free and equal like anybody else 
in the district? Does s/he have a right to a fair share of a common asset (land) like any 
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one else? These questions beg for two kinds of response. First, they beg for some 
proof of the Luo egalitarianism at the individual and the family levels. Second, at 
state level, there is also need to find out whether the Kenya Goverrument has a land 
policy that would assist an individual Luo person or family in Siaya to understand his 
official station with regard to land. I will answer the second question in Chapter Six. 
Let me answer the first one now. 
The experience I got from the field left is that the Luo are egalitarian. I reported much 
of this in chapter 4. To borrow Kekes' (1997 p659) definition, I would argue that the 
Luo people also share 
a basic egalitarian belief that serious unjustified inequalities are morally 
objectionable and that the measure of a just society is the extent to which it 
eliminates or at least reduces them. Inequalities are serious if they affect primary 
goods, which are goods necessary for living a good life, such as adequate income, 
health care, education, physical security, housing, and so forth. 
On the list of goods necessary for living a good life in Siaya is land. Land reform, 
caused unjustified inequalities that did not exist before. If the authorities that executed 
land reform in Siaya had taken the advice of the Lawrence Commission seriously, 
then land would not have been adjudicated. A landless individual in Siaya currently 
'is an invention of modernity that has imposed itself as [Siaya's] contemporary 
reality' (Hilb 1994 p 106). In fact Kenya is a perfect example of the failure of state 
planning and corporatization or privatisation of social goods and services (Meredyth 
(1997 p274). 
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One of the people that I interviewed intensively in England was an Indian who was 
born and grew up in Mombasa, Kenya. He came to England and settled in Bristol in 
1971. His father was given a quarry by the colonial government in Mombasa area, and 
his best masons were Luos. He told me that the Luo are the most skilled and hard 
working Kenyans he had ever seen. Other ethnic groups were only used as 
transporters of the blocks to the sites. He said that he grew up with Luo people and 
even knew their language and some songs. The role played by Indians in the 
development of local economy in Siaya needs to be studied. 
What the people of Siaya need is to revive their traditional sense of civil society 
which depends on the active participation of free and equal citizens in their 
motherland as the political community. This is because participation is empowering, 
transformative and egalitarian. It has the potential to change the individual greed for 
land into collective ideals and public need. Kenyans should beware of the proto-type 
of this 'revival' that is already resulting in civil strife (ethnic clashes) in the former 
white highlands and abject poverty in the former native reserves. They urgently need 
to see the difference between the concept of civil society as imposed by the West and 
the African concept of civil society. Siaya people must marshal all the necessary 
determination and all resources, physical, social, economic and human, and then lead 
the rest of rural Kenya in managing this imposed inequality. 
The fact that Siaya has been largely excluded from Kenya's development should no 
longer surprise the people of Siaya. Everybody knows that some kind of '[e]xclusion 
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is a reality in every society' (Domen 1997 op. cit. p485). Siaya's exclusion must have 
started with the European colonialists who excluded Africans from their (African) 
land and countries. At family level, Luo men also tend to exclude women from 
inheriting land. But the main challenge which the Kenya Government inherited is that 
of 'managing the tensions between social differentiation and common belonging. ' 
(ibid. p485) at all levels, national, community and family. The point is that, if 
delinked from the national colonial structure and empowered in the right way, the Luo 
traditional life is capable of managing this challenge. 
Nobody should allow future generations to live in this situation of institutionalised 
inequality and social differentiation. One option for sorting out this problem is for 
Kenyans to allow their state to continue with the weakness and inability to make clear 
its policy on issues of practical and strategic life, such as land, food, water, and 
shelter. The Goverment can then continue with its dependent, caretaker role through 
public administration. But the danger is that this will allow further exploitation, 
oppression and systematic exclusion of the majority of Kenyans as has so far been the 
case. This approach is clearly unrealistic, unethical and unsustainable. It is already 
causing deaths in all parts of Kenya, such as Siaya, Rift Valley and Coastal areas. A 
sustainable social policy option would be for the Goverment of Kenya, through local 
authorities, to empower the people to build a kind of asset democracy that utilises land 
as a common asset from which they all enjoy economies of scope. I need to explain 
the idea of communal land tenure in Siaya in order to clarify its relevance to asset 
democracy. 
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5.4.2.1 Communal Land Use in Siaya 
In the case of Siaya, the pre-existing structure is communal land tenure. Let us revisit 
the concept and find out what we can learn from it. A world view of considering 
communal tenure could be termed 'commonhold ownership schemes' in English Law. 
According to (Gray 1994 op cit. p 10- 11), 
commonhold ownership provides a means of regulating relations between owners of 
separate properties which lie in close proximity to each other and which are 
interdependent... 'commonhold' proposals comprise a significant adaptation of 
existing notions of freehold ownership... The commonhold association [the clan] 
would be responsible for the repair and maintenance of the common parts and for the 
provision of services within the commonhold scheme, receiving for this purpose, a 
service charge payable by each unit holder [stakeholder]. 
In the case of Siaya District, the commonhold association is the family and the unit 
holder is the individual woman or man. We had seen in Lipton (1974 op cit. ) that one 
of the main reasons for land reform was the farming of that land in a such a way as to 
spread the benefits of man-land relationship more widely than ever before. But after 
land consolidation in Siaya, one can no longer farm land that s/he does not own. The 
best way out of this problem is to revert to some kind of common land use on 
stakeholder basis and for the state to be responsible for the practical needs of the 
individuals and the families. Those individuals and families are the ones that 
guarantee the existence of the state by paying their taxes and delivering their votes. 
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Therefore, the people of Siaya have no alternative but to develop themselves into the 
future. In order to be trail blazer for the rest of Kenya, Siaya must become an active 
society. The active society is 
a response to the dramatic rise of part-time, irregular and non-standard forms of 
employment. Indeed, it makes these the employment nonn. It is this trend that is to 
allow the elderly, the single-mother, the student, the long term unemployed, and the 
physically challenged to become 'active' in combining part-time work with other 
activities .... Active society discourse entails a displacement of the category of the 
officially unemployed [because] unemployment has become but one amongst many 
axes of social exclusion (Walters 1996 p225). 
I can't see what is wrong with asset democracy as long as it operates in an active 
society, where no one will steal other people's rights. Its strength derives from shared 
economies of scope and benefits therefrom. Its spirit revolves around teamwork and 
mutual trust and responsibility of equal men and women in the society. The 
development administrators will not be required, only the people and their 
democratically elected leaders. In fact there is a very clear distinction between 
economies of scale and economies of scope. 
Economies of scale arise when the average cost of producing a given bundle of 
output decreases as the total amount produced increases. Economies of scope arise 
when it is cheaper to produce one or more products jointly than to have them 
produced by separate firms. These economies of scope are critical to an 
understanding of the role of common property in agricultural production, taken 
broadly to include fisheries and foraging as well as cropping and foraging industries 
(Quiggin 1993 pl. 124). 
It would pay to dig a little deeper because there are two rationalist problems to be 
dealt with. The first one is known as the tragedy of the commons. 'Colonial and post. 
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colonial administrators in Africa -regarded' traditional land tenure systems 'as 
disorganised, leaving resources open to overexploitation and a 'tragedy of the 
commons" that results 'in environmental decline through deforestation, reduction in 
grass cover and deforestation' (Woodhouse 1997 p538). Tiffen (1996 p169) also 
argued that 
[i]n relation to land, there is a tendency to romanticise common property 
arrangements without serious effort to find out whether they are locally preferred by 
potential users and non-users, whether they complement individual land rights which 
may have already become established, or whether they are feasible within the local 
socio-political reality. Communal tenure has administrative attractions, because it 
seems easier to control a few 'traditional' authorities than many individual owners 
(as evidenced in the former homelands of South Africa), and it may seem to facilitate 
anti-erosion measures and environmental improvements. 
These are examples of rationalist arguments that are decided not to admit that the 
African farmers have the right to their traditional land use systems. Terminologies like 
the 'commons' and the 'resource poor' farmer are used by the rationalists to hide the 
deprivation, exclusion and the resulting inequality between women and men in access 
and use of the land. More serious is the fact that these imported policy decisions are 
usually imposed on African governments without discussion and approval by the 
people that eventually get affected. 
The second one is called 'global future'. Kenya has to manage the tensions arising 
from her colonial economic past and her global economicfuture. Finberg's (1972 op. 
cit. p40 1) argument that 'in the end, history must be written forwards, not backwards' 
must be taken very seriously. This means that the tensions caused by Kenya's colonial 
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land structure, which the current ruling, elites are supposed to preserve, and the 
imperative for Kenya to emerge as an independent democratic Republic must be 
managed by Kenyans themselves. In other words, the global future must be a future of 
equality, development and peace; a future which belongs to the commons and the 
active citizens. 
5.4.2.2 Could Communal Land Use be a Way out for Kenyans? 
The colonial approach of divide and rule and a dual economy that benefits only a few 
politically correct individuals is very dangerous for the future of Kenya. It is 
responsible for Kenya currently being on the road to qualify as a failed state when 
6governmental structures will be overwhelmed by circumstances' (Gros 1996 op. cit. 
p454). I wonder how the West could expect Kenya to be an example of a colony able 
to adopt a bourgeois mode of production and develop her own productive forces 
within it if the same Kenya was supposed to remain a dependency. The fuel that kept 
the Kenya Debate (Leys 1996 op cit. ) raging was that Kenya was apparently not able 
to specify her social policies that would guide it into the future as a capitalist former 
colony in Africa. Wasn't Kenya's failure to carry the flag of (colonially imposed) 
capitalism in the middle of Africa that is responsible for her current marginal isation? 
Who said that native Kenyans are capitalists by nature and would simply and 
peacefully reproduce settler capitalism after independence? As the Swynnerton Plan is 
heading for the rocks, Kenyans are now being blamed for being tribalists, and corrupt, 
and unable to manage their own country. Aren't those who enforced structural 
poverty on Kenyans the ones that should be blamed for all this? 
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5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter shown that Siaya District is a good example of double exclusion from 
the national (Kenyan) and the international (post-colonial) contexts. I have discussed 
the social consciousness and social capital because they are prerequisites for what is 
badly needed in Kenya. The agrarian question is the sociology while land question is 
the political economy of rural underdevelopment in Kenya. 
Kenyans may no longer survive with the double disability of poverty and exclusion. 
Kenya inherited this backwardness from the structure of colonial economy and then 
got involved in post colonial world economy from a position of extreme weakness. 
This weakness resulted in Kenya's failure to perceive the connection between the 
agrarian and the land question and then deal with the Swynnerton phenomenon. This 
failure has ensured that Kenya is a complete legal, economic and political dependency 
and is heavily indebted to the old imperial system. 
I support a strong state, i. e., a state that is aware of its responsibility and duty to every 
individual citizen, every family and every community in the country. There is no way 
in which ordinary Kenyans can get rid of this Swynnerton induced poverty without a 
state that is capable of implementing 'efficient policies in face Of opposition from 
rent-seeking groups within society' (Lucas 1997 p72). The government and people of 
Kenya must be aware that they may never survive in this world where the very 
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colonial masters have simply transformed into market fundamentalists, green 
imperialists and 'NGO-colonialists'. 
How will Kenya manage the social pathologies arising from land consolidation, such 
as extreme deprivation, social exclusion, violence? There are also many Kenyans 
born to the urban poor, the rural landless and the small holder families; do they also 
have a right to own property or to be in charge of their own future? Where should 
women and men who are born in Siaya live? Should they live in rural Siaya, where 
they have no land or in urban areas, where they have no shelter or employment? What 
happens to them if the husband, or a male relative is not there? Where will male 
children bom of landless women go? How about those families that got too small 




LANDLESSNESS AND POVERTY IN SIAYA DISTRICT: 
TIME FOR ACTION IS NOW. 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
A solution must be found to the problems arising from land consolidation in Siaya 
District. This solution will have to come from man' because, '[m]an is the only 
animal that laughs and weeps; for he is the only animal that is struck by the difference 
between what things are and what they might have been' (Sampson (1998 p229). The 
current structural difference between women and men, as a result of land 
consolidation in Siaya District of Kenya is particularly disturbing. The way Siaya 
people are struggling with landlessness-as-poverty at individual level certainly 
"guarantees destructive conflict and a life that is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and 
short. "' (Ridge 1998 p538). Although '[t]here is nothing more difficult to handle, 
more doubtful of success, and more dangerous to carry through than initiating 
changes' (Sampson 1998 op cit. p54), something has to be done about this problem. 
That something will have to be done by Siaya people themselves, for themselves. 
There is no point lamenting over it and then doing nothing. We must have courage 
and use our own reason; that is the motto of enlightenment (ibid. pl). In any case, 
Ii mean 'human being' 
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[t]he original science movement was associated with the Enlightenment, 
revolutionary social movements for democracy and religious freedom, classical 
liberal ideology and the emergence of capitalism. The message was hopeful: 
humanity can progress if we rely on the powers of critical thought that reside in each 
of us (Perlich 1989 op. cit. pI 14) (my emphasis). 
This chapter is divided into four main sections. Section I examines land policy as 
underdevelopment in Kenya. Section 2 discusses landlessness, gender and social 
policy in Kenya. Section 3 discusses the factors that could help women of Kenya to 
deal with their future of landlessness and poverty. Section 4 proposes the action 
necessary to confront landlessness-as-poverty in Siaya, in Kenya and in Africa. I have 
three reasons for proposing action at three levels. 
Three issues need tobe kept in mind. First, that land is both a common denominator as 
well as a unifying factor in the future. Land problems in Kenya are not much different 
from those in other former settler economies in Africa. Second, the life of the Luo of 
Kenya historically started in Alego, Siaya District. This makes Alego in Siaya the 
natural starting point in confronting the fall of the Luo as well as the Kenyan tragedy. 
Third, the fact that the Luo people are egalitarian is important for the development of 
a plan that puts human equality first, especially in Africa. 
6.1 LAND POLICY AS UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN KENYA 
How did land policy originate in Kenya? Since Kenya was a British colony, land 
policy was determined by Britain. If we assume that land policy and social policy arc 
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synonymous, since landlessness is also a social issue, a rough idea of the origin of 
social policy in Britain is important for understanding the current social policy in 
Kenya. 
In Britain herself, the growth of the state involvement with the welfare of its citizens 
can be related to the development of the industrial society, and its subsequent 
maturation and decline into post-industrialism (Hill 1993 op. cit. p12). Alongside 
industrial development were political developments associated with the extension of 
suffrage, citizens' involvement with the affairs of the state, changes in social life, 
including family life; changing views of the respective responsibilities of the 
individual, the family and the state for remedies of social problems (ibid. ) The result 
was a package of developments - of the state's role, the character of the economy, the 
nature of political processes and ideologies - which those without a very dogmatic 
belief about the motive forces in political developments find difficult to disentangle 
in cause and effect terms (ibid. ). 
Development in Britain was therefore synonymous with industrialization. Notable is 
the fact that British state involvement in the welfare of its citizens was related to 
industrialization which involved citizens more thoroughly with the activities of the 
state; changes in social and particularly family life; responsibilities of the individual, 
the family and the state to remedy social problems. Therefore, the three main pillars 
on which the edifice of British industrial isation, development or social policy was 
built are, the individual, the family and the-a=. 
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A definition of development is now required. '[D]evelopment is improvement in the 
chances of survival of individual people, particulaly in the length and quality of their 
lives. It is a process of social change with economic, social, cultural and ecological 
dimensions which are all interrelated (Pronk and Sciarone 1996 p354). Throughout 
this ending century, development and conflicts have been inseparable, especially in 
Africa. Kenya is a good example where state formation, cultural opposition and 
economic inequality have all combined to curtail the chances of survival of individual 
people. Who is responsible for this? 
Britain became a welfare state in 1949 when Kenya was still her settler colony. Was it 
not possible for Kenya to be concerned with the welfare of her citizens? It was 
possible, but this depended on who was the citizen at that time. The British social 
policy in Kcnya then was based on two criteria: 46paramountcy" and "dual policy" 
(Dilley 1966). According to Dilley, the Devonshire White Paper of 1923, stated 
clearly that the British interests would be paramount over the Indians and the natives. 
This meant that the natives came after the Indians in terms of paramountcy. Secondly, 
the native had a dual obligation to develop both the Native Reserves and the White 
Highlands of the colony (ibid. ). Quoting Sir Edward Nothey, (Dilley ibid. p181-182) 
said that 
it was not Government's duty to allow natives to remain uneducated and in 
unproductive idleness in their "so-called Reserves, " but that it was their duty "to 
encourage the energies of all communities to produce... This can only be done by 
encouragement of the thousands of able-bodied natives to work with the European 
settler for the cultivation of the land and improvement of the stock. 
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Clearly, there was no evidence of British involvement in the welfare of the natives in 
Kenya. But this begs another question: Did colonial land policy answer the land 
question in Kenya? 
6.1.1. From Land Question to Land Policy 
A short historical account is again necessary to shed light on the origin of the current 
land policy in Kenya. 
6.1.1.1 Land Policy in Colonial Kenya. 
We have seen that the dual economy in Kenya was based on racial classes under the 
policy of paramountcy. Only white people and their interests were paramount in 
Kenya. Although that was the official position of the colonial government, there were 
also some white people who were truly interested in the welfare of native Kenyans. 
One example was Dr. Norman Leys. In a paper entitled 'The Kenya Policy', he 
wrote: 
The fact that large fertile areas in the uplands of East Africa were scantily populated 
or quite untenanted made the project of establishing a European colony in them a 
natural and attractive one. And so little was the future foreseen that no provision 
was made for safeguarding native rights in land. If it had been seen, no doubt 
British public opinion would have insisted that the land adequate for the needs of 
Africans be put securely in their possession. But the two governors successively in 
control of policy at the time did not believe that the best economic results would 
follow the policy of leaving the natives completely free to grow products for sale or 
consumption independently of European management (Leys N 1922 op. cit. p8) 
my emphasis. 
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Norman Leys had respect for the welfare of the natives in Kenya. But policy was 
effectively in the hand of the state, i. e., represented by the Governor, for example, Sir 
Edward Nothey or Sir Philip Mitchell, among others. Ley's interpenetration policy 
was therefore rejected. What counted then was the best economic -results, for the 
Europeans, not the welfare of the natives, who were subsequently excluded from their 
land. 
This policy of exclusion was the foundation of the sector-based official economic and 
statistical accounting in Kenya. Paradoxically, Kenyan official statistics still term the 
rural sector as informal, and largely exclude it from national statistics. First, how can 
social development planning be possible for the majority of Kenyans whose social 
statistics is never collected? 
Second, in the colonial white sector, large farms and agribusiness is the formal sector 
on which national statistical accounting is based. The problem now is that these 
sectors have also divided Kenyans so that those in the traditional, rural and informal 
sectors are supposed to be inferior to those in the urban, agribusiness, and formal 
sectors. Third, a fourth and more artificial term has also been added to the list; the 
intermediate sector (Steele 1975), also known as the missing middle. To make it 
worse, this missing middle was also a colonial policy. 
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Kenya has a long tradition of government by means of economic and agrarian 
development projects aimed at fortifying the spirit of individualism and at creating a 
stable and conservative middle class with no interest in political life. This tradition 
goes back to colonial era (the agrarian policy proposed by the governor, Sir Philip 
Mitchell, after the Second World War; the policy of agrarian reform instituted during 
the Mau Mau troubles [land consolidation]; opening of the former white high 
plateaux to African farmers some years before independence), and Kenyatta resumed 
it because it fitted in well with the spirit in which he and his closest collaborators 
planned to govern Kenya (BuijtenhuiJs 1974-5 p74). (my emphasis). 
I hope that the way colonial policy affected the current the current land policy in 
Kenya is now clear. Obviously, an important element of the policy of paramountcy 
was class. How did this arise? A glance at schema A in Chapter I tells us that class in 
Kenya was based on race, which was also the motive behind the colonial 
paramountcy policy. Again, the neo-colonial emphasis on Kenyan political population 
censuses have continued to divide Kenyans in a kind of 'class system' known as 
tribes, putting those who are supposed to be the 'majority' tribe at the top of the table, 
followed by the second majority, and so on. This is reminiscent of colonial 
administrators who treated Kenyans as tribesmen, not citizens. Another colonial 
statistical 'hangover' still persisting in Kenya is the 'Social Class Index'. This index 
was designed by the Registrar General in England, and that was used in Britain from 
1921 to 1971 inclusive (Bland 1979). It is difficult to understand why Kenya still 
uses a system that was made in Britain and discarded so long ago. It is also clear that 
the British colonial government used official statistics to cement the dualism which 
they had planted in Kenya. 
in brief, there are two policies that were involved in the development of colonial land 
policy in Kenya: paramountcy and dualism. Sadly enough, the one that could imply 
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more consideration for the welfare of 'natives' in Kenya, the interpenetration policy, 
was rejected. The rejection of the interpenetration policy could explain the current 
'land' policy in Kenya. 
6.1.1.2 Land Policy in Present Kenya. 
The discussion on realism and rationalism in Chapter 2 also showed how land policy 
generally evolved in Kenya. Colonial land policy was driven by administrative 
rationalism. However rational colonial policy could be, it was wrong. In order to 
understand this, consider Carley's (1980 p2l) definition of policy: 
policy making is about politics... Politics is certainly partisanship, meaning political 
parties, pressure groups, lobbying, public opinion and power struggle for preferment, 
dominance, control, influence, and position... Politics is also deciding the content of 
policy, the promotion of values, and choosing among alternatives in an attempt to 
solve problems and improve human life. 
This is a rationalist definition of policy making as 'the application of analytical 
rationality to resource allocation decisions' (ibid. p23). But when elaborated, rational 
exposition can confabulate, mystify and deceive. Key elements can be bypassed or 
priorities tumed upside down. 
Another aspect of the evolution of land policy in Kenya was incremejntalism. One of 
the ideas behind incrementalism is 'that policy and/or political change occurs only 
marginally, that is, what will be the case tomorrow will not differ radically from what 
exists today' (Gregory 1993 p213). The argument is that through incrementalism, 'the 
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decision maker reaches decisions by comparing specific policies and the extent to 
which these policies will result in the attainment of objectives'(Hill 1997 p102). For 
some realist reasons, Rothstein (1976 p695) also recommended incrementalism for 
Third World countries that are beset with 'constraints such as elite corruption and 
conflict, segmented and mistrustful groups, the centrality of the political struggle in 
the absence of alternative structures of power, and the dominance of urban interests 
over rural interests'. In a somewhat realist sense he advised as follows: 
An incremental response seems to me the only viable way to make a policy in these 
circumstances, but only if it is also joined to a national vision of some sort, and only 
if the elite is itself committed to creating a better future for their fellow citizens 
(p705) (my emphasis). 
By saying that 'only if the elite is itself committed to creating a better future for their 
fellow citizens', Rothstein must have been more on the realist side of the argument. 
This means that the colonial governors were realistic when it came to the British 
interests in Kenya, and rationalistic when it came to the interest of the natives. 
In other words, the post-independence Kenya government still has no social policy 
which could be 'conceived as a kind of blue print for the management of society 
towards social ends' (Townsend 1975 op. cit. p6). This is a very big question in the 
future of social development in Kenya because concensual decolonisation meant that 
the issue of land was to be discussed after independence. Up to now, land reform has 
not been discussed (Leys 1996 op cit. ). 
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In order to preserve the structures of colonial land policy, this 'say and do nothing' 
approach can also qualify as social policy in itself. It fits Townsend's (1975 op cit. p6) 
definition of social policy as 'the underlying as well as the professed rationale by 
which social institutions and groups are used or brought into being to ensure social 
preservation or development' (my emphasis). So while male superiority was 
superimposed (by land consolidation) on the traditional and historical male authority, 
nothing was done to alter the re-inforced impoverishment of women. Furthermore, 
the colonial policy of dual economy just made matters worse for women by 
legitimising gender inequality before family land. Characteristically, Kenya simply 
continued to pride herself as an open economy, an agricultural country and a tourist 
paradise. Meanwhile, ordinary Kenyan individuals and families in rural areas and 
urban poor remained or were more strongly excluded, landless, and jobless in the 
infonnal sector. 
6.1.1.3 Where is Social Policy in Kenya? 
The present Kenya government has nothing apart from a say nothing and do nothing 
social policy. It also confuses the goal of social policy with that of social welfare like 
the colonial Kenya government used to, i. e.,: 'to rehabilitate maladjusted and socially 
disorganised individuals and to reduce the present social problems" (Seeley 1887 
p541). That is why Kenya still keeps women's machinery in the Department of Social 
Services, together with others that need rehabilitation and charity such as the 
physically disabled. This is because the same government is still not able to realise 
that 
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[t]here was no [colonial] intention of creating a welfare state in [Kenya]; people 
were expected to meet their own needs with a minimum of outside help. Answering 
the needs of the vulnerable groups remained the responsibility of either local 
authorities or voluntary agencies... The view persisted into the 1940s and 50s that if 
the Africans were encouraged to stay in their natural rural setting they did not need 
aid (ibid. p543). 
It is the responsibility of all Kenyans to sort out this confusion. Social welfare should 
not be confused with rehabilitation and charity. The Kenya government should realise 
that '[o]ne reason the state is a large enterprise,, in the absence of war, is that it has to 
be to sustain its welfare activities' (Hill 1996 p8). Although welfare is the 
responsibility of the goverranent there is no evidence to suggest that the present 
Kenya government is concerned with social policy at all. That is why Kenyans are 
now getting out of control with disadvantaged groups such as sturdy beggars, 
criminals, prostitutes, robbers, and those shouting God! God! Come! Come! This 
situation manifested very early in the emergence of nation states (ibid). It is here that 
new efforts have to be concentrated. The basis of this national need must be clarified 
by again putting it in a brief theoretical perspective. 
We saw in Chapter 2 that realists begin with some general assumptions such that 
states are the key actors, the international system is anarchic, and that 'things fall 
apart'. Furthermore, 
critical realism argues that the social world is structured in a certain way and that it 
contains dominant generative mechanisms which exert a powerful influence over the 
social formation. Critical realism can happily point out that society is founded on 
basic material relations and operates through material production, appropriation and 
labour (Joseph 1998 p84). 
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The point is that when it comes to social policy, it is important for all actors to be 
realistic and have good ideas since 'good ideas, like science will be recognised for 
their objective merits' (Yee 1996 p87). As an alternative to incrementally muddling 
through, a normative optimum model which is able to combine realism and idealism 
is required (Hill 1997 op cit. ). This is the approach to the welfare of citizens that is 
badly needed in Kenya. 
In summary, I have explained the development of colonial land policy in Kenya and 
its continuation up to now. I have also discussed the theoretical justification of this 
policy and introduced the question of social policy in relation to the land issue. Now I 
want to discuss landlessness and social policy in relation to gender. 
6.2 LANDLESSNESS, GENDER AND SOCIAL POLICY IN 
KENYA 
It will be a sad day if some women of Kenya will be officially and statistically 
classified as 'untouchables'. The truth is that the seed had been planted by colonial 
land policy in Kenya. Lewis (1998 p284) said that 
the status quo today for women born on African soil is a deeply unfair one. Arguably 
they work harder than men and yet remain poorer. They are exposed to some of the 
greatest risks to the life amongst all human beings and at more stages of their lives, 
but particularly in the process of procreation and often during marriage. It is life that 
is often deadlier for the female of the species in this context because of poverty, 
violence and disease. 
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This section will examine the basis of sex differentiated poverty-as-landlessness in 
Kenya. I will also draw on the experience of some Western countries with regard to 
women and social policy in order to justify the need for doing something to help 
Kenya. 
6.2.1 Women's Poverty in Kenya: What is the Real Cause? 
Which human being has no right to food, clothing, shelter, education, water, love, 
oxygen, etc.? Here is one of the realities of life in which the West has thoroughly 
dcnrived the Third World, especially Africa. Deep down, this has been done in large 
measure by isolating women as a special case in development. Kenya is a classic 
example. Now, what can Kenya do? Esteva (1995 p7) said that 
'[t]he minefield has already exploded. 
In order for someone to conceive a possibility of escaping from a particular 
condition, it is necessary first to feel that one has fallen into that condition. For those 
who make up two-thirds of the world's population today, to think of development - 
of any kind of development - requires first the perception of themselves as 
underdeveloped, with the whole burden of connotations that this carries. 
The main victims of this paradox in Kenya are women, divided between rich and 
poor, rural and urban, the high class and low class, the landed and landless. The same 
women are different among themselves. Some are educated, rich and urbane, but they 
also cry for equality and against discrimination. Others (the majority, in rural areas 
such as Siaya) are poor powerless and landless. Of course, on the other side of this 
coin are men, the land and wife inheritors and the better farmers. 
260 
This problem is a deeply rooted. Peter Townsend (1993 op cit. p 16 8) warns: 
It is widely believed that the problems of poverty in the First and Third Worlds are 
different in kind... This is fundamentally mistaken .... It has blocked public 
understanding of the causes of poverty and of the effective kinds of action needed to 
eradicate poverty. 
Some problems of poverty in Kenya and Britain, such as access to basic needs like 
housing, education and health care, are based on economic class and, in that sense, 
they are largely similar. Other problems are based on race and sex such as 
landlessness-as-poverty and violence, especially against women. For example, the 
landlessness of Kenyans Asians was imposed by the British, while the colonial use of 
violence to impose poverty on Kenyans was clear. 
Townsend points out that policy measures to relieve poverty tend to be radically 
different. The Third World is urged to promote its development through a root and 
branch action, while the First World tends to be concerned with mild redistribution 
with changes to social security or employment incentives, rather than with 
institutional structures, and the entire sweep of economic and social development 
(ibid. ). 
How can Kenya promote development through a root and branch action if her way of 
statistical accounting is still so colonial? In other words, how can Kenya transform the 
economic and social base of her structural poverty if she is still so dependent on 
colonial statistics of racism and dualism? Colonial statistics was supposed to tell 
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Kenyans: 'You are poor because you are a woman', or 'because you live in a rural 
area', or 'because you are in the informal sector', or 'because you have too many 
children'. For example, Binns (1994 p43) describes what he calls overpopulated 
Kenya, saying that '[flarge families are often associated with the low status of 
Kenyan women for whom one of the few ways of improving status is by producing a 
large number of children'. 
This is a familiar game of blaming the victim or giving reasons calculated to divert 
Kenyan's attention from their landlessness-as-poverty. It seeks to make Kenyans 
believe that nothing can be done or changed. In order to assist the victim (the woman, 
the poor, the rural) to conceive a possibility of escaping from this condition, I want to 
try to dig up to the deepest root of the problem. The importance of racial 
discrimination has to be reviewed more rigorously than before. An illustration can be 
given for Britain: 
London in the time of Shakespeare was teeming with Africans and African women 
lived in large numbers particularly in the Clerkenwell area of the city. They were 
much courted by the young better class men around town - lawyers, actors, 
musicians, writers, the nobility (Scobie, 1994 p 106). 
An appreciation of cultural scarcity value seems to have been replaced by notions of 
dominance, greed, exploitation and fear. The fundamental problem is the rcal reason 
for the inequality between women and men in Kenya today. Don't Kenyan women 
also have the same 'skin that is something between satin and velvet'? (ibid. p108). 
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6.2.1.1 The Fundamental Problem. 
Those Kenyans who fully bore the brunt of colonialism, i. e., fully lived and served 
under colonial rule, like Mzee in Chapter 3, know it all. On the other hand, those 
Kenyans who came after, like Mzee's family, i. e., Bwana and the rest, face a real 
uncertain future, as the century draws to a close. They will be more and more 
marginalised by the international community, and their things will keep falling apart, 
yet they will not know why. Their women will get poorer as survival becomes a right 
of the fittest (most corrupt) of men. Who will speak for the poor women? 
Their reason for getting poorer is because Kenya, like America, 'is also stratified by 
social class, which gives rise to class consciousness among members of both the 
dominant and subordinate classes' (Durant 1997 p334). And though 'white' (formal 
sector) male dominance is superimposed on 'black' (informal sector) male 
dominance, rural women have not got the same opportunities to wrest compensations 
(like civil rights, access to health and education and social security) from the state. 
But this, I hope, is not the path along which Kenyans (as per schema B, chapter 1) 
want to go. Kenyan women have to fight for their right to live as equal and free 
citizens all over Kenya, and especially in rural Kenya where the majority of the 
population resides. 
Above all Kenyan women must know their enemy and that the fight for women's 
liberation in this century has not been easy. Women are even facing mounting 
problems all over the world. Latin America is dominated by machismo, a strong or 
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exaggerated masculinity. The practice of bride burning in India has not yet stopped. 
The Islamic tradition that keeps women veiled up is also around while in Africa, 
female genital mutilation imposed by men and traditional women is still continuing. 
Women of Kenya must also understand the fact that despite their comparative 
disadvantage with regard to the women in Britain, white British women (and the 
West) are also still fighting many inequalities. A woman bus driver (Daphyne 
Richards) became a bus driver for the first time in 1970, while Karen Harrisson 
became the first British female train driver in 1979.1 wonder whether a Kenyan 
woman is already driving a Kenya Bus. But the door is not yet closed. Women of 
Kenya must understand that 
[a]lthough the encounter between the coloniser and colonised changes in historically 
specific ways, and is always highly gendered, it remains a moment when powerful 
narratives turn oppressed peoples into objects, to be held in contempt, or to be saved 
from their fates by more civilised beings (Razak 1998 p3). 
Kenya must therefore learn from Western Europe and America. W. Europe and 
America must also learn from Kenya. Kenya needs to know how she can deal with her 
post colonial inheritance that is based on racial paramountcy and a dual economy in 
order to deliver what women want; Equality, Development and Peace. W. Europe and 
America need to know 
whether or not there are theoretical reasons for thinking that the ex-colonies can not 
"adopt the bourgeois mode of production" and develop their productive forces 
within it (Leys 1996 op cit. p 143). 
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In other words, W. Europe and America need to learn from the Kenya debate. They 
want to learn whether Jhgk model is working. But I am sure that Kenyans are Africans 
and do not want to become Westerners. They want to be Kenyans, living as equals 
with development and peace for all and with their own home grown form of economic 
development. 
Fundamentally, Kenyans also need to be aware that they live in the so-called civilised 
world. From Congo to Kosovo, people still kill each other on the basis of race, 
religion and tribe. From Brazil to Australia, ethnic groups are still fighting for land. 
The real world is full of injustice, inequality and deprivation. Birsdall (1998) argues 
that life is unfair because there is too much inequality in the world. Birsdall says that 
understanding the causes of inequality can help us determine what can be done about 
it and what might actually make it worse. Birsdall mentioned three causes of 
inequality across and within countries: the poor's rational decisions, prosperity, and 
bad economic policy. Are these not some of the assumptions of W. Europe and 
America that sparked the debate about Kenya? 
Consider the following example on how prosperity can produce inequality: 
Similarly, well connected individuals in emerging markets who had previously 
profited from cheap credit, subsidized prices for hard foreign currency, or 
government regulatory exceptions (say, - on the use of urban land) benefited again, as 
economic reforms raised the market value of assets that they had been able to acquire 
at low cost (Birsdall ibid. p83). 
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Kenya is a prime example in sub-Saharan Africa. Lucas (1997 op cit. p90) also said 
that 
[i]n Africa, business associations can become arenas within which communal 
rivalries are played out. In multiethnic associations (such as chambers of commerce) 
the ethnic composition of the leadership is a politically contentious issue. Other 
associations are used by specific ethnic groups to build themselves up in relation to 
their rivals, a classic example being Kenya's Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association 
(GEMA), which fought for the economic advancement of those groups until it was 
banned in 1982 
What can Kenya learn from the West in this regard? In other words, what do women 
of Kenya want? 
6.2.2 What Women of Kenya Want: Equality, Development and 
Peace 
is there a way in which social policy can, for example, help landless Kenyan mothers 
and their children achieve equality, development and peace? For the sake of argument, 
let us make three assumptions. First, that Kenya decides to implement a gender 
sensitive welfare system based on the concept of equality, development and peace. 
Second, that a delegation from Kenya is sent to the West to learn something about 
welfare. Third, that the delegation happens to visit the USA, the UK, the Netherlands, 
and Sweden. 
The delegation will, hopefully, be aware that even in the West itself, the welfare state 
is in crisis and various kinds of restructuring and retrenchment are underway. The 
USA is characterised as having supposedly gender neutral reforms but has continued 
differentiation in social security benefits (Sainsbury 1996). The British strategy, like 
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the US approach has consisted of gender neutral reforms and efforts to end formal 
discrimination' (ibid. p179). 
Dutch women's entitlements to social benefits have undergone far-reaching change 
since early 1970s. However, the male bread winner model has been less susceptible 
to change. The 1984 tax reforin was not a complete break with the model. A sole 
earner's allowance was introduced, and any unused portion of the wife's allowance 
was transferable to the husband (ibid. p 189). 
Furthermore, 
[t]he core of Swedish reforms has consisted of individualization, accompanied by 
phasing out of women's entitlements as wives and gender reconstruction measures 
promoting shared family roles (ibid. p 190). 
Most important to Kenya is that the current British (Labour) Government is taking 
action on social security in Britain. Although Kenya can still learn something useful 
from the experience of the USA, the Netherlands and Sweden, Britain is currently in 
the best position to advise Kenya on how to organise landless citizens. Kenyans will 
learn that social policy is nationally distinctive, and that organising landless Kenyans 
is the only way to meet Kenya's underlying problem, i. e., social irresponsibility of 
the Government. This is what women of Kenya want, and not just parochial politics of 
greed at the expense of public need. Let me have another look at what women of 
Kenya want. 
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want to explain this position by describing three of my experiences as an observer. I 
will discuss the role of the UN women's conferences, especially the last two 
conferences in 1985 and 1995 and their effect on gender equality in Kenya, the role of 
NGOs in Kenya and then make a brief comparison of prospects for gender policy in 
Kenya and Belize, Central America. I will give one more example that could create 
the needed awareness among women of Kenya. 
6.2.2.1 Status of Women in Kenya: How Did the UN Conferences Help? 
The fact that the international community went ahead and convened four world 
conferences for women is noteworthy. What is curious is that Kenya was a host to one 
of the conferences that took place in Nairobi from 15th. to 29th July 1985 
2. First, the 
theme of that Conference was Equality, Development and Peace. Second, a very 
important report that came out of that Conference was called the Nairobi Forward 
Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women. 
In this report, the international community asked all necessary questions, and made all 
recommendations and proposals for Governments to implement. Many themes were 
covered in the report, although the major ones were Health, Education, Employment 
and Agriculture. One subsequent question might be posed to the women of Kenya. 
During ten years from Nairobi in 1985 to Beijing in 1995, can one cite any 
recommendation in this document that was openly and explicitly implemented by the 
21 lere I am talking from my personal experience. I was seconded to the National Coordinating Commitce that was 
in charge of preparations for the conference. I was working with a group whose duty was to collcct statistics, 
write seminar papers, official reports, statistical booklets, brochures, etc. 
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Kenya Goverment for Kenyans' welfare? Why could Kenya successfully hold the 
conference and then fail to honour any of its recommendations? 
The Fourth UN Conference was held in Beijing ten years later in September 1995. 
The theme was Action on Equality Development and Peace. At this conference no 
serious attempt was made to explain why so little progress had been made. What is 
important about this Conference is that not only Kenya, but America, the Vatican and 
other world powers were on the war path with women. Reflections on the Conference 
by Hershatter (1996 p368) indicate that the US mainstream media, for some reason, 
portrayed the Conference as a disaster, and China as the nemesis of capitalist 
democracy. To make matters worse, three main arguments emerged about the 
language of the final document on the status of women (ibid. p373-4). The first 
argument was whether to include the language about (sexual orientation'. The second 
argument was whether to use the word 'gender' or the word 'sex'. 'The Vatican and 
other religious groups wanted to use the word 'sex' because gender to them implied 
support for homosexuality, a connection not obvious to other participants in the 
debate' (p374). But it may just be a matter of language. 'Arabic does not have an 
equivalent word for gender; it [is] translated in ... Arabic ... as "type of sex ... (The 
Guardian Wed. July 15th. 1998). A third argument concerned the use of the terms 
6equity' versus 'equality'. America preferred the word 'equity' because it had been 
used in the fight for comparable pay for female dominated jobs. To other interest 
groups, such as the Vatican equity was preferable because it implied 'separate but 
equal'. 'Equality', for some people implied breaking down those spheres. Howevcr, it 
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was finally agreed to use the word 'gender' and 'equality'; which showed most 
representatives of women across the world know what they want. Another question 
is whether the Third World countries, whose attendance at the conference was 
underwritten by the North, could argue with America on the question of equity and 
equality. 
Another issue before the Platform for Action that was in dispute concerned the equal 
rights of women to inheritance (Maran 1996). 
The Islamists' argument against "equality" was framed in terms of considering 
equality of inheritance rights of women as contradictory to principles inscribed in the 
Koran, which according to Islamists' interpretation, requires male inheritors to care 
for women relatives. Men are therefore, by principles of equity, entitled to an 
inheritance amounting to twice that of women (ibid. p3 5 7). 
Once more, the majority of representatives of women knew what they wanted. The 
term 66equality" rather than "equity" held sway in the Platform for Action (PFA) 
which stated, in paragraph 274 [d] that among actions to be taken by Governments 
was to 
[e]liminate the injustice and obstacles in relation to inheritance faced by the girl child 
so that all children may enjoy their rights without discrimination, by, inter alia, 
enacting, as appropriate, and enforcing legislation that guarantees equal right to 
succession and ensures equal right to inherit, regardless of sex of the child (ibid. 
p357) 
This means that despite some opposition by governments and pressure groups with 
different beliefs and agenda, the women's conferences succeeded in securing 
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agreement on a common objective. What about these pressure groups? This question 
has to be answered now. 
6.2.2.2 Can NGOs Deliver what Kenyan Women Want? 
We must not forget that when women delegates left the UN Women's Conferences, 
they went back to their families or husbands and/or to their governments or states. The 
same UN member governments are the ones that will be requested to implement the 
recommendations of these UN Conferences. On the other hand, does Kenya have as 
much power as America to discredit or ignore UN Conference resolutions? This is a 
test for the current international concern for international poverty and gender equality. 
'Whether they are seen as a progressive arm of an irresistible march toward liberal 
democracy that marks "the end of history", an extension of the push towards 
privatisation, or a means to resist the imposition of Western values, knowledge and 
development regimes depends on the perspective and agenda of the imaginer' (Fisher 
1997 p442). Post cold war imaginative NGOs are pressurising Third World 
Governments into taking action on poverty or gender equality, I agree. But it also 
seems to me that NGOs are hydra-headed and anathema to Third World governments. 
They are changing societal norms and challenging national governments, and linking 
up with counterparts in powerful transnational alliances, ... muscling their way into 
areas of high politics, such as arms control, banking and trade, that were previously 
dominated by the state (Simmons 1998 p84). 
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Post Cold War NGOs' involvement in matters of policy in the Third World policy is 
questionable. Hearn (1998) argues that the cuffent 'NGO-isation' of Kenyan society 
could be considered as another aspect of the new scramble for Kenya, this time by 
NGO's involvement in Kenya's development and the scramble of official AID 
agencies to find, finance and work with NGOs. One example in which NGOs have 
failed the women of Kenya is in their relationship with the Women's Bureau. 
Going by six years experience in the Women's Bureau, Kenya is a good example of a 
country where women's advancement of life chances is still officially hindered by 
men. Created in 1976 after the Declaration of the Women's Year, the Womens' 
Bureau is typical of the 
structures that have been associated by poor allocation of human and financial 
resources as well as by marginalization. This situation is inherent in the nature of the 
origin, the social context and the lack of genuine gender awareness in policy design, 
and it is an indication that, unless there is a structural change in the awareness and 
commitment of decision-makers at home and a structural change at the world level, 
the gender gap will not be closed (Assie-Lumumba 1996 pl 1). 
A year's observation of the status of women in the Department of Women's Affairs, 
Belize, 1992-93, gave me a more worthwhile story. In Belize, women are more 
independent, and aware. While the majority of women in Kenya are locked up in rural 
poverty and don't even know about the existence of their Bureau, women in Belize 
are participants in various projects organised by their Department. While women in 
Kenya are marginalised by their own Bureau, women in Belize are mobilised by their 
Department. Women of Kenya desperately need to discard Parochial politics, mobilise 
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themselves and demand a central role in policy that determines equality development 
and peace in Kenya. 
The struggle for women's empowerment and rights in Africa as elsewhere in the 
Third World has been an uphill battle against patriarchy, poverty, and autocracy, 
including NGO chauvinism (Nzomo 1994). Steve Biko said; 'change the way people 
think, and things will never be the same' (Fisher (1997 op. cit. p457). My argument is 
that sovereign governments should not need prodding by Western NGOs or the 
United Nations so as to give their own citizens a chance to improve their lives or to 
take responsibility for the welfare of their citizens. Like women of Scotland, Ireland 
and Wales (Breitenbach et al 1998) women of Kenya should take action about their 
marginalisation. They should no longer live in a patriarchal, dependent colony of men, 
under a govermnent which is a victim as well as a manager of colonial settler 
patriarchy. Only women can deliver the kind of future that Kenya is currently 
yearning for because '[w1omen, however, are less likely than men to see force as a 
legitimate tool for resolving conflicts' (Fakuyama 1998 p35). 
What appears problematic is the lack of evidence to show that the majority of Kcnyan 
women know who their enemy is. Another problem is that the bourgeois feminists are 
least concerned with the status of the landless poor women in rural areas. They 
resemble liberal democracy and market economies that work well because, unlike 
socialism, radical feminism, and other utopian schemes, they do not try to change 
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human nature (ibid. p40). In relation to management of consolidated rural land, Kenya 
can also learn from Japan. 
In 1901, the law on cultivated land consolidation was established in Japan, to enable 
owners of agricultural land to organise co-operatives for the consolidation of their 
lands, but the feudal landlords hampered the progress (Zhou 1997 p4). In Japan (as in 
Kenya), land consolidation could turn farms from fragmented to compact, enlarge 
parcel size, and make sale, lease, access, and other forms of joint use of land 
physically easier, but it did not enlarge the fann size. Neither did it ensure efficient 
use of the consolidated land by the full time farmers or absentee landlords (ibid. ). As a 
result of lack of land policy, consolidated land is still lying fallow in rural Kenya, 
despite acute landlessness. 
Kenya desperately needs to successfully manage the physical effects of land 
consolidation. Fragmented small farms could be efficient in a low wage economy 
since they are conducive to development and diffusion of land saving and scale- 
neutral technology, dispersion of natural risks, and economies of scope. But high 
wage economies, such as the settler farms in Kenya, hamper the achievement of 
economies of scale, waste resources of land, labour and capital management and 
technology. Thus the critical issue in Kenya was how to effectively consolidate and 
enlarge the fragmented small farms in order to avoid landlessness (ibid. ). At the level 
of a district, like Siaya, it is a question of how to live with land lessncss-as-povcrty. 
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This responsibility lies with Siaya County Council (SCC). We had seen that all land 
in Siaya is held in trust by the Council. Since a Ministry of Lands and Settlement 
exists in Kenya, it is difficult to understand the extent of trusteeship of Local 
Authorities. However, there are three factors that could do good for Siaya women and 
help them in their struggle against landlessness-as-poverty. 
6.3 POVERTY IN SIAYA DISTRICT: WHO WILL DO GOOD? 
First, the one who will do good is s/he who will help Siaya people to help themselves, 
to be self reliant, to free themselves from valuelessness, and to live as equal human 
beings. S/he is the one who will understand what Whitaker (1964 p19) meant by 
saying that 
some people are "slaves by nature"; no political or legal freedom will make any 
difference to them if they are not prepared to do something about it for themselves, 
by taking on the responsibilities that fall to every man. 
How then does a 'natural slave' conceive a possibility of escaping from her/his 
condition of dependency? Have Kenyans realised that they have fallen into that 
condition? Should they not at least be made aware of their status? Nobody can 
become free without taking action to free him/herself Are Siaya people also the 
same? 
if I seem to be labouring the point about underdeveloping Siaya District, it is because 
the point cannot be over-emphasised. My argument is that Siaya people were forced 
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into this culture of dependency by colonial and neo-colonial social engineering. There 
are at least three reasons for saying so. If the Kenya gover=ent is itself a 
dependency, how can Siaya District, which is just a district in Kenya, be 
'independent'? 
Any comparisons made with development studies in Kenya in the 1960s and 1970s 
underline the features of underdevelopment and dependency today. For example, 
Chapter 4 showed that the administration, through the DCs, provides local agents of 
the government and not partners in the development or welfare of any Kenyan. Their 
duty is to maintain the dual economic status quo that is only benefiting the local 
landowners. 
6.3.1 Is Social Development Possible in Siaya District? 
No society in Africa should give up the struggle to free itself from depcndency and 
deprivation. 'What is required [of African societies] is a 'principle of charity' which 
tells us that more likely than not, other people are right (rationally justified) in the 
majority of their beliefs, and therefore that we have no choice but to interpret their 
utterances - or construe their scientific theories - in accordance with the best going 
standards of truth in our (presumably their) communities' (Norris 1997 p133). This 
principle also supports a decentralised community environment where planning for 
the future is in the hands of individuals and families because, 'there is no reason to 
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believe that planners, lacking perfect foresight, will be more successful at forecasting 
the future than ordinary mortals' (Lal 1997 p74). 
We should not forget that truth is relative, as it is constructed and therefore is 
whatever we make of it (Norris 1997 op cit. ). We should also not forget that the limit 
of one's language means the limit of her/his world (ibid. ). You cannot manage in a 
world where planning is done in a language which is outside your world. Another 
factor to consider is that 'communication' about facts in the world is influenced by the 
nature of the world in which we move' (Kratochwil 1988 p272). All women of Siaya 
need is to be guided by a social development process that speaks their language. One 
example that shows how women of Siaya District are being socially underdeveloped 
should be discussed. 
6.3.2. Religion and Status of Women in Siaya District 
The worst scenario of women's underdevelopment in Kenya is in Siaya. In chapter 1, 
talked of Nairobi people shouting, Jesus, God! God! Saviour! The problems of 
religious affiliations have become as contagious as the current NGO-isation of the 
Kenyan society. In 1994, for example, out of 185 hospitals in Kenya, 62 or 33.5% 
belonged to missions, particularly the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church and the 
American Presbyterian Church of East Africa. Religion is a major factor of 
underdevelopment in Siaya (Heam 1998). 
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This is because the aim of imported religious institutions is to change a person's 
identity (Toulis 1997) and identity with religion can become stronger than identity 





Fig. 6-1 Religious Identity Transcends Ethnic Identity 
Denominations such as Legio Maria Church (that broke away from the Roman 
Catholic Church) have changed people"s identity in Siaya and made its followers 
accept their condemnation to landlessness-as-poverty. The gender aspect here is that 
the male church leaders blame the situation on ethnic customs and traditions although 
the point is that their exploitative relations with their mainly female followers is the 
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cause of this poverty. Feminine poverty cannot be eradicated in Siaya unless Legio 
Maria is eradicated first. 
Issues that are 'closest' to individual's lives, such as divorce, extra marital 
pregnancies, smoking and drugs that are found in America, (Reichley 1986) are also 
found in Siaya District. The pregnancy situation in Siaya compares very well with that 
of the United States. Thomas (1998 p419) argued that 
[to] be a woman, poor and fertile, in the United States in the 1990s is to be blamed by 
politicians and social reformers for an increase in Poverty and alleged immorality in 
society. Poor women, it is said or implied, are bearing children for the purpose of 
obtaining or supplementing a welfare cheque. They are sexually out of control and 
are the cause of their own poverty (my emphasis). 
Why did I compare Siaya and US? Because poor women in the whole world get 
blamed for their fertility. But if we focus on Siaya, a big difference emerges. How 
would it be for a woman, poor and single in the poorest district of a poor country 
where there is no welfare cheque to be fertile? Would she not go where she could get 
some assistance of sorts? No wonder, Canadian and American based denominations 
such as pentecostalism (Reichley 1986 op cit. ) are now spreading all over Siaya 
district. 
Another aspect of women's underdevelopment in Siaya is church Politics. This is 
different from denominational poverty of Legio Maria, for example. The involvement 
of the Churches in 'opposition politics' in Kenya, through their National Council of 
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Churches of Kenya, is well known (Sagar-Friedman 1997). The role of Churches in 
opposition politics in Kenya can only be seen as undue imposition that can only result 
in confusing Kenyans. This is because these Churches do not have their origin in 
Kenya and they are also not democratic themselves. The fact is that opposition 
politics in Kenya was originally associated with Oginga Odinga and the formation of 
the Kenya People's Union in 1967, and therefore with Siaya District. We know that 
multiparty politics in Kenya, (KADU and KANU) started because of the land issue. 
What is emerging in Kenya now is that 'indigenous' denominations such as the 
African Inland Church and the Legio Maria Church have been strong defenders of the 
KANU government (ibid. ). But a closer look could tell where the hearts of these 
denominations lie. Legio Maria has its origins in the Catholic Church in Nyanza 
Province (Onyango 1998). Further still, Mumbism, an African indigenous church, that 
was opposed to European religions was started in Alego, Siaya in 1907 (Ogot 1963 op 
cit. ). Therefore involvement of indigenous churches in Kenyan Politics ahaa started 
from Siaya. 
But could religion be the only solace for the excluded individuals, such as the widows, 
the disabled, the aged, the widowers, the orphans, the bastards, the divorced, etc., who 
need the basic necessities of life in Siaya? That may be true, despite the fact that a 
family is still the first group a human being belongs to. An ordinary individual must 
necessarily move ftom family to religion, back to family, or home to Church and 
back to home. But who will provide the bread at home? There is one disturbing factor 
here with specific reference to Siaya. 
280 
The 1989 Population census found that Siaya District had the highest mean age for 
household head by district of 41.7 years, followed by Kitui with the mean of 40.8 
years (Republic of Kenya 1996(c) p2l). Kiambu District had the lowest, 34.0 apart 
from urban districts like Mombasa with 32.6 and Nairobi with 32.1. The average for 
Kenya was 36.5 years. This means that the average individual breadwinner in Siaya is 
older than any rural district in Kenya; which implies that the only way for Siaya 
people to get a sympathetic ear is to go to Church. If we take note that 'Islam is on a 
steady resurgence [in East Africa] taking advantage of its simple hierarchy unlike 
Christianity where senior members of the church reign supreme'(Schonecke 1996 
pl), we would wonder whether Islamic egalitarianism could replace Christian 
hierarchy in Africa. 
So we are back to history and are examining the roles played by Islam and 
Christianity in underdeveloping Africa, especially since the time of David Livingstone 
to the present. In Kenya, there were many violent clashes between colonialists and 
African religious sects, such as the Kikuyu 'Dini ya Yesu Kristo' in 1947, and 'Dini 
ya Msambwa' in North Nyanza in 1948 and the Kolloa in Baringo District in 1950 
(Berman 1990 p335). With all these unfinished businesses of religion in Africa, 
should Africa come up with their own home grown religion? 'Did You know that it 
was the papal bull signed by Pope Alexander XI in 1498 which kicked off mass 
enslavement of Black peoples'? asks Prof. Osaga Odak (Nairobi, Weekly Review 
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Sept. 6th. 1996 p32). I agree with Prof. Odak that 'Black people are thoroughly 
disunited by the many foreign religions competing for their souls'(ibid. ). 
In brief, religion and the status of women in Siaya is an ethical but also a 
fundamentally 'structural' issue that must be addressed by the government of Kenya. I 
hope the government knows that its duty is to be on top of social policy and to be able 
to guidg such religions and NGOs that tend to exercise governmental duties in 
important sectors like health and education. I have shown the various ways in which 
landlessness-as-poverty is affecting every aspect of individual life in Siaya. It is really 
difficult to do good in a situation where nobody is being mindful of other people's 
welfare. Who will restore hope to the individual, the family and the state in Siaya as a 
locality, Kenya and Africa in general? This is fundamentally a question of eradicating 
imposed landlessness-as-poverty, gender inequality and social exclusion. But this is 
also a question that best describes the postcolonial Luo economy and society. What 
should be done? 
6.4 LANDLESSNESS-AS-POVERTY IN SIAYA: TIME FOR 
ACTION IS NOW. 
The UN has declared 1997-2006 as the Decade for the Eradication of Poverty. 
Eradicating poverty is an ethical, social, political and economic imperative of 
niankind (Nairobi, Daily Nation 18th Oct. 1997). The UK DflD has also decided to 
eradicate Third World poverty by 2015. With the current will of Britain, Kenya's 
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colonial boss that Omera 3 served so well, the UN and the international conununity, 
poverty can be eradicated from omeraland, from Kenya and from Africa. First of all, 
this thesis had proved that Omera is by nature egalitarian, a democrat, a believer in 
social justice, equality development and peace. Furthermore, Omera is transnational 
and diasporic. Secondly, Africans have to resolve the tensions arising from their own 
centre-periphery relations. This thesis has also shown that state formation in Kenya 
was shaped by a combination of factors that were designed to uproot indigenous 
Kenyans from their land. Beware that 'if the history of European state formation and 
nationalism is any guide, a true global society and a new consciousness may be far in 
the future' (Gilpin 1981 p223). 
This is a fundamental test for Africa's long term stability. Africans should not forget 
that 
[s]ince independence, as before it, Africa has remained subject to the crises 
experienced or generated by the Western world; the cold war, the rise in the price of 
oil, the fall in commodity prices, Aids. By the 1970s, the combined effect of these 
crises and the lack of interest shown by the ex-colonial powers in resolving them, 
have led to the virtual collapse of Africa's economic relations with the industrial 
world. Mineral and agricultural products fell by two-thirds; the burden of the debt 
grew. The World Bank abandoned its high modernist assumption that African 
agricultural production is so inefficient that technical intervention in it was bound to 
be vastly profitable. Instead it demanded that the state cut back its machinery 
(Ranger 1998 p274-5). 
The end of Africa's lost century will never see anything like African socialism. 
European imperial rivalry is still fighting for African land and souls through the forces 
of social contestation, green imperialism, NGOs and Churches. Currently, the 
39 omera' is a Luo word for ' brother' or 'comrade'. Some people call Luos 'omeras' 
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problem, especially for Kenyans, is that these forces are also rent seekers and land 
grabbers in their own way. They will not advise the people of Kenya (both at the 
centre and the periphery) on how to live with landlessness and valuelessness. It is for 
ordinary Kenyans to realise that this is wrong political economy. 
This argument needs some illustration. According to Dryzek (1999 p44) 
political thinkers used to think about democracy solely in terms of the ideal of a self 
governing community within precise territorial boundaries (many of them still do). 
Extending this idea of democracy to the international system has always been quite 
hard. But this extension is made easier by the degree to which recent thinking argues 
that the essence of democratic legitimacy is to be found not in voting or 
representation of persons or interests, but rather in deliberation. In this light, an 
outcome is deliberate to the extent its production has involved authentic deliberation 
on the part of the people subjected to it. Thus deliberation or communication is the 
central feature of democracy. Such a discursive or communicative model of 
democracy is particularly conductive to international society because, unlike older 
models of democracy, it can downplay the problem of boundaries. 
In the way that Europe is currently doing, Africa can also only develop as a sum of its 
parts. But 
[i]n order to understand the whole as sum of its parts, we need to steep ourselves in 
the history of that people. We need to enter their imagination, their spirit in order to 
recapture and retrace the lineage of their communal development. The apotheosis of 
their national evolution is their political development as an authentic national 
community. It is a community based on will, not force (Williams 1993 op. cit. 
p6-7). 
We are therefore bound to revisit Plato's thesis of sexual egalitarianism and human 
equality and come out with a conceptualisation of a multi-centric world that is bascd 
on the principle of co-existence among individuals, states, corporations, ethnic 
groups, churches, etc. (Rosenau 1990). This is what puts the periphery at the ccntre of 
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social development and also puts Siaya at the centre of Africa as far as rural structural 
poverty is concerned. 
The Luo people, as Kenyans and also Africans must be saved from strucutural 
poverty. We had seen that the Luo had developed their own personality and social 
development until they were forcefully disrupted by colonial Britain. We had also 
seen how the Luo played their part in the two World Wars, how they became tenants 
of the Crown. 
6.4.3 Action on Poverty and Landlessness in Siaya. 
A realist must be able to think global and act local. We all know that the deep roots of 
poverty lie in depriving the poor of their land, their homes and their jobs. I have said 
that the remedy lies with the people reclaiming the power and dignity that should 
never have been taken away from them in the first place. Further, the deep roots of 
poverty are not different from the deep roots of the larger economy. Local 
communities know very well that powerful national and international capitalist 
interests are ranged against them. The poorest, most oppressed communities are often 
also the most outward looking, because they have no choice (T'he New 
Internationalist, No. 296 Nov. 1997 p 10). There are two serious issues involved here. 
First, the problem we are dealing with is that of managing a three way transnational 
relationships. It concerns the relationship between Siaya (society) and Kenya (state), 
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and the relationship between Kenya and the West (international community). I 
maintain that Siaya people should not allow themselves to be bottled up by the state 
that is suffering from slavery-by-nature syndrome. They must look the international 
community in the eye and ask for their right to equality, development and peace. 
Second, the role of Europe in creating the current human problems in Africa cannot be 
forgotten. In this respect, I must quote the Encyclopaedia of Africa South of the 
Sahara (1997 Vol, 2 p495). 
At the end of the twentieth century, Africa is experiencing a crisis that has economic, 
cultural, political, and moral dimensions. 
In such a context, the question of land tenure moves increasingly to the fore. Land 
tenure is behind the ethnic and tribal conflicts which has bloodied so many countries 
- Rwanda, Liberia, and Somalia, for example. It is also part of what is at stake in the 
pacification of South Africa as it emerges from apartheid. Land tenure remains an 
ongoing issue in Zimbabwe despite the Lancaster House agreements of 1980 
guaranteeing the rights of the white minority. It is equally important in Mauritania, 
where it was the cause of a conflict with neighbouring Senegal in 1989. Finally, it 
remains potentially explosive in other countries from Cote d'lvoire to Uganda, 
including Niger, Chad, Nigeria and Ghana. In fact the list could include every 
country in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Africans have to reject economics of underdevelopment since African land belongs to 
Africans. This is the first point to understand in order to develop a historical and 
viable land based policy action that can eradicate poverty in Africa. I also agree with 
Amin (1997 p 103) that 
[h]istory is not shaped by infallible laws of pure economics, as believed by some 
university professors. It is the product of social reactions to the effects of these laws, 
which in turn define the social relations of the framework within which economic 
laws operate. 
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Action on land policy in Africa must reject what is termed "the fundamental concept 
of resources" supported by those who argue that 
[r]esources are not things or stuff or materials; they are a set of capabilities. These 
capabilities use the stuff of the material and non-material universe in a life sustaining 
manner. These capabilities define a functional relationship that we call resources (De 
Gregori 1988). 
I have proved that Siaya people as Africans, are aware of their situation with respect 
to the powerful national and international capitalist interests. In human terms, Siaya 
can be seen as the centre of rural poverty in Africa. All Siaya people (Africans) need 
is deliberative empowerment to discard redundant traditions and customs, restore 
mutual trust and end conflicts arising from land and boundaries, perceive land as their 
common asset and maximize communal, national and international benefits from their 
social and economic development. 
Since the Luo people initially settled in the present Alego Location of Siaya District. 
Alego is therefore the centre of Luo history in Africa and the diaspora. Land policy 
action to develop Siaya District must initially focus on Alego in Siaya and then spread 
to the rest of Africa. It must be deliberative and must involve mutual negotiation, 
information, communication and education of the stakeholders as a process of trust 
building and social development. It is therefore akin to focal point planning. 
Focal point planning is a term used ... to describe a system of planning which ensures 
that by means of appropriate institutions and procedures, all pertinent issues and 
problems in a proposed development are discussed and resolved in a consensual 
framework (Marsh and Brower 1987 p69). 
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The first and most logical result of this development focus is the process of replicating 
focus planning in other parts of rural Africa. This is because structural poverty will 
not be eradicated from rural Africa without extra focus to ensure equality and 
empowerment. Equality is always the goal and empowerment is the way. The 
formation of solidarity for poverty eradication in Africa rural (SPEAR) is highly 
overdue. SPEAR will be a society of intemationalists, i. e., those who are ready to act 
local and think global. It will bring together expertise from the people (civil society), 
the academic community, the donors, the industry, the NGOs and the local authorities. 
In the case of Siaya, the people will constitute representatives of welfare societies, 
different participatory clans, women groups and local civic bodies. The government 
will be represented by Siaya County Council, while the indistry will be represented by 
elected members of the local chamber of commerce and industry. The academic 
community will represent teachers and students from local schools, local Universities 
as well as the Centre for International Research on Poverty, University of Bristol. 
6.4.2 Action on Poverty in Kenya. 
It is also important for Kenyans, in particular, to note that land is a fundamental 
problem which requires a new approach and a new consciousness. I have shown the 
connection between the land problem in Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe. I had 
also discussed the land question in East Africa. Since Kenya is in East Africa, rcalism 
demands that any action on land in Kenya must take history into account. 
288 
Kenyans have been cheated by so called 'economic development' for too long. What 
Kenya needs is to be inward-looking and focus on social issues affecting her people. 
A permanent body in charge of social development, for example, a National Council 
for Social Development (NCSD) is urgently required. DflD and other donors could 
help Kenya with initial expertise to set it up. Kenyan Universities should also start 
appropriate courses on poverty and social policy. This will create the necessary 
awareness for public responsibility to the needs of the citizens, as well as the citizen's 
own role in public life. This will also produce the necessary graduates qualified in all 
aspects and areas of poverty and policy that are currently badly missing in all sectors, 
rural, urban, public and private. 
To the critics and the unconvinced, I must say that '[w]e will never know unless we 
try to find out. And so far we haven't tried because our rational, scientific culture 
regards ... traditions as "unhistorical ... (Hancock 1995 p517). Africans must be 
realistic and create their history. 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has stated the need and the action neccesary to deal with 
underdevelopment caused by land consolidation in rural Kenya. It has discussed the 
origin of land policy in Kenya, what Kenyans inherited, and what is responsible for 
the current inability to take policy action to eradicate poverty in Kenya. It is 
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incrementalism and rationalism that has blinded the Kenyans to realism, pragmatism 
and courage which are necessary for effecting change. 
The main argument is that equality is sacrosanct since all human beings are bom 
equal, irrespective of sex, race or ethnic group. Development must be for all, and 
peace in the family, the clan, the country and in Africa; an enabling political 
environment that facilitates active citizenship, self reliance and individual economic 
empowerment. We all know that women do not live in a world of their own and 
therefore any development initiative that targets women alone cannot succeed. 
Development initiatives have to aim at the individual in the natural context, i. e., the 
family, the community, or the society. 
The difficulty of effecting change in this situation comes from the fact that we are 
operating under a system that is itself a complete dependency. This difficulty can only 
be overcome if the donor community interacts directly with the society (Siaya). In a 
broader context, the West also needs to agree that Africans will not become sclf 
reliant and also contribute to world development if it is kept in a perpetually 
subservient position because of land. The main reason why there is no peace in Africa, 
or why the Kenyan valley is no longer happy, or why Siaya is the poorest district in 
the Kenyan periphery is land. 
290 
The individual, the family and the state must be empowered so as to eradicate poverty 
in Siaya, Kenya and Africa. I have proposed an action plan that can help all and which 
depends on committed action by all who wish well for Africans. It will be the only 
way of giving some hope to the children and healing the bad memories of the aged in 
Siaya. It will also be a sign of the very necessary respect (by the West) for the need 
for social development based on gender equality and tradition in Africa. 
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Chapter 7 
LAND CONSOLIDATION AND STATUS OF WOMEN 
AND MEN IN SIAYA: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has tried to answer one question: How did land consolidation affect the 
status of women and men in Siaya District of Kenya? It found that land consolidation 
has adversely affected the status of women and men in Siaya. It has made Siaya 
women valueless and Siaya men landless. The thesis has also shown that land in Siaya 
is a part of the land issue in Kenya and in Africa. The land issue in Siaya is therefore 
not only a local problem, but it is also national and multinational. 
Thisjast chapter is divided into three sections. Section I is a summary of the main 
arguments. Section 2 presents the major findings and conclusions as well as 
contributions to theory and knowledge. Section 3 contains policy issues that havc 
arisen including recommendations for action. 
7.1 SUMMARY OF MAIN ARGUMENTS 
The most effective way of explaining the effect of land consolidation on the status of 
women and men in Siaya District is through the use of historical and theoretical 
evidence. Historically, land consolidation took place in a Particular place from a 
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particular time in the past. There is a clear and specific historical path that was taken 
by a specific policy action of a particular European colonial power on a particular 
African society. Had Kenya not been colonised at all, the story of land and gender in 
Siaya would not be the same. 
7.1.1 History and Land Consolidation in Siaya 
This thesis is about a social process that took place in the life of a society (Africans, 
Kenyans and the Luo people) through time (the twentieth century) and in place 
(Africa, Kenya and Siaya District). We have to understand first that the precolonial 
society was characterised by traditional life of various African ethnic groups. I have 
shown that the Luo, people were traditionally egalitarian and conducted their affairs in 
the open. Second, that Kenyans did not need to be colonised for land reform to take 
place. Land reform was always going on as a natural aspect of human life. Land 
consolidation or adjudication was an unnecessary imposition by colonial authority in 
order to render Kenyans landless and poor, cheap labour. State formation in what 
became Kenya was effected by means of five factors: fQ= (violence), religion 
(Christianity), indirect rule (colonial governance or administration), colonial or = 
I= and language. The forceful and dictatorial nature of the present government of 
Kenya (public administration) is an inheritance of the structures and institutions from 
colonialism. Furthermore, the persistence and prevalence of religious cults (such as 
Legio, Maria) on top of the main colonial churches (Catholic and Protestant) are 
reminiscent of former cults of resistance such as Mumboism (which originated from 
Alego in Siaya). 
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Colonialism was characterised by many social upheavals for indigenous Kenyans. 
First, European settlers were encouraged to come to Kenya to take the most rich and 
productive land for themselves. Second, Kenyans were forced to fight in the First 
World War, and really suffered from it. There was a clear and very substantial 
contribution of the Luo people to this war. This is a contribution that cannot be denied 
and should not be forgotten. Third, there was forced male labour migration from rural 
areas to European plantations and urban areas. Again, the Luo of Kenya played a 
major role in providing the initial labour force in Uganda, and later in Kenya. Fourth, 
the Luo, people also fought in the Second World War along with other Kenyans. A 
particular case was presented in Chapter 4 of a World War 2 veteran that I interviewed 
in Siaya. What did they or their wives and families gain from the War? Fifth, dissent 
and reaction of Kenyans against half a century of colonial oppression and 
dispossession led to the Mau Mau uprising in the Central Highlands. Mau Mau could 
be the apex of armed resistance in Kenya - because both sides mainly fought with the 
gun - but it was not the beginning. The British sent military operations to quell 
resistances from various ethnic groups as early as 1893. These ethnic groups were 
mainly protesting against Europeans imposing themselves on their land. 
Mau Mau gave the colonial government a chance to impose land consolidation as a 
pmjjshm= to all tribes in Kenya, beginning with the Kikuyus. I have argued that 
land consolidation was not meant for the development of African agriculture, but for a 
permanent disruption of the traditional life of the native Kenyans in order to make 
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them become tenants of the crown (squatters) and a permanent source of cheap 
labour. This provides one explanation why the British refused to interpenetrate with 
native Kenyans for the mutual benefit of both parties. 
The formation of the colonial nation-state of Kenya assumed that native Kenyans did 
not have any sense of law and order. That is why English and Indian laws were 
imposed in Kenya. That was also the origin of indirect rule as well as all kinds of 
dualisms that plague Kenya up to now. Other examples are Kenyan laws (customary 
and state laws) and the Kenyan economy (formal and informal sectors) societies 
(urban and rural) and agriculture (commercial and subsistence). The focus of this 
thesis, Siaya, is still characterised by customary laws, informal sector, rural society, 
and subsistence agriculture. 
7.1.2 Theory and Land Consolidation in Siaya 
it was hard to find a theoretical justification for the need for land consolidation in 
Siaya District. Although I knew that theory could not be value neutral, I tried to side 
with realism throughout the thesis. I argued that differentials in the status of women 
and men was mainly a question of class. Two problems with class are that it tends to 
persist and it inflicts sufferings on innocent people. Even if the Luo, people of Siaya 
decide to allow girls to inherit land the same as boys, men will still have a hcad-start 
advantage, since they had already inherited the advantage in the past. The class 
differentials that ensued during land consolidation will not therefore be reversed 
overnight. Secondly, the children of landless people in Siaya will not have land, 
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irrespective of sex. How far back do we then go in trying to correct these past 
injustices? What statistics do we use to understand historical injustices? That is how 
land consolidation caused the differential status of women and men in Siaya. 
Another issue of theoretical debate here is gender. My argument is that gender, like 
economics, is another wooden tool imported from the west to underdevelop Africa. If 
Western feminism is supposed to fight injustice and inequality against women, as 
human beings, that deserves salutation. But doesn't feminism which assumes that 
white women are more equal than black women also breed inequality? I know that 
white women cannot leave behind their 'whiteness' when, say, going to Africa. But 
other women also cannot leave their 'colour' behind when going to Europe or North 
America. Is there any theoretical justification for indigenous African women being 
generally synonymous with poverty and exclusion even in their motherland, while 
white women never feel the same anywhere in the world? This sets up the paradox 
that some African bourgeois feminists eat with the enemy while pretending to be 
struggling on behalf of their poor sisters. But they are also slaves by nature to an 
imperial system that encourages 'coloured' or poor women to be dependent, sterilised 
or to family plan while encouraging 'white' or rich women to be independent, strong 
and achievers. 
Much social theory encourages the African man and/or woman to carry his/her own 
burden and liberate themselves as European men and women had to do. That can bc 
agreed. But Africans should also be clear that human inequality that is rationaliscd by 
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Western feminism and backed by imperial masculinity has failed and will continue to 
fail. The reality is that all people (not only Africans) need to start from their 
motherlands where they are stakeholders, and among their families in equality, 
development and peace. It is -initially from the motherland that international or 
multinational citizenship and equality for all human beings can be justified. 
Equality, in this thesis, is the connecting factor between rationalism and realism. It is 
worth repeating that Kenyans must also understand that their country will only 
become their motherland on policies defined and understood in their indigenous 
ethnic terms and not by neo-colonial force, law, religion, administration or language. 
will not agree with rationalism that supports the administration of development for the 
benefit of the powerful at the expense of the powerless. That is why it is necessary to 
make a strong point about the African origin of human beings, as I have tried to do, in 
order to underline the fact that human beings are born equal, irrespective of sex or 
race. 
Since human beings can be considered to be bom equal, there is no theoretical reason 
why only men were allowed to inherit land in among the Luo people. It was difficult 
to find a good reason for inheritance rights on the grounds of sex. First, I found that 
inheritance imposes inequality because it gives one party a headstart advantagc 
compared to the other. Secondly, when inherited land is already legally owned by the 
inheritor, it cannot trickle down to those who were relatively dcprived during the 
initial distribution. That is how Siaya women became legally landless as a result of 
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land consolidation. Thirdly, communal land ownership is the best alternative for 
Africa because of the economies of scope that the stakeholders enjoy. 
7.2 FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTION TO 
KNOWLEDGE 
7.2.1 Main Findings 
This thesis found many serious problems that arose with respect to the situation 
obtaining in Kenya. First, it found that the Swynnerton plan was rationalised as a plan 
to develop Kenyan's native agriculture, but was instead meant to economically, 
socially and culturally underdevelop Kenyans. 
Secondly, the Swynnerton plan also "institutionalised" pre-existing colonial 
inequality by hatching the idea of 5 year development planning which continued from 
colonial to the present Kenya. Kenyans still believe that ýEuropean agribusiness is the 
m instay of their national economy. But it has divided the poor from the rich. This 
dependency has been specifically cemented in Kenya by the colonial 
underdevelopment economics (settler economies) based on land and agriculture and 
theoretically (through different versions of classical economics) based on land, labour 
and capital as factors of production. Kenyans have also been slow to rcalisc that 
development economics can involve giant deceptions so that some people can go on 
enjoying the best of what they own (such as the wildlife reserves of the natural 
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enviromnent) or produce (such as horticultural and agricultural produce sent by air to 
New York and London). 
Thirdly, I found that statistics has also been tailored to the service of foreign interests 
still operating in Kenya. Unfortunately, this is how Kenyans still perceive their 
development issues. While the official statistics which started with the need to 
account for European agriculture, continues to distort reality, Kenyans do not yet 
appreciate the need for alternatives. After independence, and as neo-colonialism 
strengthened, statistics about tourism, environment, and population gained more 
prominence than gender, social and grassroots statistics f-Qr Kenya. 
Fourthly, I found that social and economic differentiation and underdevelopment in 
Siaya started as a European economic enterprise well before land consolidation started 
in rural Kenya. It actually started with the coming of the Europeans and the process of 
incorporation and dispossession, the railway line reaching Kisumu in 1902 and the 
coming of Indians to Nyanza Province. That is the deepest root in the current 
connection between land consolidation and gendered social stratification in Siaya. In 
fact had the Mau Mau struggle not taken place, there would have been no land 
consolidation in rural Kenya, but there would still have been social underdevelopment 
in Siaya. 
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Fifthly, this Mau Mau-induced underdevelopment was not only for European 
economic benefit, but also for African political gain after independence. That is the 
root cause of tribalism in Kenya. This cause is supported by the fact that the British 
intended that Kenya would be ruled by a land hungry clique with no difference from 
white settlers. The same land centred political establishment still continues to rule 
Kenya and account for Kenya's economic, cultural and social development three 
decades after independence. But since politicians are also basically speculators, 
political parties also survive on different levels of deception and self deception, and 
tend towards corruption, especially after being in office for too long. This is the 
problem that is facing Kenya at the moment, i. e., how to emerge from this land- 
centred strangehold into a democratic Kenya with gender equality, human 
dcvelopmcnt and peace. 
7.2.2 Conclusions and Contribution to Knowledge 
There are many conclusions that arise from this argument. They deserve to be listed. 
Colour, space and sex must be combined in defence of human equality. As I 
explained in Chapter 2, forms of inequality based on colour or sex cannot be 
acceptable. Land does not become a resource through science or some magic. All 
native human beings must have equal right to land, as a natural resource, and 
irrespective of sex. 
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2) Land consolidation only institutionalised a structure of inequality that was to 
ensure virtual underdevelopment in Siaya. It is a situation in which poverty is 
historically rooted to the extent that it has gone beyond local and national politics. No 
politician in Siaya or in Kenya has ever shown awareness of the dangerous 
relationship between land consolidation and poverty in Luoland or Kenya. Further, the 
responsibility for the land issue was deferred before decolonisation ensuring that the 
incoming African regimes will not be aware of their responsibility to the people. I 
demonstrated in Chapter 3 that there is a strong political and economic connection 
between land consolidation and development in Siaya and Kiambu districts. This 
showed the extent to which the Britain succeeded in socially polarising the so-called 
major tribes (the Luo and the Kikuyu) in order to underdevelop Kenya. This also 
explains why the current KANU government is now being overwhelmed by reports of 
corruption and insensitivity to landless-as poverty in rural areas. 
3) Siaya people have to manage the problems that arose from land consolidation. I'llis 
is because change is always a part of human life. Traditional agrarian life cannot 
continue for ever in the face of so much poverty Siaya. I found that most basic 
necessities, like woodfuel, building materials like stones and sand are now very 
scarce in Siaya. Either they are in people's plots, and therefore privatized, or the 
access road no longer exists. Some people cannot even have access to water for their 
livestock. It is important for the international community to understand that Siaya 
people urgently need the basic things that were denied to them by land consolidation. 
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4) Since all means for personal and social development in Siaya were cut off by land 
consolidation, what remained is a situation where people are in constant legal and 
physical disputes at all social levels: family, clan and community. The previous 
solidarity, trust and sense of self help of the Luo people during traditional land 
ownership and use was ended. That is why no economic development has been 
realised in Siaya since land consolidation. The resultant land market has not even 
produced more food or cash crops for the people. Some land is still lying fallow 
because of absentee land owners or owners who are too poor to develop all their land. 
5) Kenyans living in the rural areas like Siaya will have to be empowered in order to 
affect a kind of delinking process from the predatory capitalists and land grabbers in 
urban areas. They will invest the whole responsibility for their land with themselves 
first and then to a grassroots democratically elected authority. In this research the 
author has argued for a complete delinking of the rural from the urban superstructure 
if rural community development is to succeed. The local authority in charge of Siaya 
rural community, Siaya County Council, will then need expert and donor assistance 
to learn how to take the responsibility for immediate basic needs of the people. 
6) Siaya women must also be empowered to demand their rights within the Siaya 
society and not to run away to urban areas to encounter even more problems. They 
should also be saved from dependency on men, so that they can be able to live as 
individual citizens, not just as daughter, or wife or mother of a man. Since poverty 
- also breeds violence, these women can be saved by a project that encourages local 
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communities to discuss these problems in the open and negotiate mutual solutions. 
This is also a way to instil social responsibility and accountability on the local 
authorities. 
7) Landless men must also be given opportunities to make ends meet in Siaya. Men's 
cultural dependency can only decrease with their empowerment through further 
education and gainful employment. This is also the best way of minimising violence 
against women and enable peaceful family life to grow again in Siaya. Family life 
can only start and stay when individuals are empowered by their democratically 
elected authority that is ready to provide both practical and strategic needs for family 
life, such as housing, clean water, communication facilities, security, health services 
and education. The society will then be able to pay the necessary rates and taxes, and 
also deliver their votes to facilitate better management of the political economy of the 
district. 
8) Africans have to understand that people in the West are now more concerned with 
their own future than ever before. That is why Africans need strong govermnents that 
are capable of ensuring home-grown equality, development and peace. Equality can 
only be ensured if the family land is preserved for posterity and not sold to the market 
forces. Development can only come if all the social, physical (land), human and 
economic are all usefully engaged for local gain. That is why whole continents like 
Europe are currently behaving like melting pots with single currencies and local 
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tourisms for the benefit of Europeans. The reality that has caught up with Europe 
should catch up with Africa too. 
Kenyans must wake up to the changes that this melting pot scenario has brought to 
Britain. They should forget any specialness in their relationship with Britain. British 
people will not do business with any country where there is no peace and where 
human rights are not guaranteed. Paradoxically, this research has proved that these are 
the same values that the Luo people cherish. The Luo also want a Kenya where all 
women and men are truly liberated from parochial bureaucracy and where life chances 
are not distributed by sex, colour or ethnic group. My argument for a special project to 
confront the ill effects of land consolidation in Siaya is that the Luo of Kenya cannot 
miss the opportunity to show the rest of the world that realism and ethical approach 
can ensure human equality, peaceful life and sustainable development in Africa. 
7.2.3 Theory and Development 
This thesis has tried to make significant contributions to theory and development. 
Five might be listed. First, I have sought to demonstrate that gende is a relational 
construct and must be examined within particular cultural (ethnic), social and 
economic contexts. Gender is not only a concern of women but for all because it is a 
central variable in an ethical and human centred development policy. The nco-colonial 
strangehold that women in the West have had over gender has continued to cloud the 
real post colonial (post 1994) issues that people in Africa arc currently going through. 
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Second, I have presented a new dimension to the centre-periphery approach to 
development theory. I have shown that with reference to colonial settler economies 
such as Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa, underdevelopment is a triangular 
scenario where the precolonial economy is divided between the rural and urban while 
the centre (metropole) remains the same. We have so far failed to explain Kenya's 
underdevelopment because of undue reliance on dualistic models like centre-periphery 
and trickle-down theories of dependency and modemisation style schools. We need to 
discuss something new -a rural-urban-metroPole, (or society, state and the 
international community) as a three-tier model of Third World underdevelopment. It 
is structural and different from the feminist which projects underdevelopment only as 
a lifelong struggle for 'individual' equality between women and men. 
This approach can be generalised to explain African or Third World 
underdevelopment in general. "Rural" or society, represents excluded and 
underdeveloped societies or communities in a Third World country. In Kenya, it 
would represent Siaya District or Luo people. "Urban" or =k represents the centre 
of power in the Third World country. In Kenya, it would represent the powerful, 
especially the public administration, the black settlers and the favoured districts like 
Nairobi/Kiambu District as we saw in Chapter 5. The metropole are those who now 
call themselves the West or the international community. The main development 
problem now facing the Third World is gendered management of the linear 
relationship between the rural, the urban and the metropole interests and values. 
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Third, I have also sought to contribute to 12olicy as a discipline and practice in the 
Third World. It has often been assumed that 'policy' is a preserve for politicians. This 
thesis has revealed that one reason for Africa's inability to develop is the confusion 
between policy and politics. The wrong belief that policy is a preserve of politicians 
and senior government officers explains why in a country like Kenya, there is no 
public post for policy specialists or advisers, while in the metropole, like England, 
even County Councils have officers in charge of all social policy issues like 
employment, housing, education, health, water, and so on. Kenya is only full of 
business professionals like macro-economists, demographers, planning officers that 
add nothing to the quality, pace or direction of development at local or national 
levels. Until policy makers become accountable to poor women, gender equality in 
poverty reduction will remain elusive. 
Fourth, the thesis also attempts to offer some value added elements to Social Science. 
it challenges to ann-chair academics that continue to lament man-made problems of 
Africa such as traditionalism, poverty, ignorance and disease without doing something 
about it. Such academics are asleep to the transcendent cause: 'the need to be 
committed to a cause larger than the self, if we are to find genuine self-esteem, and to 
be all we can be' (Singer 1997 p258). Policies have to be deconstructed and 
constructed by professional experts as part of empirical concern and reality. 
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Fifth, this thesis has attempted to make a contribution to the paradigm shift associated 
with postcolonial studies and sage philosophy in Africa. By critically examining the 
colonial means of incorporation and dispossession such as language, religion and 
violence, it has demonstrated a close relationship between economics and 
underdevelopment in Africa. It has shown the need to study and understand who gains 
and who loses economically, and by sex, in situations of violence, religion and 
colonial language in Africa. 
I know that there are some pertinent issues that could not be treated fully enough in 
this thesis. I will only mention two: the land question and the question of Asians in 
Kenya. First, it must be made clear that this thesis is NOT about the problems of land 
ownership in Kenya that resulted from the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 or any 
other. I am, however, aware of the social problems like rural-urban migration and 
differentials in regional development, that arose from the arbitrary division of Kenya 
into Crown Lands, Urban Lands or Native Reserves. This is the connection between 
the land question in Kenya and in Siaya. 
Second, the question of Asians in Kenya was very important for the economic 
development of Nyanza during colonialism and is still important for the economic 
development of Kenya. However, Asians have played a minor role in the social and 
cultural scene, including gender issues and concerns in Kenya. Since the focus of this 
thesis was more on the social than the economic aspects of development in Kenya, I 
was not able to do more on Asians in Kenya. I hope someone will undertake research 
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on the contribution of Asians to social development in Kenya. That will be a 
significant addition to what is presented here. 
7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION AND FOR POLICY 
Changes come because of those individuals who when confronted with the realities of 
how things are, do not only laugh or weep, but take action. Siaya people must act 
NOW. Although the concern of the international community for the plight of the poor 
in the Third World is now common knowledge, it is a mistake to depend on 
misleading economic indicators to measure the level of poverty. Going by such 
misleading indicators, Kenya may not be one of the poorest countries in Africa, but 
Kenya is harbouring some of the poorest communities in the world. This opinion was 
also expressed by the head of the observer group from the West that went to monitor 
the 1997 general elections in Kenya at the SOAS' seminar in London on 12 February 
1998. He told the seminar that he personally travelled through all parts of Alego 
constituency in Siaya District and all he saw was poverty. That is the reality on the 
ground, and that is where action has to start. Without the international community 
acting together to immediately eradicate Ihis poverty, landlessness and outdated 
traditions and customs in Siaya, the war against malaria and AIDS menace will not be 
won while the gap between the status of men and women will continue to increase. 
This action must be appropriate. That is why Siaya is a case for focal point planning. 
The action has to be taken by the main participants in the life of Siaya people as 
'School for Oriental and African Studies, University of London. 
308 
explained in Chapter 6. Eradicating poverty must be an empowering process and must 
involve the people themselves and their locally elected authority in making those 
policy decisions that will differentially allocate benefits and penalties among them. 
Empowered people will always feel liberated and ready to take risks and work hard 
for the common good. They will take risks because they have got a cushion (social 
security) to fall back on. They have the cushion guaranteed by their improved 
traditional welfare systems assisted by their democratically elected and responsible 
local authority. That is the lesson we leamt in Chapter 6. 
First, action to address the question of landlessness-as-poverty in Siaya as a welfare 
initiative should be taken at one level. A special project based on negotiation and 
information will be necessary to deal with the main obstacle for gender and 
development in Siaya: lack of physical, social, economic and human means of 
communication. For physical communication, Siaya needs to start by restoring the 
road network that was designed during land adjudication. For social communication, 
Siaya people need to maximise mutual trust among themselves. They need to be 
assisted to discard all retrogressive customs and traditions for their own future. To 
manage economically, Siaya people will need money. I hope that the international 
community will see Siaya as a classical case for poverty eradication in Africa. When 
Siaya is physically, socially and economically empowered, the result will be human 
resource that will ensure sustainability of the development initiative. 
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Second, African solidarity will be needed to ensure eradication of poverty from rural 
Africa. The solidarity for poverty eradication in Africa (SPEAR) will have to work at 
all levels, local, national, regional and international. It will integrate the inner 
continental capabilities as well as marshal international resources, lessons and 
experiences for the benefit of Africa. There is no other way to deal with the effects of 
land consolidation on the differential status of women and men in Siaya, in Kenya and 
in Africa, eradicate poverty, restore hope and the dignity of being human, irrespective 
of faith, colour or sex. It is the only way to make Africans' life worth living again. 
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Appendix I 
INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONNAIRE 'A' 
I have been sent by my research director to find answers about any changes in land 
distribution. The information is required for my part fulfilment of conditions for 
award of a Degree. I just wanted to assure you that the information you will give me is 
strictly confidential and no real names will be used. So, please feel free. 
District: Siaya 




Now, let us begin. 
Al. Your official name (as appears in the ID card) -------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
A2. How old are you? -------------------- Years. 
Can you give me an example of change in the ownership of land, or the amount of 
land, locally (or to you or your family or village) during the last 12 months? 
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Tell me aboutyour marriage life. 
A3. What is your marital status at present? I Married 2. Widowed 3. Separated 
4. Single 5. Divorced 
A4. If currently married, -are you a co-wife or the only wife? 1. Co 2. Only 
-are you a polygamist or a monogamist? I. Mono 2. Poly 
A5. If a co-wife, how many other co-wives do you have? No -------- 
If a polygamist, how many other wives do you have? No 
AA If currently married, I would like to know if you have been married only once or 
more than once. 1. Only once 2. More than once. 
AT If widowed, were you 'inherited'? 1. Yes 2. No 
Have you ever inherited a wife? 1. Yes 2. No. 
Tell me about your education 
A8. What is your level of formal education generally? a) None b) pre-primary c) 
primary d) secondary e) university f) other 
A 9. If none how many languages can you speak and write? No ----------- 
Name them 
SPEAK WRITE 
Tell me about whatyou dofor a living 
A. 10 Are you formally employed and on monthly payroll? I. Yes 2. No 
Al 1. If Yes, are you employed by 1. The Goverrunent; 2. Private Company; 3. NGO 
4. Other? 
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A. 12 If No. are you in full time business? I. Yes 2. No 
A 13. Do you have more than one source of income? I. Yes 2. No 
A. 14. What is your average monthly income? K. Shs -------------- 
Tell me something about land 
A. 15 Do you remember when land was consolidated in this place? 
1. Yes 2. No 
A 16. What was your marital status then? 
I. Married 2. Widowed 3. Separated 4. Divorced 5. Single 
A 17. Do you currently have your own piece of land in your rural area? 
I. Yes 2. No 
A. 18. If Yes, How did you acquire the land? 
I. Bought it 2.1nherited it 3.0ther 
A 19. If you bought it, how much did you pay for it? 
K. Shs ------------- 
A 20. If you inherited it, from whom did you inherit it? 
Give relation only 
A21. Do you have a Title Deed for the land? 
I. Yes 2. No 
A22. Do you have a piece of land or house I some urban area or town? 
I. Yes 2. No 
A23. If Yes, how did you acquire it? 
I. Bought it 2. Local Authority Land 3. Other 
A24. Do you think that women and men in this place have equal rights to own land? 
I. Yes 2. No 
A25. Do you think that land consolidation was a bad or a good thing to happen here? 
I. Good 2. Bad 
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A27. Should individuals have equal rights to own land irrespective of their sex? 
I. Yes 2. No 
A. Do you think they have it in this District? 
I. Yes 2. No 
A29. In your view, is the current land use system optimal? 
1. Yes 2. No 
A30. To what extent are women's needs considered in the current land use system? 
A3 1. Is there a need for land policy in this Country/District? 
1. Yes 2. No 
A. 32. Is there a need for gender policy in this Country/District 
I. Yes 2. No 
A33. Would it be better to have one policy incorporating both gender and land 
issues? 
1. Yes 2. No. 
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A. 34. If Yes, tell me what land and gender issues that you would like to see 
incorporated in the policy. 
A35. When land consolidation was going on in this place, do you think that women 
and men were given equal consideration? 1. Yes 2. No 
A. 36. Tcll me two specific problems with regard to landlessness in this place. 
I ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
A37. How would you compare women's and men's ownership of land before and 
after land consolidation? 
A38 Could you kindly what Luo culture says about women's and men's ownership of land? 
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A. 39 What would you generally say about landlessness in this place? 





Methodology used in this thesis can be explained under three headings: the nature of 
the problem, how it was perceived, and the disciplines within which it was 
investigated. I will then explain the methodology itself. 
1. The Nature of the Problem. 
Development of research questions depended on the nature of the problem. This thesis 
grew out of my concern for two main problems: the situation of women and the 
practical problems caused by land consolidation in Siaya District of Kenya. Siaya is a 
district where historical chains of circumstances have successively and concurrently 
combined to cause untold poverty and exclusion from the rest of Kenyan society. 
During the actual process of land consolidation, all Luoland was in a big turmoil 
because of the conflicts resulting from land consolidation that was effected in a native 
reserve without regard to customary laws. People are still in constant conflicts and 
there are inter-family and interclan feuds all over Siaya. This prompts two questions: 
Who expects ordinary people of Siaya to understand what the constitution or the laws 
of Kenya say about land? Why was state law, such as Land Adjudication Act of 1968 
imposed on a rural community that was supposed to be govemed by native customary 
laws? My understanding is that land consolidation was illegal as far as the customary 
laws of different ethnic groups in Kenya, including the Luo were concerned. I was not 
surprised to find that the illegal policy action is still continuing to cause so many 
social, cultural and economic problems to women and women of Siaya District. 
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Throughout the work on this thesis, I was very aware that land consolidation must be 
understood as a deliberate policy action that was consciously intended to work at the 
individual level, irrespective of sex. 
2. Relevance of Research Methods 
I therefore needed a methodology that could help understanding of the connection 
between land consolidation and the problem resulting from the need for women and 
men to own land individually in Siaya. Local customs and traditions meant that the 
process of privatization of land was the responsibility of men. The resulting problem 
was that as men realized their right to own land, the scramble for land intensified. 
Apart from customs and traditions, the colonial and postcolonial governments in 
Kenya also furthered the increase of conflicts over land. By bringing the issue of 
bound= into sharp focus, both regimes deliberately promoted a policy that was 
conducive to conflicts over land. 
In order to understand how the powers of customary law and public law work in this 
case, I had to employ a methodology that was capable of combining all the issues 
involved. These were poverty, social instability and social stratification. That is how I 
got to the topic of the effect of land consolidation on the differential status of women 
and men in Siaya District. The fact that the issues that I examined were all real events 
and happenings in place and time meant that I did not need to rely on assumptions and 
hypotheses. I was studying real facts of human life in Siaya. That is why I employed 
an historical and qualitative method based on evidence from the pcople of Siaya 
themselves. 
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3. Mixture of methodologies? 
For empirical evidence four methods were used in this thesis. First, I used an 
individual questionnaire (Appendix 1) in all administrative divisions of Siaya District, 
such as Bondo, Boro, Ugunja, Rarieda, Yala and Ukwala. Second, I held a total of 29 
intensive discussions with men and women who represented various shades of opinion 
about the problem of my research, (see Table A2-1 below). These included old men 
and women who were conversant with land issues as well as Luo customs. I observed 
a land 'court' case in Siaya and had 4 focus group discussions with women and men 
that represented different shades of opinion in Siaya. 
For secondary evidence, the main sources of data were Kenya government 
publications such as census reports, development plans and economic surveys. My 
reservations for the irrelevance of official statistics in the area of social development 
were made very clear. I also got some semi-official (with more influence of the 
donors) but a bit more relevant statistics such as welfare monitoring surveys and 
regional gender statistics. 
Chapters I to 3 used historical, theoretical and comparative analyses to put the 
research questions in their context. Chapters 4 and 5 were mainly reports and 
discussions of the empirical information that I gathered from the field. In Chapter 6,1 
presented a theoretical discussion and a justification for the appropriate action to be 
taken in the face of mounting poverty and gender inequality due to land consolidation 
in Siaya and land issue in Kenya and Africa. 
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4. Table A2-1: List of Discussants 
A) Siaya Discussions: Local Opinion Leaders 
1. P0 Nyahor (F) 
2. SH Omuya (M) 
3. P0 Olute (M) 
4. J0 Obiero (M) 
5. NS Mudhai (M) 
6. A0 Oyendo (M) 
7. PJ0 Oduol (M) 
8. GR Aringo (F) 
B) Siaya Discussions: Civil Servants and other Opinion Leaders 
9. Assistant Land Registrar, Siaya District (F) 
10. The Medical Officer of Health, Siaya District (M) 
11. The District Developmenr Officer, Siaya District (M) 
12. The District Manager, Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation, Siaya (F) 
13. The Headmistress, Hawinga Girls Secondary School (F) 
14. The Principal, Siaya Farmers Training College (F) 
15. The District Land Adjudication Officer (M) 
16. The Branch Manager, Agricultural Finance Corporation (M) 
17. The District Surveyor, Siaya District (M) 
18. The Director, National Environmental Secretariat (M) 
19 The Town Clerk, Siaya Municipality Council (F) 
20. The Treasurer, Siaya County Council (M) 
21. The Clerk to Siaya County Council (M) 
22. The Programme Coordinator, IFAD, Siaya District (M) 
23 The Deputy Chairman of Siaya County Council 
Q Nairobi Interviews 
24. The Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Planning and National Development 
(M) 
25. The Director, Institute of Development Studies, University of Nairobi (M) 
26. Programme Officer, Food and Agricultural Organisation, Kenya (M) 
27. A Distinguished Land Lawyer in Nairobi (M) 
D) Overseas Interviews 
28. Mr. B. Luther Bristol UK (M) 
29. Prof K. Ingham, Bristol UK (M) 
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APPENDIX 3 
Alego Negotiation, Information, Communication and 
Education Project 
Below I set out, in outline, a possible practical project to tackle some of the problems 
listed in this thesis. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
My thesis has shown that the Alego Location is the center of both conjunctural 
poverty, (traditionalism, culturalism) and structural poverty (landlessness, illiteracy, 
and disease) in Siaya District. Alego is the place where the Luo people settled initially 
when they came into the present Kenya about 500 years ago. Alego is also in the 
center of the district and Siaya Town is in Alego. The fact that Alego needs a special 
empowerment project to deal with 5 centuries of underdevelopment cannot be 
overemphasized. 
Kenya's land use management system has been based on three separate instructions 
listed below. First, was the institution of private property, which evolved from the 
feudal tenure system in England. Here land is individualized private property that 
belongs to the landlord. The second is the form of government regulation in land use, 
where land belongs to the 'whole country, i. e., the public or government. The third 
one is where land belongs to the individual through the community or the clan. This is 
the motherland concept that will be developed here. 
This project will go through a given process. First, is to inform the people about the 
issue to be addressed. Second is to educate the people on the issue. Third is to 
netiotiate with the people about their understanding and involvement in the issue. 
Fourth is to communicate with the people as they start to fully participate in the 
success of the project. The project will endeavour to negotiate, inform, communicate 
and educate thus empower the people of Alego to liberate themselves from both 
conjunctural and structural poverty. 
2. SPECIFIC AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
This project will be based on focal point planning (see Chapter 6). It will focus on 
one specific issue of social development, i. e., communications. It will start with the 
most critical aspect of rural communications: RURAL ROAD NETWORK. This 
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focus will then relate to three other aspects of communication such as negotiation, 
information and education. 
Alego Rural Road Network 
Main Aim To open up all rural roads network in Alego as per the land maps held 
by the District Surveyor. 
BENEFITS I. -Easier inter-village comunication for all 
2. -Easier access to local growth points and resources such as 
market centres, schools, grazing areas, health centres etc. 
3. -Increased local trade and exchange assured. 
4. -Gender equality, development and peace assured. 
Step I Inform the main parties involved in the project, i. e., the people of Alego and 
the Siaya County Council. 
Step 2 Educate the people about the need for and importance of community transport 
facilites, through home visits, village meetings, public barazas, and county council 
meetings. Encourage interaction between the people and their grassroot elected 
representatives on the issue. 
Step 3 Involve all in a negotiation process on the issues arising from information and 
education stages. The negotiation process should accomplish the following 
tasks: 
-Sort out customary and traditional gender biases and so as to increase the 
value of women in Alego 
-Inculcate a sense of responsibility towards the Alego people in SCC. This 
will become true when SCC delivers all the land roads. 
-Develop a sense of civil and active society among Alego people 
-Develop trust, mutual respect and cooperation among the people for their own 
social change. 
-Empower the people to have self confidence and courage in themselves 
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Step 4 Main aim is achieved. 
-There is evidence that a higher proportion of Allego people can communicate 
among themselves, and become more equal in time and place. 
-Alego becomes a civil and active society continuing to maintain and improve 
on their transport and communication networks. 
Support for Alego NICE Project 
1. Financial Support 
-ANICEO Support Fund 
-The project will operate one account into which all project funds from donors will 
be depsited. 
-Other support will include donations in kind to ANICEP. 
2. Logistic Support 
International Consultancies to the project 
-International poverty consultant 
-International professionals 
-International volunteers 
Regional (East African) support and consultancies 
-Rural development examples from other parts of Africa. 
Local Consultancies and support to the project 
-Individuals, e. g Alego outmigrants support. 
3. Responsibilities 
a) Management* ANICEP could be managed by a special Board on behalf of SCC. It 
will aim at enabling the SCC to work together with the local community, i. e., the 
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people and clans of Alego and/or their welfare societies, and the donor community. 
This should be possible within a period of 5 years. SCC will undertake to house the 
project in a safe accomodation as well as provide security to project property and full 
time staff, both local and international. 
3.1 The Board will consist of. 
I -The Chairman (SCC) 
2 -the Donor(s), 
3-a Consultant from the Centre for International Research on Poverty, University of 
Bristol, UK, 
4- the Coordinator (Secretary) 
5-the Treasurer, 
6. Two women and 2 men elected by the people of Alego to the Board 
b) Execution of the project will be the responsibility of the project coordinator, 
assisted by other national and international project staff. 
The people will be required to pay back their dues, initially through voucher to the 
Council. The SCC will deliver the services, manage the economy, and expect the 
support from the people. 
The whole society will be able to engage in a peaceful civil life rooted on gender 
equality and full awareness of individual rights and responsibilities. 
After five years, the project will be expected to have established a rural environment 
with successful communication, interaction and income generating activities which 
will then enable the people of Siaya to pay back their dues to the SCC in cash. 
The project management as well as the civil society will receive necessary guidance 
and training on various project activities from the project administration and 
professional personnel such as subject matter specialists and consultants engaged in 
the project. 
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The success of the project will mean that the civil society in Siaya will be able to 
sustain the project and continue with their life in greater equality, and with greater 
hopes of development and peace. 
A replication of the same project will then be possible in other districts in Kenya, East 
Africa or elsewhere in Africa. 
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Appedix 4 
KAKA NG'ADO LOWO OKELO POGRUOK E GI NGIMA MAR 
JOMAMON KOD JOMACHWO E DISTRICT MAR SIAYA E 
PINY KENYA 
Mani en temo nono kaka ng'ado lowo okelo pogruok e ngima mar jomamon kod 
jornachuo ei Siaya District mar Kenya. En gima duon'g ni jogo ma nyalo somo dholuo 
kende bende mondo osom gino ma owachore e iye ka. 
Ka podi ok adhi nyime, nitie weche maoko ma onego aketi e ler. Mokuongo, en 
gimaduon'g mondo jiduto on'ge ni ng'ado lowo en gima ne obiro kod teko mar 
wasungu. Kuorn chik mar Jaluo, lowo nee en mar jokakwaro. ok nee en mar ngato 
achiel. Gima duon'g en ni j oluo mange'ny podi A ong'eyo girnomiyo wasungu nee ojok 
ni nyaka ngad lowo. 
Mar ariyo, ere kaka ng'ado lowo nee otimore kod ngima mar jornamon kod jomachuo c 
piny Luo? Mani ne owuok kuom chik Luo ni ngano ma nyako kata dhako A oncgo yud 
lowo e dalagi kama onyuolee. To maduon'g en ni ngato manyako kata dhako ok nyal 
gero ode kende owuon, e dalagi kata e lope ma on'giewo. Kendo moro ni ngano 
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manyako mosee bedo maduon'g ok nyal ik e dalagi ka Nyasaye okawe. An'go ma omiyo 
Joluo nee okelo chike machalo magi? 
Ka nee pod ngado lowo A obiro e piny Luo, chikegi nee nyalo tiyo nimar lowo nee mar 
okakwaro, kendo nee nitie kaka dak mar j oma nyiri kod j ornachwo ochan. Ban'g ngado 
lowo, chike ma nee Jolup konyorego koro ok nyal timore. Wach mokuongo manee thago 
chunya en ni Joluo biro bet nade e ngima mabiro ka koro lowo bende ongee, chike bende 
olokre, tich ma n'gato nyalo yudogo konyruok bende ongee, tuoche bende obiro e piny 
ma opogore opogore? Mar ariyo, an'go ma omiyo ngima mar jomamon odok chien 
ahinya e piny Luo kaka Siaya District? 
E dwe mar abiriyo, kod aboro higa, 1997, nee atimo resach e piny Siaya nyaka. Nairobi 
kapenjo ji gimomiyo mon ne A yud lowo ndalo ng'ado lowo. Nee abet kod grubc mar 
jo mopogore kapenjogi penjo, katajogo ma nee apenjo achiel, achiel. 
Nitie weche ariyo manee jogo owachona. Mokuongo, nyako ok nyal mi lowo nimar 
naythi ma nyako onyuolo ok en japiny kane mage. En japiny kawuon gi. Mar ariyo, 
nyako maduon'g ka otho, A nyal ike e dala gi nimar ongee kaka min mare biro yuage. 
Nyaka ike oko eka inyalo yuage kaka ng'atno ma, osee dhi tedo. Magi gin weche mance 
owuok e dhog jornadongo manee apenjo wachni. Nee ayudo ni joluo podi omako weche 
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mag sinohonoho, kod weche mag chira saidi. To gimaduon'g en ni weche gi medo mana 
duoko joluo chien. 
Ngima man e piny Luo, moloyo to piny mar Siaya, biro bedo matek ahinya ka wach mar 
lowo A olos maber, kendo ji oyudo kaka chano dak. Nee ayudo ni ng'ado owow okelo 
dhier man'gongo saidi e piny Luo. Joluo pod laro lowo manee osee ng'ad higni apar gi 
wiye mokadho. Podi ok gingeyo ni mano ema nee Wasungu dwaro; ni mondo 
jomaongee lowo obed angeny ma koro dhi tiyo e sembnigi nono. Mar ariyo, Joluo A 
ongeyo ni wasungu nee dwaro mondo oketh ngimagi machon mondo gibed ma onge 
konyruok kata matin. 
Gima duon'g en ni wasungu nee dwaro ketho ngima joratenge duto e piny Afrika, ok 
ngima Joluo kende. Kuom ranyisi, ka nee lweny mokuongo kod mar ariyo ovvuok, 
joratenge mangeny manee okedo matek saidi ka terno konyo ngima wasungu. E piny 
Kenya, jo Siaya bende nee okedo saidi, to gima nee giyudee to ongee. Resach manee 
atimo oyudo ni Siaya e district ma dhier duon'gie moloyo duto e piny Kenya. Ango 
momiyo jo-Siaya A nyal tiyo kaachiel mondo ogol dhier kuomgi? 
Gik ma kelo dhicr e piny Siaya gin ariyo; lowo kod ngima mar jornamon. Onego jo 
Siaya ogol chike maduoko ngima chien machalo sinohonoho kod chira mangeny 
maongo gima omiyo. Lowo osee bet maongee, koro chike man'geny onego rum mondo 
ji odag kod kwe; eka dongo nyalo chako biro matin tin. Bende jo Siaya oncgo ng'c ni 
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Serikali ok nyal neno ni gidhi marach, nimar serikali bende en mar joraten'g kaka gin. 
Miyo nyaka gikonyore mana kendgi. 
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